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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

ARABIA

PART 5

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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING
ARABIA—PART 5

CHAPTER I.—PERSIAN GULF

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE

EA 1011/1

No. 1

PERSIAN GULF: ANNUAL REVIEW FOR 1950

Sir R. Hay to Mr. Bevin. (Received 31st January)

(No. 10. Confidential) Bahrain,
Sir, 25th January, 1951.

I have the honour to transmit herewith a political review of events in the Persian Gulf during the year 1950.

2. I am sending copies of this despatch to Aden, Amman, Bagdad, Beirut, Basra, the British Middle East Office, Cairo, Damascus, the Air Officer Commanding, Iraq, Jeddah, Tehran, the United Kingdom High Commissions at Karachi and New Delhi, the Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf, the Group Captain, Persian Gulf, and the Political Agents at Bahrain, Kuwait and Muscat.

I have, &c.

W. R. HAY.

Enclosure in No. 1

Annual Report

General

The year has again been a quiet one, the outstanding event being the death of the Ruler of Kuwait in January. The Sheikdoms as a whole have been on good terms with each other and with their neighbours and there has been no internal political trouble. So far as is known, communism has very few sympathisers amongst the local population. Reports emanating from various Middle East countries that His Majesty's Government was about to bring into being a federation of the Gulf States gave rise to a certain amount of speculation but interest quickly subsided when it was discovered that they were without foundation. Saudi territorial claims have been the subject of much correspondence, but for the most part have caused little concern to the various rulers, who are anxious not to say anything which might displease Ibn Saud

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and trust that His Majesty's Government will protect their interests. The various oil companies continued to make steady progress. No new oilfield has been discovered, but two new sea-bed concessions have been signed. Civil aviation is assuming an ever-increasing importance in the Gulf. A new agreement has been signed with the Ruler of Kuwait and one with Sharjah is almost ready for signature. Some Lebanese airlines have been using the Kuwait airport without authorisation and regulations have been promulgated which will enable action to be taken against them. At the end of the last month of the year there were over a thousand operations at the Bahrain airport. This increase in activity is due partly to the private enterprise of Mr. Bosworth, whose Gulf Aviation Company is now running two scheduled services daily between Bahrain and Dhahran in addition to less frequent services to Dohah and Sharjah. In June two Air France aircraft crashed within forty-eight hours of each other while approaching the Bahrain airport with heavy loss of life. The results of the enquiry held into these accidents have not been published. There has been a great diminution of the number of cases reported of abduction into slavery on the Trucial Coast, possibly as a result of the seizure of the Sheikh of Dubai's launch in 1949. There have, however, been a few abductions from the Batinah coast in Muscat territory.

Bahrain

Sheikh Salman has enjoyed good health throughout the year and has good reason to be satisfied as his dispute with Qatar over Zubarah has been settled, at any rate for the time being, and he has obtained a substantial increase in royalties from the

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Bahrain Petroleum Company. At the beginning of the year he became increasingly restive over the Zubarah question and started to interfere with Petroleum Concession Limited's communications between Bahrain and Qatar. In March, however, the Political Agent succeeded in bringing about a settlement whereby the Ruler of Qatar agreed that Sheikh Salman could send his people to Zubarah without any passport or customs formalities and that the fort there should remain unoccupied, while Sheikh Salman agreed to reduce the transit duty on goods imported from Bahrain to Qatar. Since then Zubarah has ceased to be the main topic of Sheikh Salman's conversations with Government officials, but it is always possible that some quite small incident may re-open the dispute. In April the Bahrain Petroleum Company agreed to raise the royalty payable to the ruler on locally produced oil from Rs. 3/8 to Rs. 10 per ton. This means an increase in the Bahrain revenues of about Rs. 90 lakhs per year. As a result the ruler has turned his attention to development schemes and already has a rough plan prepared for extending the Manamah customs jetty for a distance of about four miles and constructing a wharf at which ocean-going steamers will be able to berth. He also is considering a project for pumping up fresh water from springs under the sea round the island and bringing an increased area under cultivation. Meanwhile he has engaged the services of a British agricultural expert to advise on improved methods of cultivation and on the growing of new crops. There has been much building in Bahrain during the year and a large hostel for students is nearing completion. The surface of some of the main roads has been greatly improved. In March a census was held and the total population was found to be 109,650. In October the Bahrain Government took over responsibility for the local quarantine administration. The Bahrain Petroleum Company's efforts to find oil at a lower horizon have failed, and there appears to be little prospect of their finding any fresh oil deposits until the sea-bed boundary between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia has been fixed and they are permitted to operate in the waters north of the islands.

Kuwait

Sheikh Ahmad bin Jabir, who had ruled Kuwait for twenty-nine years, died on 29th January after an illness lasting a little over a fortnight. His first cousin and

potential successor, Sheikh Abdullah as-Salim, was away from Kuwait during his illness and death and it was feared that the succession might be disputed and that there might be some local disturbances. Arrangements were accordingly made to deal with these should necessity arise, but fortunately when Sheikh Abdullah arrived in Kuwait on 31st January he was immediately greeted by all the ruling family and the people as ruler. He is about 58 years old and not in very good health. He is more modest than his predecessor and appears to be more sincerely devoted to the interests of his people. He started well, but is somewhat weak in dealing with his relations. One of the first questions to be taken up with him was the employment of British experts to improve the administration of Kuwait which is still run on very primitive lines. In October he agreed to employ British experts in his Finance and Customs Departments and efforts are now being made to find suitable candidates for these appointments. He paid visits to Riyadh in May and Bahrain in December. The boom period at Kuwait is over, but the ruler is expending his large revenues from royalties on health and education and the general development of the place, though all this is being done in a rather haphazard manner and it is probable that much money is being wasted. The Kuwait Oil Company are making steady progress and do not contemplate any rapid increase in their production for the present. The American Independent Oil Company have drilled four wells in the neutral zone without finding any oil. In these circumstances, no further effort has been made to reach an agreement with the Saudi Arabian Government regarding the future form of administration in the neutral zone. The dispute between the Kuwait Oil Company and the ruler over oil rights in the islands of Kubbar, Qaru and Umm al Maradim has not yet been referred to arbitration.

Qatar

Sheikh Ali, apart from long-standing arthritis in one of his knees, has remained in good health throughout the year. He is not a very satisfactory ruler owing to his lack of intelligence and stupidity but he tries his best and his relations with His Majesty's Government's officers have been excellent. He still refers all matters to his old father, the ex-ruler, Sheikh Abdullah, who, although he is paralysed down one side and can hardly live much longer, is as shrewd

and wily as ever. Allowances were fixed for the numerous members of the ruling family in March and, although this has pacified them to some extent, they are still clamouring for more. Group Captain Plant was appointed as adviser to the ruler in February. He has little or no previous experience of administration and has required a good deal of coaching, but some progress is now being made. A fairly satisfactory settlement has been reached with the ruler regarding the distribution of the royalties between the ruling family and the State, and a budget has been prepared. Quite a good road has been made along the sea-front at Dohah and a new warehouse has been built on the customs jetty. A site has been chosen and plans made for a school. The police under Mr. Cochrane have made great progress and are now about 140 strong. The local guards at most of the oil company's camps have been replaced by police and as a result there has been a decrease in the amount of pilfering. Petroleum Development (Qatar) Limited have made substantial progress in their building and production programmes and tankers are now calling regularly at Umm Said. The total payments made by the company to the ruler during the year amounted to about £400,000. Their dispute with the ruler over oil rights in the sea-bed was referred to arbitration in February. Each party was represented by a prominent K.C. and Lord Radcliffe was chosen as the third arbitrator. It was decided that the company were entitled to oil rights in the territorial waters, but not in the sea-bed beyond these waters. The Superior Oil Company of America, who, in conjunction with the Central Mining Investment Corporation Limited, had obtained a concession for the sea-bed rights subject to the result of these arbitration proceedings, have since then been carrying out surveys in the sea-bed but are not yet ready to start drilling.

Trucial Coast Sheikhdoms

In May the Kalbah regency was ended and Sheikh Hamad bin Said, who had reached man's estate, was recognised as ruler with full powers. Apart from this there have been no changes amongst the rulers, but Sheikh Sultan bin Saqr of Sharjah has remained ill in Bombay throughout the year and his brother, Muhammad, has been acting in his place. Sheikh Hamad bin Rashid, the Ruler of Umm al Qaiwain, was awarded an honorary M.B.E. in November. The only disturber of the peace has been

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Sheikh Muhammad of Bakhah, who made a descent on the village of Sha'am in Ras al Khaimah territory in July. H.M.S. *Flamingo* proceeded to the spot and peace was restored and a truce negotiated between the contending parties. Up to this time Sheikh Muhammad had always claimed to be independent and had been treated as such, but after the departure of H.M.S. *Flamingo* he claimed to be a subject of Muscat and sought refuge with the Wali of Khassab. As in theory Bakhah lies within Muscat territory his claim to be a subject of Muscat was not disputed and the Muscat authorities were requested to send him to Sharjah in order that some kind of settlement of the dispute might be reached. In the absence of the Sultan no action was taken and in November Sheikh Muhammad was reported to be about to make a further attack on the Ras al Khaimah faction in the village. H.M.S. *Flamingo* again proceeded to the spot and with the assistance of the Wali of Khassab Sheikh Muhammad was persuaded to come on board. He was taken to Sohar on the Batinah coast and handed over to the Sultan's Wali there. The Muscat authorities have now sent him back to Bakhah and say they are confident that he will give no further trouble. The Ruler of Ras al Khaimah is still claiming compensation for the damage inflicted at Sha'am in July and endeavours are being made to arrange for a settlement. Sultan bin Salim, the ex-Ruler of Ras al Khaimah, returned from his exile in April. Since then he has remained quiet and it is understood that he and his party have abandoned collecting tolls in the Wadi al Qaur. Negotiations are going on between him and Sheikh Saqr, the present Ruler of Ras al Khaimah, regarding his allowance, and if, as appears likely, no settlement is reached he may again give trouble. In April one of the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi's relations caused a disturbance at the oil company's camp at Ras Sadr and the attitude the ruler took over the incident was unsatisfactory. H.M.S. *Wild Goose* took the Political Officer, Trucial Coast, to Abu Dhabi, where he remonstrated with the ruler and a landing party visited the oil company's camp at Ras Sadr in order to reassure their employees. Since then, there has been no further trouble and relations between the company and the ruler have greatly improved. Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Limited continued drilling in Ras Sadr in Abu Dhabi territory and by the end of the year the well had reached over

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10,000 feet without any oil being found. At the end of the year the Superior Oil Company of America obtained a concession for the Abu Dhabi sea-bed after protracted negotiations. Their rights are dependent on the result of arbitration proceedings between Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Limited and the ruler. Similar proceedings are still pending between Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Limited and the Ruler of Dubai.

Muscat

The Sultan has remained in good health. In February he left Muscat for Dhofar and had not returned at the end of the year. During his absence it has been found difficult to obtain a decision from the Muscat Government on any matter of importance. In February he gave notice of termination of the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation of 1939 between him on the one hand and His Majesty's Government and the Government of India on the other, as a result of which it was due to expire on 11th February, 1951. At the end of November, however, in order to avoid having to return to Muscat for negotiations for a new treaty, he asked that the existing treaty should be prolonged and the manner of effecting this is at present under discussion with him. The situation in the Sultanate proper has remained peaceful throughout the year. In September there was a mutiny in the Muscat infantry which led to the discharge of about ninety Baluchis recruited from Pakistan territory. Arabs from the Batinah coast are being recruited in their place. There are no signs of the early demise of the Imam of Oman and the Sultan has taken no action to extend his influence over the tribes of the interior. One of the two leading tribal leaders, Sulaiman bin Himyar, has made two indirect approaches to the Residency for the recognition of his independence by His Majesty's Government, but no reply has as yet been given to him. There are signs that he and other tribal leaders are anxious that the interior should be opened up for exploration by an oil company. Gwador was the cause of some anxiety in the spring: Pakistani levies established a blockade round the Muscat enclave and there were rumours that the Mekran tribes intended to attack it. Representations were made to the Pakistan Government and since then there has been no further trouble. The Pakistanis announced their intention of making a further approach to the Sultan for the sale

to them of the enclave, but had not done so by the end of the year. Mr. Hartley, an agricultural officer in the employ of the Aden Government, completed a survey of the Batinah coast in January and the Sultan agreed to the immediate allotment of funds for the implementation of some of his recommendations, but up to the present little appears to have been done. Negotiations by a private company for the right to develop the Muscat fisheries have up to date been unfruitful. Sir Cyril Fox obtained a concession for the minerals in Dhofar other than oil and in the autumn visited the province with a representative of a firm he had persuaded to take an interest in their development. The representative had to leave after a very short stay owing to ill health, but was disappointed with what he saw in the short period he was there and it seems likely that the concession will prove abortive. Petroleum Concessions Limited have at last given notice of their intention to abandon their Dhofar concession and the Sultan has accepted this decision with pleasure. The company have carried out no exploration for oil in the Sultan's territories during the year and no progress has been made in the discussions with him regarding the exploration of the Huqf area on the southern coast of Arabia opposite Masirah island.

Foreign Relations

Relations between the Gulf States and their neighbours have continued to be friendly in spite of numerous disputes regarding boundaries and islands, and there have been no serious incidents. No real progress has been made in the settlement of any of the disputes, nor in the demarcation of frontiers, *e.g.*, those between Kuwait and Iraq and between Kuwait proper and the Kuwait-Saudi Neutral Zone. Negotiations with Saudi Arabia have been in progress over the land boundary with Qatar, the Trucial Sheikdoms and the Sultanate of Muscat and Oman, and over the ownership of a number of islands in the northern half of the Persian Gulf. Saudi tax collectors appeared in Abu Dhabi territory as usual in the spring and the Saudis have protested against survey operations by Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Limited in what has hitherto been regarded as Abu Dhabi territory. Markers erected by the Saudi Arabian Government on islands which are claimed by us for Kuwait and Bahrain were demolished by the Royal Navy during the summer. In the early part of the

year the Bahrain Petroleum Company and the Arabian American Oil Company carried out rival survey operations in the neighbourhood of the Bu Sa'afah shoal north of Bahrain, and an arrangement was eventually reached whereby both companies were restrained from carrying out any operations in this area pending the determination of the sea-bed boundary between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia. The Persians have taken no further positive action to assert their claims to Farsi and Tamb islands, but the agitation for the return to them of Bahrain has continued and so far as it is in their power to do so they treat Bahrain as if it were part of Persia. There have been complaints from the Iraq Government about the treatment of some of their nationals in Kuwait, but no serious incidents have been reported on the Kuwait-Iraq border. The litigation over the Kuwait ruling family's date gardens in Iraq drags on and no final settlement is in sight. Relations with India have been entirely satisfactory and the only possible cause of friction at present is the Bahrain Government's determination not to allow any more Indians to set up business in Manamah.

Indian representatives from Bagdad and Tehran, who under an informal arrangement are authorised to keep an eye on Indian interests in the Persian Gulf, have visited both Bahrain and Kuwait. Except for the trouble at Gwador, which has already been mentioned, there is little to be reported about relations with Pakistan. A Pakistani party assisted in the anti-locust operations on the Trucial Coast in the spring, but no Pakistani representative has visited any of the Gulf States. Relations with the Americans have been cordial. Mr. Hart and other American consular officers from Dhahran have paid frequent visits to Bahrain and occasional visits to Qatar, the Trucial Sheikdoms and Muscat, and the United States Consul at Basra has several times visited Kuwait. The United States continue to keep one ship permanently in the Gulf as the flagship of their Commander, Middle East Force, and the U.S.S. *Maury* carries out survey operations at the northern end of the Gulf each cold weather.

25th January, 1951.

EA 15310/18

No. 2

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR

Operations of Gulf Oil Company in Kuwait

Mr. Morrison to Sir O. Franks (Washington)

(No. 527. Confidential) *Foreign Office,*
Sir, *4th May, 1951.*

At the close of our conversation this afternoon on the Far East, the United States Ambassador asked for my sympathetic interest in regard to proposals by the Gulf Oil Company to form a separate corporation on the American registry to operate in Kuwait. He said that he understood that there were legal difficulties about this but that it was a matter of some importance as it would result in the company deriving

certain taxation benefits which would make their products in this somewhat low-grade field more competitive in price. He did not ask for an immediate response and I promised to take note of what he had said.

I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Political Resident at Bahrain, the Head of the British Middle East Office and His Majesty's Political Agent at Kuwait.

I am, &c.

HERBERT MORRISON.

EA 15310/15

No. 3

PROPOSED OPERATIONS OF THE GULF OIL COMPANY IN KUWAIT

To Sir O. Franks (Washington)

(No. 1885) *Foreign Office,*
(Telegraphic) *7th May, 1951.*

Your telegram No. 1345: Kuwait Oil Company.

The statement reported in your second sentence is misleading. At the moment Gulf and Anglo-Iranian Oil Company have not agreed how to proceed although we hope

to discuss further with both companies next week. The question of the nationality of the concessionary company has been mentioned in discussion with Gulf but it is quite incorrect to suggest that we maintain that the position under the Political Agreement was "an unalterable tenet of His Majesty's Government's policy."

2. Articles 1 and 2 of the Political Agreement dated 5th March, 1934, between His Majesty's Government and the Kuwait Oil Company provide that the company or any transferee company shall be and remain a British company, that the obligations and benefits of the concession shall not be transferred to any other company without the prior consent of His Majesty's Government, and that they shall not be transferred to any company in which more than 50 per cent. of the capital and voting power is controlled by persons other than British subjects.

3. It is true that in 1934 we stipulated that the Oil Concession in Kuwait should be held by a British company (as we had a right to do in accordance with the undertaking given by the Ruler in 1913 that he would never grant an oil concession to anyone except a person nominated by the British Government). We have, however, since departed from this attitude and should no longer wish to insist on this condition before approving a concession. Aminoil, who hold the concession from the Ruler of Kuwait for his share of the Neutral Zone, are a wholly American company. Articles 2 and 3 of their Political Agreement with His Majesty's Government, dated 20th June, 1948, provide that the company or any transferee company shall be and remain an American company incorporated in the United States or a British company incorporated in the British Empire and that the obligations and benefits of the concession shall not be trans-

ferred to any company not so registered or incorporated. Corresponding articles in the Political Agreements signed in 1949 and 1950 with the Superior Oil Company of America in respect of the Qatar, Dubai and Abu Dhabi sea-bed concessions are similar except that they require that no more than 49 per cent. of the capital or voting power in any company formed to operate these concessions shall be controlled by persons other than British subjects or United States citizens. This information is no doubt available to the State Department.

4. While reserving His Majesty's Government's right to give or withhold consent to any transfer or to any assignment of benefits under the Commercial Agreement, we are fully prepared if necessary to waive the provisions of the Political Agreement with the Kuwait Oil Company in so far as they at present entirely preclude an American company from operating. We have not yet been asked to do so but we regard this as entirely incidental to the main problem involved, which is to find a solution which will be satisfactory to both companies, the Ruler and His Majesty's Government.

5. The United States Ambassador saw me on 4th May and asked for my sympathetic interest in regard to the Gulf proposals. I promised to take note of what he said. We propose to answer any further approach from the United States Ambassador which is made in the terms indicated in your telegram under reference on the foregoing lines and to inform him that we are ready to enter into discussions with the companies at an early date. We regard it as important that the Americans should be under no misapprehension about the point dealt with in this telegram and we should therefore be glad if you will explain our attitude to the State Department.

correspondence to become public and promised to treat it as secret.

2. I am sending copies of this despatch to Tehran and Washington.

I have, &c.

(For W. R. HAY),
MARTIN LEQUESNE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 4

Sir R. Hay to His Highness Shaikh Sir
Salman bin Hamad Al Khalifah

Bahrain,

After compliments: 9th July, 1951.

In referring to correspondence ending with my letter of 26th June, 1951, I have the honour to address Your Highness as follows on the subject of the guarantee requested by you of protection against external aggression and protection of your subjects' interests in foreign countries:—

I have been authorised to inform Your Highness that on the basis of the existing treaties and engagements His Majesty's Government regard your State as being under their protection which means that they accept responsibility to protect your State against any external aggression in the same manner as any British territory. They also regard your subjects as British Protected

Persons and will protect their interests in foreign countries to the same extent as they do those of their own nationals.

I have, &c.

R. HAY.

Enclosure 2 in No. 4

To His Excellency the Political Resident,
Persian Gulf, Bahrain

After compliments:

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 9th July, 1951. I note that on the basis of the existing treaties and engagements His Majesty's Government regard my State as being under their protection, which means that they accept responsibility to protect it against any external aggression in the same manner as any British Territory and that they also regard my subjects as British Protected Persons and will protect their interests in foreign countries to the same extent as they do those of their own nationals. I am very grateful for this, and on my part I take this opportunity of assuring His Majesty's Government that I and my successors will always faithfully observe all existing engagements.

I have, &c.

SALMAN BIN HAMAD AL KHALIFAH.

EA 1057/4

No. 4

ANGLO-BAHRAINI RELATIONS

Sir R. Hay to Mr. Morrison. (Received 17th July)

(No. 89. Secret)

Sir,

Bahrain,

10th July, 1951.

I have the honour to forward herewith a copy of the letter which I delivered personally to the Ruler of Bahrain on 9th July conveying an assurance of protection against aggression in accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram No. 393 of 5th July, and a translation of the

Ruler's reply. On receipt of the letter the Ruler expressed his heart-felt thanks to His Majesty's Government for the assurance together with an appreciation of the assistance always afforded him in the past and many prayers that the happy relations which exist between Great Britain and Bahrain might continue for ever. He said he fully realised the undesirability of allowing the

APPENDIX

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

EA 1012/1

No. 5

LEADING PERSONALITIES IN THE PERSIAN GULF

Mr. Pelly to Mr. Attlee. (Received 28th August)

(No. 111. Secret) Bahrain,
Sir, 25th August, 1951.

I have the honour to enclose herewith a report on the leading personalities in the Persian Gulf in 1951.

2. I am sending copies of this report to His Majesty's representatives in Amman, Bagdad, Beirut, Cairo, Damascus, Jedda, Tehran and Washington, to Sir Thomas Rapp, to the United Kingdom High Commissioners in Karachi and New Delhi and the Deputy United Kingdom High Commissioner, Bombay, to the Governor of Aden, to the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, the Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf, the Air Officer Commanding, Iraq and the Senior Royal Air Officer, Persian Gulf, and to His Majesty's Consuls-General Basra and Khorramshahr.

I have, &c.
C. J. PELLY.

Enclosure in No. 5

Leading Personalities in the Persian Gulf, 1951

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6. Abdullah bin Salim, Shaikh, C.I.E.
7. Abdur Razzaq Razzuqi, Khan Bahadur.
8. Dickson, Lieutenant-Colonel H. R. P., C.I.E.
9. Fahad bin Salim, Shaikh.

10. Izzat Jafar.
11. Jabir bin Ahmad, Shaikh.
12. Jordan, Mr. L. T.
13. MacPherson, Mr. J.
14. Mohammad bin Ahmad, Shaikh.
15. Nufi Yusuf al Nufi.
16. Salim bin Ali, Shaikh.
17. Subah bin Ahmad, Shaikh.
18. Subah bin Nasir, Shaikh.
19. Subah bin Salim, Shaikh.
20. Yusuf bin Ahmad al Ghanim.

Muscat

1. Ahmad bin Ibrahim, Saiyid.
2. Bhacker, Abdul Latif, Haji.
3. Boulter, Lieutenant-Colonel H. G.
4. Dykestra, Reverend Dirk.
5. Gokaldass, Rai Bahadur.
6. Ismail Khalili al Rassassi.
7. Mohammad bin Abdullah al Khalili.
8. Mohammad bin Ahmad.
9. Said bin Taimur, Saiyid, Sultan of Muscat.
10. Saif bin Ahmed bin Hamid al Rashidi.
11. Salih bin Isa al Harthi.
12. Shahrab bin Faisal, Al Saiyid.
13. Sulaiman bin Hamyar al Nabhani, Shaikh.
14. Taimur bin Faisal, Saiyid.
15. Tarik bin Taimur, Saiyid.
16. Thoms, Dr. Wells.
17. Woods-Ballard, Lieutenant-Colonel Basil, C.I.E., M.B.E.
18. Wynne, Mr. Martin Gaymour, M.B.E.

Qatar

1. Abdullah bin Darwish.
2. Abdullah bin Qasim al Thani, His Excellency Shaikh.
3. Abdur Rahman bin Darwish.
4. Ali bin Abdulla al Thani, His Excellency Shaikh.
5. Ali bin Ahmad al Ansari.
6. Jasim bin Darwish.
7. Mohammad al Mani.
8. Mohammad bin Uthman.
9. Salih al Mani.

Trucial Coast

1. Ahmad bin Rashid al Mua'lla, M.B.E., Shaikh.
2. Hazza' bin Sultan.
3. Juma bin Maktum, Shaikh.
4. Khalid bin Ahmad bin Sultan al Qasimi, Shaikh.
5. Khalid bin Sultan.
6. Mohammad bin Hamad ash-Sharqi.
7. Mohammad bin Saqr.
8. Rashid bin Humaid, Shaikh.
9. Rashid bin Sai'd bin Maktum, Shaikh.
10. Said bin Maktum, C.B.E., Shaikh.
11. Saqr bin Mohammad bin Salim, Shaikh.
12. Saqr bin Sultan bin Salim al Qasimi.
13. Saqr bin Sultan bin Saqr al Qasimi, Shaikh.
14. Shakhbut bin Sultan bin Zayid, Shaikh.
15. Sultan bin Salim al Qasimi.
16. Zayid bin Sultan.

BAHRAIN

1. Abdul Aziz al Qusaibi, Khan Bahadur

Born in 1877. The eldest of four brothers, two of whom are one-eyed like Abdul Aziz himself so that they have only five eyes between them. They are Nejdīs of plebeian origin and are said to have started life as coffee-shop boys, and their name suggests that one of their forebears was a butcher. During the first Great War, they acted as Ibn Saud's agents in Bahrain and from this activity made their fortune. They also traded in pearls and invested much of their money in property in Bahrain. Hasa and Qatif, where they are big land-owners. Until 1941 they were in partnership, but in that year, after bitter quarrels, they separated and each is now independent of the others. Abdul Aziz is a pleasant intelligent little man, never physically strong. When excited he is apt to get hysterical. He was one of the chief supporters of Major Daly's diving reforms and has been of great help to the Government on many occasions. He is not Ibn Saud's official agent, of course, but he often acts most usefully as if he were. He was made a Khan Bahadur in 1921.

2. Abdullah bin Hamad, Shaikh

Brother of the Ruler (No. 12). Born in 1911. Very short-sighted and wears thick glasses. Abdullah is very ambitious and undoubtedly had hopes of succeeding his father. He has always been keen on learning and is the only one of the brothers who speaks any English. He is sensible, though rather slow-witted, careful over money and fairly progressive. For several years he was a magistrate on the Bahrain Court, but he retired from it twice in a huff because his father refused him something he wanted. He walked out a third time and then to his disgust his father appointed Shaikh Daij (No. 7) in his place. When Abdullah wished to return he was not re-appointed.

Abdullah and Daij accompanied Shaikh Hamad to England and the next year Abdullah spent six months living with a tutor in Oxford learning English. When he came back he was full of Western ideas, but little of this has survived except the furniture and European sanitation in his house. Shaikh Salman appointed him president of the Muharraq municipality, a post which Shaikh Salman had himself held before he succeeded. Besides his one trip to Europe, Abdullah has travelled several times in India. He is more conversant with European ways than any of his brothers. Physically he is not very strong.

3. Abdullah bin Isa al Khalifah, Shaikh

Second brother of the late Shaikh Hamad and uncle of the present Shaikh of Bahrain. Born about 1883. Shaikh Abdullah is the cleverest, wickedest, most entertaining and most powerful member of the Khalifah family. His education is very slight. He can read but can scarcely write, and often laments the lack of educational facilities in his younger days. He is very intelligent, with a sharp sense of humour; he has tact, political ability and an even temper, though he can be fierce when really roused. He is a skilful negotiator and arbitrator.

Shaikh Abdullah has travelled in India and the Near East and has visited England twice, once in 1919 and again in 1923 with Shaikh Hamad, who took him because he was afraid to leave him on his own in Bahrain.

Shaikh Abdullah was his father's favourite and the son of Shaikh Isa's last wife, a powerful old lady who is still alive. Although his elder brother Shaikh Hamad had been appointed heir apparent, Shaikh Abdullah was for many years the most powerful man in Bahrain. His mother bitterly resented her son not having been heir apparent.

Shaikh Abdullah is always in debt, but cheerfully so, and is not mean. Most of his money is spent on sexual pleasures, for which he is notorious throughout the Gulf. His tastes are catholic and he does not trouble to hide his affairs. He has had countless wives and male and female attachments. He is feared and disliked by the Shia Baharinah on account of the wild doings of his earlier life. His servants used to carry off Baharinah women for their master. Respectable Arabs dislike and mistrust him. He is very popular with a section of the younger Shaikhs, who prefer him to Shaikh Salman.

Outwardly Shaikh Abdullah had always supported the Government of his brother, late Shaikh Hamad, and has professed to be pro-British because Bahrain must be dependent, though he would himself prefer the country to be entirely independent. Whenever there has been political trouble, there have been rumours that Shaikh Abdullah was behind it, but this has never been proved.

Shaikh Abdullah is more energetic than most of the younger members of the family. He used to be a good horseman and is fond of hawking and shooting. He is careful about his health, and in spite of his unrestrained lasciviousness he is rarely ill.

Shaikh Abdullah is the chairman of Manamah Municipal Council and attends the Bahrain Appellate Court as a judge. He is by far the most important politically of the ruling family.

4. Abdur Rahman al Qusaibi

Brother of Abdul Aziz (No. 1). Born in 1892. Formerly Victor Rosenthal's pearl-broker. An intelligent and sophisticated man. Has travelled much in the East and in Europe and was appointed honorary Wazir of Saudi Arabia by Ibn Saud in 1951. He dresses in European style and stays in the Savoy Hotel when in London. He often has big schemes which do not come off, but this is not the case of the large cinema which he has just opened in Manamah. In intelligence and outlook he is far in advance of the ordinary Bahrain merchant and is able to take an objective view of his own people and the "Arab Cause," at least when talking to a non-Arab. He is a good and amusing talker.

5. Belgrave, Mr. C. Dalrymple, C.B.E.

(See Who's Who.) Born in 1894. Adviser to the Bahrain Government. Looks younger than his age. Has served the Bahrain Government since 1926. Has the confidence of the Shaikh and the senior members of the Ruling Family—so far as any Arab gives confidence, particularly to a Christian. Though conservative in outlook and suspicious of innovation Mr. Belgrave has to his credit a series of performances and considerable progress in the Bahrain administration during his long reign. His amiability of character and considerable charm of manner tend to conceal his almost oriental ability to avoid persuasion into any line of action of which he does not approve. His occasionally indefinite and halting manner is not an indication of lack of clarity of mind, but his method of saying "No" when he might feel it awkward to be definite about it.

These characteristics are, however, only incidental to the enthusiasm, energy and ability with which Mr. Belgrave has conducted the affairs of Bahrain for so many years and which have resulted in the island's administration becoming a model for the Middle East. In Bahrain the large sums spent on efficient public services, the fair allocation of the oil revenues amongst the ruling family, the comparatively efficient and honest civil service and police force, the sound budgeting and the general air of order and contentment—by marked contrast with other Middle Eastern countries—may all be attributed in very large measure to the efforts of Mr. Belgrave.

He is ably assisted by his wife, who devotes much of her time to female education in the islands. They have one son, at present studying at the London School of Economics. The Ruler is thought to be attracted by the idea of his succeeding his father as Adviser—but he as yet does not show signs of possessing the required ability.

6. Brown, Mr. Russell

General Manager and Chief Local Representative of the Bahrain Petroleum Company. Has been in Bahrain employed by the Oil Company for over 10 years. Is a "refinery man" and was Refinery Manager before he became General Manager. His father is a newspaper proprietor and was the Governor of the State of Michigan. He broke away from the family business and, in the recurrent American tradition, did odd jobs—including playing a saxophone in a jazz band—while attending night classes to prepare himself for work in the oil business. He was first hired by Mr. Max Thornburgh (No. 16) and worked for some years in Texas, New Mexico and Venezuela in companies of the Standard Oil group. Although an oil man through and through, Mr. Brown, as well as an engaging personality, has wider interests in things and people and though he never forgets his main business in life he is able to appreciate the view outside it. He has the usual American prejudices against the British, but his long experience of working with them gives him a balanced view and he is co-operative. He is married and has a son and a daughter. He and his family are generally popular.

Made a Vice-President of his company in May 1951. This gives him considerably enhanced powers and reduces the number of references to the company board in New York.

7. Daij bin Hamad, Shaikh

Brother of the Ruler. Born in 1915. A fat, amiable and good-natured young man, who was his father's favourite son. He is practically illiterate, but quite intelligent. He accompanied his father on both his visits to England. He acquired a good deal of money and property from his father, for which reason most of his brothers dislike him. He is mentally energetic though physically slothful, and is much addicted to women. He is sometimes generous. He sits in the Joint Court with the Assistant Political Agent. At times when the local situation becomes difficult, such as when attacks on the Jews threatened, has showed a remarkable resolution in taking security precautions, and it was he who kept on urging his brother, the Ruler, to deal with matters firmly.

8. Hussain bin Ali Yatim

Born in 1914. The son of a small trader at Bahrain of Sunni Persian origin. Hussain Yatim when quite young, was taken up by Major Holmes, a concession hunter through whom the Bahrain Oil Concession was arranged, and, after some years at the American Mission School, was sent to England to be educated. He was at Brighton Grammar School for about three years, usually spending his holidays at Major Holmes's house in Essex. He did well at school.

When he returned to Bahrain he was employed by Major Holmes as interpreter and secretary. He had inherited some money and property from his father and, in addition, had various commercial interests. After working for Major Holmes he was employed by the Bahrain Petroleum Company as interpreter and in various other jobs. Meanwhile he developed his own business, importing goods from America, starting an ice factory and a petrol-filling station for the Oil Company. More recently he has started a water distilling plant, has begun a trade in motor

launches and become a director of the Gulf Aviation Company. He went to England again some years after he had left school, and to America with Shaikh Mohammad bin Isa.

Hussain Yatim married the daughter of Yusuf Lutfally Khunji, who was at one time a wealthy piece-goods merchant in Manchester. The girl was brought up in England, studying medical work. Her father eventually lost most of his money and returned to Persia. Hussain and his wife live in European style.

Hussain Yatim is the only young man in Bahrain who was educated in England. It is difficult to say whether the experiment has been a success. Naturally, from the point of view of commerce his education, his experience in England, his knowledge of European people, their ways and their business methods, have been of great use; but these things have given him a feeling of superiority over his fellow countrymen and of dissatisfaction with social conditions. He is clever and versatile, but not very stable. He is continually launching experiments of which he tires before there has been time to judge the results.

9. Khalifah bin Mohammad, Shaikh

Son of Shaikh Mohammad bin Isa al Khalifah (No. 11). Born about 1913. Superintendent of the Bahrain Police, educated at Beirut and the Nasik Police School. He speaks English well and associates with Europeans more than any member of the family. He is fairly intelligent, enterprising and ambitious, and is on bad terms with a good many of the younger Al Khalifah, who are very jealous of him. He is not as soft as most of his young cousins, but he is putting on weight rapidly, which makes him less and less energetic. He is inclined to regard his services, for which he is well paid, as the conferring of a very great favour on the State. He has good manners, lives in semi-European style, is pleasant to deal with and has a sense of humour. He is interested in modern inventions such as cars, speed-boats, wireless and cameras. He is extravagant and in debt, but he does not use his official position to his own advantage. He is not popular with the general public, who regard him as ostentatious and arrogant. In 1948 he visited the United Kingdom as a guest of the British Council.

Married a third wife, aged 16, in May 1951.

10. Lermite, Mr. Basil H., M.B.E.

Born in 1901. Has worked for Petroleum Concessions, Limited, in the Persian Gulf for about 12 years and became Persian Gulf Manager of the Company in July 1947. He is regarded, with considerable justification, as an authority on the concession areas held by his company including the difficult ones in Oman and Muscat. He was indeed once described as "the silent repository of unrivalled knowledge of Qatar and the Trucial Coast Shaikhdoms." This is going too far. Silent Mr. Lermite certainly is, particularly on official occasions and when transacting business. His knowledge of the Trucial Coast is not, however, "unrivalled" and has certainly no profundity about it. He is in fact an efficient oil company liaison officer for work amongst the more barbarous Arabs and has done his company exceedingly well for many years. He knows very little Arabic and conducts all his work through and relies for most of his information on interpreters.

His outlook is limited and despite long years of dealing with semi-independent Shaikhs and with the political authorities, he seems unable to appreciate the political implications of the activities of his company and that they should be integrated with Government policy. The result is that he is inclined to let these activities develop for months on independent lines and, when they are interrupted by

difficulties with local people, to demand that His Majesty's Government should interfere and, as it were with the wave of a magic wand, dissipate difficulties which would never have arisen if they had been consulted in the first place. It is said that he keeps too many of the reins of office in his own hands.

He was made M.B.E. in the New Year's Honours 1948.

11. Mohammad bin Isa al Khalifah, Shaikh

Eldest surviving son of Shaikh Isa and uncle of the present Ruler. Born about 1881. His mother, who is still alive, but mental, was of the Bin Ali family. In appearance Shaikh Mohammad is thin and upright. He has a grey beard, sometimes dyed black, and long hair in the Bedouin style which is usually hidden under a head dress. He is very short-sighted, and nearly blind without his glasses. His dazzling smile reveals a complete set, top and bottom of gold teeth.

Shaikh Mohammad's manner is rather stiff. He is the most travelled of all the family, and has visited most parts of the world. He is fairly well educated, something of a poet, and excessively proud of what he considers his superior ability in drafting important letters, proclamations, &c. He is politically-minded, autocratic, and intensely proud of his family's achievements. He is not anti-British, but is critical of many things the British do and does not hesitate to voice his opinions. He is intolerant of Shias and actively dislikes the Baharinah. He is extremely mean and always complaining of his debts. He is generous, however, to his own large family, which used to be better disciplined than others of the Khalifah. He is more moral than his relations and confines himself to women. He has had a good many wives.

Shaikh Mohammad is fussy, inclined to suspect that he is being slighted, and too fond of letting his personal interests influence, his opinions on public matters. He is open to argument, but has a quick temper. He was very loyal to the late Shaikh Hamad, though the latter was usually bored by him and could not appreciate his liking for foreign travel. Shaikh Mohammad "enjoys" ill-health, which is partly genuine and partly assumed. Before going on his travels, which used to be an annual event, he invariably developed medical reasons necessitating a change of air.

Shaikh Mohammad fills no public office and is not relied upon by the Ruler in the same way as is his brother, Shaikh Abdullah bin Isa.

12. Salman, His Highness Shaikh, K.C.I.E.

The present Ruler of Bahrain. Born about 1894, eldest son of the late Ruler, Shaikh Hamad bin Isa. Has some education and a slight knowledge of the geography and history of the neighbouring countries. Has visited India and Egypt, but has never been in Europe. Appointed successor by his father in a secret document in 1940 and elected Ruler by his immediate relations when his father died in February 1942.

In disposition, cautious, careful over money, in some directions progressive but in other ways old-fashioned. His private life is outwardly respectable and he holds the view that people's behaviour in the privacy of their houses is no concern of anybody. He has never been in debt, even before he inherited his father's wealth. His generosity towards his relatives is considered with a view to keeping them in subservience. He is considerably older than his seven brothers, none of whom is particularly fond of him.

Shaikh Salman has at present two wives, the senior one from the Khalid branch of the family. Her father and other relations were involved in

murderous attacks on Baharinah villages about 20 years ago and were later suspected of complicity in the attempt to assassinate Shaikh Salman's father. Some of this family were exiled for several years. The senior wife, though childless, has a certain amount of influence over Shaikh Salman and she is not friendly towards the British. The second wife mother of three sons and a daughter, is of the family of Khalifah bin Hamad of Jesra, politically a non-entity.

The settlement by the Political Agent in 1950 of his dispute with the Ruler of Qatar over Zubarah removed a cancer which ever since his accession had embittered his relations with His Majesty's Government and he has since been much more amenable.

13. Skinner, Mr. E. A.

An old employee of the Standard Oil Company of California, Mr. Skinner was part of the spear-head of the American oilmen's invasion of the Persian Gulf and worked in the thirties with the Bahrain Petroleum Company when it started exploration and the earliest production. He is now a vice-president of the company, resident in Bahrain near Manamah in the finest and most modern air-conditioned house on the island. His job is liaison and political work of which he largely relieves the chief local representative; it is not heavy, and the fact that he has a weak heart and is an old and valued member of the company seem to have been considerations in giving it to him. He hails originally from the Southern States as does his very charming wife, and his quiet manner and experience of men and things and oil make him agreeable and satisfactory to deal with. He seems to have pro-British sympathies and sent his only son to school at Sherborne, though the young man, in the American way, is now following in his father's footsteps working on a rig in Saudi Arabia.

14. Smith, Mr. G. W. R., M.B.E.

Born in 1904. Director of Customs, Bahrain Government. Previously an employee in the shipping firm of Gray Mackenzie and Company. Mr. Smith was taken into employment by the Bahrain Government in 1943. He is a Scot and probably merits the usual adjective "shrewd." In any case he runs the most money-making department (*i.e.*, the Customs) of the Bahrain Government and the most vital service—food supplies—with a minimum of fuss and a quiet competence. His judgment of local affairs as well as his work is limited, but sensible as far as it goes. He is well thought of by the Shaikh and likely to retain his post as long as he wants to—which will probably be to the end of his working life in the East. Will never set Manamah harbour on fire, but on the other hand could always be entrusted to put out any minor conflagration. Takes himself too seriously.

15. Storm, Dr. W. H.

Dr. Storm has been working in the American Mission of the Dutch Reformed Church, whose headquarters in the Gulf are at Bahrain, since about 1930. Since 1943 he has been in Bahrain itself, and before that was stationed at Muscat and Kuwait. He is highly regarded for his work by the local people and specialises in eye operations. He is not interested in politics and is agreeable to deal with. He married the present Mrs. Storm six years ago, his previous wife having died. She had worked as a missionary in China. She is a woman of between 40 and 50, a trained nurse, and helps her husband in his work and is also thought very well of by the locals.

16. Thornburgh, Mr. Max Weston

Born in 1892. An American citizen. At one time vice-president of the California Texas Oil Company, and as such resident for some time at Bahrain before the last war. During the last war was petroleum adviser to the United States State Department. While he was at Bahrain the late Shaikh Hamad gave him a small desert island off the north-west corner of the main island. He sunk a well in it and planted a garden. He has now built himself a house and office and resides there occasionally with his wife and son. A man of considerable gifts of intellect, character, and personality. He has employed them in work of a doubtful and sometimes even of a sinister nature. He used his knowledge of the oil business to advise, for a considerable fee, the Venezuelan Government in its negotiations with the oil companies in that country as to the best terms to be obtained in revising their concessions. After that, and a few other similar performances, it was not long before some oil companies found it good business to retain Mr. Thornburgh as "Consultant"; Shell for example paid and probably still pay him £5,000 a year. He got himself appointed as president of Overseas Consultants Incorporated, the company charged by the State Department, with the implementation of the five-year plan in Persia. His remuneration for this work is not known, but when, as a result of speculation and corruption in Persian Government circles, the funds for the plan and the president's salary began after five years fruitless expenditure to be short he publicly blamed the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company for this, saying that if they had paid their "just" dues to the Persian Government all would have been well. He had so far represented himself as the idealistic champion of the oppressed in Persia, and indeed (as he frequently said) of all humanity, to whom the incidental remuneration for his advice as to how to end their miseries was a matter of small moment. His actions in advising the Persian Government during its moves to expropriate the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in the spring of 1951 made no attempt to sustain this difficult rôle. He told them that he did not advise expropriation, but he went to great lengths to show them how to expropriate if they wanted to take such action. He was patently hostile to the British for whom in the past he had expressed friendship and admiration.

17. Yusuf Fakhroo

Born about 1880. A wealthy Holi merchant and boat owner of Muharrag who became a Bahrain subject some years ago. A large, stout man, he never looks one straight in the face, but in conversation assumes a bluff manner. He is the head of a large family of no social status with connexions in Qatar and Persia. By lending money to Shaikh bin Isa and other members of the Ruling Family, he has acquired a strong influence with some of the Al Khalifah. The latter, however, do not like him.

Twenty years ago he was involved in certain gun-running incidents and there is reason to suppose that he was also interested in slave traffic. At one time he sat on every council and mejlis, wielding great authority in public life, but four years ago, owing to his behaviour during some local political trouble, he was dismissed by the late Shaikh Hamad from all public bodies. His son Ahmad has taken his place on the municipal council.

He was for many years forbidden to appear at the Agency, but this ban was afterwards lifted. He is still one of the richest and most powerful men in Bahrain. He has an independent outlook and is not at all inclined to conceal his opinions, which he expresses roughly, no matter how offensive they may be to his hearers. He is in very poor health and not likely to live long.

KUWAIT**The Ruling Family of Kuwait (Al Subah)**

The Ruling Family of Kuwait is divided into two factions with an intervener. The two factions are the descendants of Jabir, father of the last and Salim, father of the present Ruler. The intervener is Abdullah Mubarak uncle of both the last and the present Ruler. The succession in Kuwait went from Jabir to Salim (both sons of the "great" Mubarak) then to Ahmad son of Jabir and now Abdullah son of Salim. Abdullah Mubarak, who is the only surviving son of the "great" Mubarak of whom the last two rulers have been grandsons, thinks that his turn should come next. With the exception mentioned in (1) below the two factions of the Subah family are not on good terms.

It seems to be axiomatic that the Jabir faction should, like Abdullah Mubarak, be on good terms with the Saudi Ruling Family and the Salim faction to be on bad terms with them.

Only members of the Ruling Family have the style of Shaikh.

1. Abdullah bin Ahmad, Shaikh

Born 1905. Eldest son of the late Ruler Ahmad bin Jabir. His mother was of the 'Al Ghanim family of leading local merchants. He is darkish, very fat and suffers from diabetes. He assists Abdullah Mubarak in the security office and is his substitute there. He is uneducated, summary in the execution of his duties (because he has not outgrown a tribal conception of public administration) and is not an easy conversationalist. He has never left the State and has acquired no Western frills. He is the only member of the Ruling family apart from the Ruler and possibly Abdullah Jabir who does not run up debts. He is also very religious. As a result he has a very high local reputation and next to the Ruler commands greater respect in Kuwait than any other member of the Ruling Family. The present Ruler has raised him to third place in the local order of precedence and he must now be regarded as a possible candidate for the succession. He is on very friendly terms with Shaikh Abdullah Mubarak and, as he has little push, would doubtless be quite happy under him.

2. Abdul'ah bin Jabir, Shaikh

Born in 1902 and descended from a brother of the "great" Mubarak. His father Jabir was not the ruler of that name. Is in charge of the administration of justice (in which he is assisted by his son Jabir, born 1930, educated for a few years at Victoria College, Alexandria), Department of Education and the Department of Auqaf. He is also in charge of a recently formed department for the registration of titles to land and is reported to have enriched himself on the proceeds. Rich but careful with his money and does not run up debts. In age and outlook he is closer to the Ruler than any other member of the Ruling Family, and possibly the only member of the family the Rulers turn to for advice. He is somewhat obstinate and conservative in his general outlook but his administration of the Education Department is on the whole enlightened. Almost alone among the Shaikhs he takes an interest in gardening. Has two other sons, Subah born 1932 and Mubarak born in 1934, at the American University, Beirut.

3. Abdullah ibn Khaza'al

Born about 1910. A son of the late Shaikh Khaza'al of Muhammarah (now Khurramshahr). Since the death of his eldest brother Chasib he claims to be the head of the family. In 1946 he led

an abortive attack on Khurramshahr from Iraq territory and fled to Kuwait. His deportation was under consideration for some time but he was eventually allowed to settle in Kuwait where the Kuwait Oil Company gave him employment. He is unreliable and excitable and would renew his intrigues in Khuzistan if given the least opportunity.

4. Abdullah bin Mubarak, Shaikh

Born 1910. Only surviving son of the "great" Mubarak by a Georgian slave and uncle to the present Ruler. As a result of a scare (high blood pressure and albumenaria) he went to the Lebanon for medical treatment in late 1950 and returned early in 1951 reassured and perceptibly thinner. Seems to have overcome the common local failing of eating too much. Reputed to be a heavy drinker in private. He is dashing and authoritative and makes himself feared. Is on very good terms with the Ruling family of Saudi Arabia whence he doubtless gets his spendthrift habits and his self-importance. He is always in debt but has the excuse that unlike other members of the ruling family, he has no source of income other than the civil list. He is childish and his life is really made up of play-acting various romantic roles (the picture-book Shaikh, the disconsolate mourner and so on). He has little education and speaks with a very slight lisp. He has a marked taste for sycophants by whom he is surrounded. He is co-operative except in any matter that he thinks impinges on his personal dignity. In minor administrative matters he tends to be an embarrassment because he gives decisions in matters that are not his concern and is affronted if challenged.

The Jabir faction laugh at him. The Salim faction hate him. But he is not without support in the town and is very friendly with Shaikh Subah bin Nasir.

The Ruler has given him second place in the order of precedence and the succession should normally fall to him. He realises that both factions of the Subah family are against him and relies on the support of His Majesty's Government. He proclaims his pro-British sentiments in which he is doubtless sincere but he promises to make a very unstable ruler.

He is married but has no children.

5. Abdullah bin Mullah Saleh, M.B.E.

Born 1906. Awarded M.B.E. 1947. Succeeded his father as Secretary to the late Ruler in 1938 and managed to retain the office under the present Ruler. Is intelligent and speaks good English.

The strength of Abdullah Mullah's position is that everyone in the town hates him. For that reason he is invaluable to the Ruler who is thus assured that he is not in league with any possible usurper. The present Ruler hated Abdullah Mullah during his predecessor's reign and tried to oust him then but when he became Ruler himself was wise enough to see his value.

Abdullah Mullah is the Ruler's representative with the Kuwait Oil Company and with Aminoil so that he has an unrivalled knowledge of and experience in handling oil company matters. He has also much political experience. He protests that he is pro-British and probably is. From the point of view of His Majesty's Government there might be a very much worse State Secretary in Kuwait than Abdullah Mullah.

His chief fault is that he uses his official position to further his private aims. He grew up in a Kuwait that was poor and he has not been able to resist the temptation to get rich quick. He has burnt his fingers and landed himself with a tobacco company that does not pay, an electric light company that is grossly inefficient and various other commercial activities that left him with a huge overdraft at the bank. He seems however to have retrieved his

position and to be now on a firmer financial footing. He is certainly a much overworked man.

He has eight or nine children of whom two are at school in Somerset.

6. Abdullah bin Salim, Shaikh C.I.E. Ruler of Kuwait

Born about 1888, created C.I.E. in 1938. Became Ruler in early 1950. Cousin of the last Ruler whom he actively disliked and nearly unseated in 1938. As a result of the "democratic revolution" of that year he became head of the Advisory Council, which his predecessor allowed to lapse and he himself has refused to revive, and in charge of State Treasury. He remains in charge of the treasury and presides meetings of the Municipal Council. He gives the other departments of the state very wide autonomy.

Unlike his predecessor the Ruler is not greedy, authoritative or fond of display. He claims to have the welfare of the state at heart and his general behaviour supports that claim. He has sold the luxurious yachts of his predecessor and abandoned the pretentious scheme to build a marble-lined palace. He has had a local dhow built for his own use and is happiest when away from Kuwait resting on the island of Failaka. He is a bookish man with very simple tastes and has a reputation of never having incurred debts. He is invariably pleasant to deal with and to talk to although he has an impediment in his speech that makes him a little difficult to follow. His intentions are good but he is not a man of action. He professes the greatest friendship for His Majesty's Government in which he is doubtless sincere but tends to exaggerate the difficulties of his position.

He is fatherly towards the younger sons of his predecessor and has not allowed his own half-brothers to acquire the dominating position they would like. To Abdullah Mubarak he is generous although he has been known to threaten to oust him.

His only children are by slave women.

7. Abdur Razzaq Ruzzuqi, Khan Bahadur

Born 1900. Made a Khan Bahadur 1943. A Kuwaiti who was for many years Residency Agent on the Trucial Coast where he enriched himself before retiring in 1946. He now lives in Kuwait, where like many other Kuwaitis, he burned his fingers badly in the boom period of 1948-50. He is now gradually paying off a very large overdraft. He lends his name to various enterprises with foreign backing that wish to work in Kuwait. Is a member of the Education Committee where he seems to exercise a good influence. Speaks good English, is very pleasant and has sensible views on the lines on which Kuwait should develop.

8. Dickson, Lieutenant-Colonel H. R. P., C.I.E.

Born in 1881. Chief Local Representative of the Kuwait Oil Company since 1936. Son of the late John Dickson, His Majesty's Consul-General, Jerusalem. Educated at St. Edward's School, Oxford and Wadham College, Oxford. First commission 1903. Served in India, eventually joining the Indian Army. Went to Iraq as a military officer in 1914 and in 1915 was transferred to the Political Department. Served in the Nasriyah area from 1917-19. Political Agent, Bahrain 1919-20. Adviser to Mutassarif Hillah Liwa, Iraq, 1921-23. Private Secretary to Maharajah of Bikaner, 1927. Secretary to the Political Resident, 1928-29. Political Agent, Kuwait 1929-36. Acted as Political Agent, Kuwait, during the summer of 1941 at the request of His Majesty's Government. Has an immense knowledge of the Bedouin and their ways but is very diffuse in imparting it. Although he has not the ear of the present, as he had that of the late, Ruler he enjoys considerable local prestige. He is generally

respected because of his years and is in constant touch with all grades of local society except the student class. He is getting a little old for his job but the company have found no-one who could adequately replace him and for that reason is likely to continue profiting indefinitely by his undoubted usefulness. His wife, who has the M.B.E., talks Arabic and has contacts in the local harems. His book "The Arab of the Desert" which was published in 1950 contains much useful information about the manners and customs of the bedouin.

9. Fahad bin Salim, Shaikh

Born 1906. Half-brother of Ruler by a slave mother. Very black. Educated at the American University Beirut where he had a poor scholastic record. Speaks creditable English and is highly literate in Arabic. Although a forceful personality he does not seem to get all his own way with the Ruler. Formerly in charge of the State finances to his own profit and the State's loss. Has now no official post although he uses the building in which the Advisory Council should, but never does, meet. Fond of travel. Visited the United States extensively in 1950 where he was extremely well received. A short visit to the United Kingdom on the way back from the United States made much less impression on him for various reasons including the execrable weather he met with. Is hot-headed and probably very "nationalistic" but has charm, is an entertaining talker and obviously has ideas on a wide range of subjects.

Strongly opposed to Abdullah Mubarak and to the Jabir faction. Is the moving spirit of the Salim faction.

10. Izzat Jafar

Born 1912 in Egypt and educated in the Lebanon. Is believed at one time to have been a professional pimp. Has good manners and speaks English well. Attached himself to the late Ruler and ended up as his social secretary and controller of his household. Lived in the Ruler's palace where he made himself indispensable. The late ruler's sons Jabir and Subah, whom he saw grow up, are much attached to him as is the late Ruler's widow. His Majesty's Government insisted on his removal from Kuwait during the last war because of suspected intrigues with the axis Powers. He claims to have rendered assistance to the allied cause in the Lebanon during his absence. At the time of the late ruler's death he was steadily acquiring more and more influence in Kuwait to the exclusion of the State Secretary, Abdullah Mullah who refers to him as the snake. He brought members of his family into Kuwait, and has established them there with himself, as traders. He was the go-between in the negotiations for the American Independent Oil Company concession. That company took him to the States and feted him royally. He arranged the irregular Middle East Air Lines service from Beirut to Kuwait. He it was who introduced the (since departed) Egyptian schoolmasters and the Egyptian Qadhi and his son to Kuwait. He also tried to induce the Banque de l'Indo Chine to break the (legitimate) monopoly of the British Bank of Iran and the Middle East. Altogether he has been an apt and active instrument for diminishing, even excluding, the influence of His Majesty's Government in Kuwait.

Since the late Ruler's death he has lost his former predominance although he still lives at the palace (not used by the present Ruler) with the widow and some of the sons of the late Ruler. In 1950 under the pretext of taking Jabir and Subah to the Lebanon he took them to London without the Ruler's consent. He explained that he did this because he knew that if he had asked for permission it would be refused.

Izzat is clearly out to seize every opening to regain his former position and so while keeping Jabir and Subah in hand is trying to get foothold in the Salim camp and also that of Abdullah Mubarak. He is not liked by the Kuwaitis.

11. Jabir bin Ahmad, Shaikh

Born 1926. Third son of the late Ruler. His particular claim to eminence, and the succession, is that both his father and mother were Subahs. He is very like his father both in appearance and disposition and would make an arrogant and difficult ruler. He is much under the influence of Izzat Ja'afar by whom he is being groomed for stardom. Speaks fair English and is in charge, under Shaikh Abdullah Mubarak, of the security guards in the Kuwait Oil Company's area at Ahmadi where his chief pre-occupation seems to be to ingratiate himself with the Kuwaitis to the detriment of the company's interests. Is a likely candidate to the succession in his age group.

12. Jordan, Mr. L. T.

Born 1906. General manager of the Kuwait Oil Company at Kuwait since 1948. Born in Texas and educated at the Lufkin Grammar and High schools. Later he attended the Texas College, where he took a degree in mechanical engineering in 1929. In June of the same year he was employed by the Venezuela Gulf Oil Company (a subsidiary of the Gulf Oil Corporation) as a petroleum engineer. From 1931 to 1935 he served as a production engineer in this company and gained experience in drilling and other production operations. In 1937 he was made assistant field superintendent in charge of drilling, construction and production in the Taparito field, and shortly afterwards was promoted to chief production manager of the Venezuela Gulf Oil Company in 1939 and in 1945 was made district manager of the company's western Venezuelan operations. Is a big, unruffled man who does a difficult job very well. He is not very happy in his British assistant on the administrative side so tends to devote himself more to technical matters and to his American technical assistant. Is quite untiring in the exhausting social side of his work and is completely supported in this by his agreeable and devoted wife. The larger issues of company policy are handled in London so that his relations with the Ruler are unembarrassed. An extremely pleasant person to deal with and most co-operative.

13. Mr. J. MacPherson

Born 1890 in England, where his parents still live, emigrated to Canada at the age of 15, went on to the United States where he seems to have done some jobs until linking up with Standard Oil. A naturalised American citizen. Formerly in charge of Aramco's operations at Dhahran which he left, apparently because of disagreement with the company on their policy towards the Saudis. Very outspoken on the faults of the Saudis and the difficulty of working with them. Joined in 1949 the American Independent Oil Company who had obtained the concession for Kuwait oil rights in the neutral zone. Seems to be happy working with the Kuwaitis and claims that he is financially better off for the change. A man of definite views, and a wide range of experience and acquaintances. Is small and wiry and a hard worker. Doubtless very tough but a pleasant companion. Admits that he did not hit big money until 1935. His wife is a pleasant but not very assured woman who was formerly his secretary. Is invariably friendly and co-operative.

14. Mohammad bin Ahmad, Shaikh

Born in 1907. Second son of Shaikh Ahmad, the Ruler of Kuwait. Although he is a full brother of Shaikh Abdullah bin Ahmad, he is not so gross, and is of lighter complexion. He was educated in Beirut and speaks English. He has managed His Highness's affairs in Basra, and in particular the litigation over his date gardens for some time, and does his work with reasonable efficiency. In 1946 he was shot by an Iraqi patrol close to the Iraq-Kuwait frontier, in the belief that he was a smuggler, and wounded in the neck, but has since fully recovered from his injuries. It is doubtful whether he is a strict teetotaler, and he is reported to have a fondness for poker and a convivial evening. He is popular in Iraqi circles and knows how to get round minor officials.

15. Nusf Yusuf al Nusf

Born about 1898. Member of a prominent Kuwaiti family and one of four brothers. From 1934 until the troubles in 1938 he was Director of the Municipality. He then went to Karachi to represent his brother's firm, later returning to Kuwait, where he continued such commercial activities until 1947. He then became director of finances in the Department of Education and in 1948 the director of the Department of Health. He is also on the Education Committee. He is one of the more efficient of the public servants of Kuwait, doing his work without fuss, and he gives full support to Dr. Parry, the British doctor in charge of the State hospital. His brother, Muhammad is in charge of the Department of Public Works.

16. Salim bin Ali, Shaikh

Born 1926. His father (killed 1938) was half-brother of the present Ruler. His mother was a sister of Subah al Nasir so that both his father and mother were Subahs. As he falls within the same age group as Jabir bin Ahmad the Salim faction are advancing him as a rival to Jabir bin Ahmad. In his claim to the succession he might muster the Bedu support around Subah bin Nasir that Abdullah Mubarak seems to be counting on. A pleasant looking young man with no education.

17. Subah bin Ahmad, Shaikh

Born 1928. Fourth son of the late Ruler. Brought up, with his brother Jabir, by Izzat Ja'afar and is much attached to both of them. His point of dissimilarity is that everyone likes him. Has some English.

18. Subah bin Nasir, Shaikh

Born in 1903. Strong supporter of late Shaikh Ahmad, who owed much to his assistance during the 1938 troubles. He is gross, gluttonous and possibly mentally unstable. Some years ago he murdered his younger brother while sitting beside him in the Kuwait town, threw the body out of the car and drove over it several times. He has been deeply involved in the smuggling between Kuwait and Iraq. In 1948 he was accused of murdering three Muntafiq tribesmen including a member of the powerful Sadun family who were participating in the smuggling racket on behalf of a rival Shaikh. Shaikh Ahmad threatened to expel him, and he fled to Ibn Saud, who refused to receive him. He subsequently returned to Kuwait, where Shaikh Ahmad was loath to take further action against him owing to the assistance he had received from him in the past.

He spends nearly all his time out in the desert where he has reserved large stretches of grazing for himself. Is very friendly with and supported by Shaikh Abdullah Mubarak doubtless for reasons of

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common interest. His claim to the succession which is strong if not serious derives from his being a grandson of the "great" Mubarak and having had a Subah mother and father.

19. Subah bin Salim, Shaikh

Born 1913. Half-brother of the Ruler. He runs the town police which is a body set up in opposition to the security police run by Abdullah Mubarak and also the police court. Is often ill, but is mentally very alert and an interesting conversationalist. His standard of education is considerably above the usual Subah level. He speaks a little English and is entirely under the influence of his half-brother Fahad. Generally pleasant to deal with.

20. Yusuf bin Ahmad al Ghanim

Born 1903. Has travelled to England and the United States. Speaks English, has a son studying engineering at Glasgow University. Local agent of B.O.A.C. and A.I.O.C. and holds many trading agencies. Enriched himself through labour and other contracts with Kuwait Oil Company during the company's period of expansion. Has a joint local working arrangement with the Contracting and Trading Company of Beirut (Bustani). Very westernised and a steady drinker. Keen business man but pleasant socially. Politics liable to change with his personal interests. Is one of the many who are highly critical of the patriarchal administration in Kuwait and of the predominance of a largely uneducated and often worthless ruling family but is completely submissive to this order of things.

His old father who is still alive is much respected.

MUSCAT

1. Ahmad bin Ibrahim, Saiyid

Born about 1898. Is a member of a junior branch of the Ruling Family of Muscat. His headquarters are in an old Portuguese fort at Hazm, commanding one of the routes leading into the interior of Oman. It is said that at one time he used to hoist the White Flag of Oman and the Red Flag of Muscat as suited his convenience, but for some years now he has been in the employ of the Sultan as Minister of Internal Affairs. He is a picturesque figure with a long grey beard and has a forceful personality, but is notorious for his cruelty and corruption.

In June and July 1948, he visited the Buraimi area as the Sultan's representative in an effort to get the tribes in that area to comply with the Sultan's wishes regarding the exploitation of oil there.

The Sultan is reported to have been well pleased with his work there and in consequence his stock has risen.

2. Bhacker, Abdul Latif, Haji

Born about 1885. Is the most prominent member of the Khoja community in Matrah, and the head of a firm which has branches in Gwadar and Mekran. A cunning old rogue and an expert smuggler. He owns a fish-meal factory at Matrah which is not at present working, pending the arrival of certain machinery which has been ordered from the United Kingdom, and the obtaining of the services of an European engineer at a price for which no one will come. He is a Muscat subject, although most of his community who have settled in Muscat for many generations, are still treated as British subjects.

3. Boulter, Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert George

Retired Indian army 1947, late of Rajputana Rifles. Born 30th December, 1900, married. Appointed by Sultan on recommendation of his Foreign Minister as Commandant of the Muscat

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Infantry. Arrived 21st May, 1951. Studied poultry keeping in the United Kingdom after retirement. Served periods with Tochi Scouts and Mahratta Light Infantry.

4. Dykestra, Reverend Dirk

Head of the local branch of the American Dutch Reformed Mission, and residing in Muscat since 1909. With his wife has endeavoured with little success to run a school and church in Muscat. Owing to their giving religious instruction to Arab boys in the school, the present Sultan recently forbade his subjects from sending their children, with the result that attendance is limited to the few children of the Mission's employees. It is believed that not a single convert has been gained by this mission, and it hard to know what this elderly couple find to do. They are friendly and co-operative with the British community but, naturally somewhat critical of the Sultan's administration.

5. Gokaldas, Rai Bahadur

Born about 1908. Head of the firm Khimji Ramdass in Muscat, and leader of the Hindu community there. Is a typical Hindu "bania" with smooth manners and plenty of business ability. Has from time to time undertaken Government contracts, especially for the present supply of rations to labour employed by the R.A.F. on Masirah island. Has always been anxious to keep in with the British authorities, and is very nervous about the attitude the Sultan is likely to adopt towards Hindus if they cease to be under British protection. His name was suggested to the Government of India for appointment as their non-career vice-consul at Muscat, but the Sultan refused to countenance the proposal. Can be trusted to make as much money as he can out of every transaction, regardless of other people's interests. With the establishment of a branch of the Imperial Bank of Iran at Muscat, his firm has lost some of the financial hold which they previously had over the place.

6. Ismail Khalili al Rassassi

Born about 1908. A Palestinian who has been in the service of the Sultan of Muscat since 1929. He was originally a school teacher, but is now Wali or Governor of Matrah. He was at one time believed to be strongly anti-British, but is outwardly very friendly. The Sultan makes use of him owing to his lack of educated and experienced persons to hold positions of trust, but he must be regarded as rather a doubtful character.

He was formerly permitted to exercise some measure of supervision over the other Walis, but this supervision is now exercised by the Minister of Internal Affairs, Sayid Ahmad (No. 1), as the Sultan is believed to have decided that Rassassi is too corrupt for the purpose.

7. Mohammad bin Abdullah al Khalili

Born about 1878. A member of the Beni Ruwahi. In 1920 he was elected as the Imam of Oman. As such he possesses spiritual authority over most of the tribes of the interior and also considerable temporal power. He resides at Nizwa, and has his own Walis or Governors stationed at various places throughout Oman. His influence is naturally opposed to that of the Sultan, who is anxious to bring the whole of Oman under his control. Mohammad bin Abdullah, is opposed to all progress and especially to the penetration of Oman by Christians in search of oil. He has recently placed under his interdict the only car to reach his headquarters. His death has been expected and hoped for by the Sultan for many years but he shows remarkable powers of survival and is now reported to be fitter than ever.

8. Muhammad bin Ahmad

Shaikh of Bakhah, a small village on the west coast of the Musandam Peninsula, north of Ras al Khaimah. Though only a petty Shaikh of the Bani Hidayah section of the Shihun tribe, he has come to notice through his participation in border disputes around Sha'am village (which is partly peopled by members of his tribal section) on the northern boundary of Ras al Khaimah where it meets the Sultanate province of Ruus al Jibal. Having claimed to be an independent Shaikh and succeeded in getting himself included for purposes of supplies during the last war with Shaikhs of the Trucial Coast in political relations with the Political Officer at Sharjah, in a recent disturbance at Sha'am in which His Majesty's Navy had to be asked to intervene, he declared himself to be a Muscat subject and sought protection from the Sultan's Wali at Khassab. His status as a subject of the Sultan has now been recognised, and he and his family carry Sultanate passports.

9. Said bin Taimur, Saiyid, Sultan of Muscat

Born in 1910. He succeeded as Sultan on the abdication of his father in 1932. Is normally accorded the title of "His Highness," but he does not allow this to be used in official documents, and as an independent ruler is probably anxious to be given the title of "His Majesty." He is an honorary G.C.S.I. and K.C.I.E. but these titles are not used when addressing him and he made a mild protest in 1946 when the G.C.S.I. was conferred on him without his first being consulted. He was educated at the Mayo College, Ajmer, and speaks excellent English. He was at school in Bagdad from 1927-28. He visited the United Kingdom and United States in the winter of 1937-38. Is small in stature and rather shy and timid in his manner, but very astute and careful to preserve his dignity. He has a remarkable knowledge of correct procedure and can be relied on to "do the right thing" in public, although he appears terrified of appearing a fool on public occasions. He is always most polite and courteous, and reasonable regarding all matters which have no effect on his personal status. Is sincerely anxious to maintain his family's long-standing friendship with His Majesty's Government. His rule is of an entirely personal nature and he has few competent persons to assist him, and few even whom he can trust. He has now a British Minister for Foreign Affairs, Administrator in Gwadar and commandant of his force of some 300 military and of his police, but so far has invested them with no more power than his other employees. His chief ambition is to extend his control over the whole of Oman, of most of which he is ruler in name only. He spends much of his time in his province of Dhofar many hundred miles from Muscat, and the administration of his State is liable to suffer in consequence. Whilst in Muscat he renders himself rather inaccessible also, a fact which does not help to make him popular. He has one son born in 1940, Saiyid Qabus. Though he made enquiries about schools in the Lebanon or Egypt, no decision has so far been made as to his education.

10. Saif bin Ahmed bin Hamid al Rashidi

Born in 1910. Eldest of four sons of Ahmed on whose death on 14th December, 1948, he succeeded as Taminah of the Beni Ruwahi tribe. Lives in the Wadi Ruwahi. Is in opposition to the Imam of Oman, who belongs to the same tribe, and is on good terms with the Sultan. He is believed to wield as much influence as his father and to be as well disposed towards the British.

11. Salih bin Isa al Harthi

The most influential Hinawi Shaikh and accepted as their Tamimah. It is said that his power extends to passing sentence of death upon any member of his faction. In August or September 1949 he visited Muscat on his return from India, where he went for medical treatment, as a guest of the Sultan, and called on the Political Agent. He received ammunition, rifles and Rs. 6,000 as a gift from the Sultan. His knowledge of Arabic poetry is said to be good. He is only about 30, and resides at Ibra in the Sharqiyah district of the Sultanate, headquarters of the Al Hirth, of which he is the Shaikh. He has two wives but no sons. He succeeded his brother Muhammad, who died in 1948. His heir is his cousin Ahmad bin Al Muhammad bin Isa.

12. Shahab bin Faisal, Saiyid

Born in 1902. Uncle of the Sultan of Muscat and full brother of the ex-Sultan, Saiyid Taimur. He ordinarily acts as personal representative at Muscat for ceremonial purposes while the Sultan is absent at Dhofar. He has charming manners and speaks the best Arabic but in administrative matters is inefficient and corrupt, and is not trusted by the Sultan, who latterly has been unwilling to grant him any real authority during his absences.

13. Sulaiman bin Hamyar al Nabhani, Shaikh

Born in 1911. Probably now the most influential Shaikh in the interior of Oman. He is supposed to be the right-hand man of Mohammad bin Abdullah, the Imam (No. 7), but is also on good terms with the Sultan. Messrs. Petroleum Concessions Limited, who own an oil concession from the Sultan for the whole of Oman, are endeavouring to obtain his co-operation in their explorations of the interior.

Has recently sought recognition by His Majesty's Government as an independent Shaikh. Resides in the Jabal Akhdhar and is Tamimah of Ghafiris. Aged about 45 and has three sons, the eldest, Sultan, being his heir.

14. Taimur bin Faisal, Saiyid

Born about 1888. Sultan of Muscat 1913-32, when he abdicated voluntarily. He was a weak ruler and was only too glad to be relieved of further responsibility for the management of affairs when his son Saiyid Said (No. 8) was old enough to take his place. Receives an allowance of Rs. 2,000 a month from the Muscat Government. He had a catholic taste in wives and married amongst others a Turkish and a Japanese lady. He lived for some years before the war in Japan, and had one daughter by his Japanese wife. He is now living as a private citizen in Bombay, and likes to be known by the name of "Mr. T. F. Al Said." He is on good terms with his son, the present Sultan, and paid a visit to him in Muscat in 1945, and has since been visited in Bombay by the Sultan.

15. Tarik bin Taimur, Saiyid

Born in 1922. Half-brother of the Sultan of Muscat and son of the ex-Sultan, Saiyid Taimur, by his Turkish wife. He was educated during his early years in the English school at Constantinople, and later in Germany, and speaks good English and German. He returned to Muscat shortly before the war, and his first task there was to learn Arabic. During the war, he spent some years in India, where he received training in police work and civil administration. He also spent some months attached as an officer with the Zhob Militia in Baluchistan. Is a man of strong physique and character, and is probably feared by the Sultan, who has so far failed to give him any position commensurate with his abilities. He is at present employed as President of the Municipality of Matrah and Muscat. He was married, it is

believed somewhat against his will, to an Arab lady in 1946, and a son was born to him in 1947. Is very friendly and enjoys British society and games of hockey, tennis and bridge.

16. Thoms, Dr. Wells

Born about 1906. Like his father before him, has been medical officer of the American Dutch Reformed Mission for many years. Is a very able doctor and popular with the tribesmen, and has visited all parts of the interior of Oman, about which he has provided much useful information to the American Survey authorities for the completion of maps under preparation on the basis of the air survey carried out during the war. He is always very friendly and co-operative, and in particular rendered much medical assistance to the personnel of the vessels engaged in the salvaging of the *Dahpu* in the hot weather of 1946.

17. Woods-Ballard, Lieutenant-Colonel, Basil, C.I.E., M.B.E.

Born in 1900. Late of the Indian Political Service. Appointed as Minister for Foreign Affairs (Nadhir Al Kharijiyah) by the Sultan in February 1949. He is an able officer, but the Sultan gives him little opportunity for displaying his talents. Correspondence with His Majesty's Consul and other foreign authorities is conducted through him and he has been entrusted with a scheme for the agricultural development of the Batinah Coast and with the drafting of a municipal law for Muscat and Matrah. He is well liked by the Sultan whose independence he is careful to safeguard in his dealings with His Majesty's Consul.

18. Wynne, Mr. Martin Gaymour, M.B.E.

Appointed by the Sultan to be Administrator in Gwadar in April 1949. Ex-Indian Police. Born in 1910. A well read person with plenty of energy and enterprise, who, if allowed to, would probably run a small Gwadar enclave very well. But hitherto the Sultan has left the Administration entirely in the hands of the Wali, entrusting the "Administrator" with only municipal hygiene and recommendations for improvements, for which the minimum funds are likely to be available. Whether he will be content to continue indefinitely in such circumstances, in a place without society or amenities remains to be seen.

QATAR

1. Abdullah bin Darwish

Born about 1903. Lives at Dohah. A typically sharp, avaricious, vain and calculating merchant of Persian origin. Until the second world war, he was a man of meagre means but like many others, he profited by war conditions. His particular line was smuggling, in which he was helped by the laxity and avarice of the Ruler (No. 2) and the deceased Shaikh Hamad, who was the Ruler's youngest son and appointed successor. He paid them heavily for their compliance, but his immediate profits were large enough to stand the strain, and by making himself indispensable to them, he became executor of Shaikh Hamad's will and administrator of his estates, thus recouping his initial expenditure with interest. It appears probable that he will succeed in laying hands on Shaikh Abdullah's fortune in the same way. He is distributor for Anglo-Iranian Oil Company products in Qatar, contractor to Petroleum Development (Qatar), Limited, sole contractor to the Superior Oil Company once they begin their operations, and agent for and shareholder in the Gulf Aviation Company. He is the only Qatar merchant to hold any business agencies for European firms, and is related by blood and by trade to the Fakhroo family in Bahrain, and by marriage to the ruling family of Qatar. He has

made himself the wealthiest and most powerful man in Qatar.

He has consolidated his influence over the present Ruler (No. 4) by lending him money and by avoiding the error made by Salih al Mani (No. 9) of quarrelling with Shaikh Abdullah, who still exercises great influence over his son. However his position as virtual Ruler of Qatar has declined considerably in the past year, not only because he has been absent for many months, but because he has been denied by the Adviser the monopolistic position he had before. Nevertheless, his influence over the Ruler is still considerable and over Shaikh Abdullah almost complete.

He is a man of immense ability and energy, whose unpleasant and domineering nature encourages Europeans to criticise his activities frankly and even rudely. He does not enjoy this, but he profits from it, and his technical efficiency has increased and is increasing at a remarkable rate. He is noisily pro-British, and has intelligence enough to try to appear to be going our way, and to advocate the sort of thing which he knows we want, but fundamentally his nature and aims are incompatible with ours, and his influence on the course of affairs in Qatar at present is bad.

His moral character is said to be worse than that of the generality of people amongst whom he lives. He is probably the best-hated man in Qatar.

2. Abdullah bin Qasim al Thani, His Excellency Shaikh

Former Ruler of Qatar. Abdicated on 21st August 1949, about six months after losing his son Hamad, on whom he greatly relied, and whom he had designated as his successor. Took with him the entire contents of the Treasury, plus a pension of 4 lacs (£30,000) a year, leaving his eldest son, Ali, in the penniless state which contributed largely to the speed with which Darwish was able to establish control over him.

He now lives at Riyan, about ten miles from Dohah, where he dominates his son, and is dominated by the Darwish brothers, to whom he has practically abandoned the management of his property and affairs. He is a venerable, patriarchal, white-bearded figure, with a firm old face which does not belie his character, and even in his approaching dotage is quite clearly a stronger character than his son. He suffers from diabetes and some chronic complaint of the legs, and recently had a slight stroke which has left him unable to rise without assistance, and considerably more halting of speech than formerly.

His influence over Shaikh Ali is seen in numerous instances, but has to quite an extent declined in the past year; his wishes act rather as a brake than a barrier to the reforms that Shaikh Ali is prepared to enact. The outstanding case of his intervention is in the allocation of the family allowances from the oil royalties, and his insistence on larger allowances for those of whom he approved personally, irrespective of the claims of justice and equity has gravely hampered Shaikh Ali's efforts to deal with this problem, which in a country like Qatar is of fundamental importance. In general his continued presence in Qatar has had a bad influence on the Ruler.

3. Abdul Rahman bin Darwish

The youngest of the Darwish brothers. Gives an impression of oily untrustworthiness which is only too accurately borne out by subsequent acquaintance. His morals are loose, but he is an astute rogue, and his smooth manners help him to take in those whom he deals with more successfully than can his brother Abdullah. But whereas further acquaintance with Abdullah may lead to a more favourable appraisal

of his character, based on his undoubted ability, second thoughts on Abdul Rahman are unlikely ever to do so. He is the family liaison man and do-all.

4. Ali bin Abdullah al Thani, His Excellency Shaikh

Born 1894 and succeeded his father as Ruler in August 1949. He is Abdullah's eldest son. A fine presence, and in repose a dignity too soon belied by the vacuity of his conversation and the hysterical fury of his ineffectual wrath. A weak, self-indulgent character, spendthrift where his father was miserly, and vacillating where his father was obstinate. Is easily influenced, but now that he is getting a little confidence in his Adviser and recognises the efforts of His Majesty's Government to help him, he is not dominated by the Darwish brothers as he was last year, though he does listen to most of their views.

He is bigoted in religious matters, having sought consolation in religious contemplation when, in his earlier days, his father's favour and trust was extended over his head to his brother Hamad.

Although he cannot always be persuaded to wise courses by reason, he has shown more sense this year than he did last. His visit to the Ruler of Bahrain in February this year taught him a lot, and not only in conducting business but also in conversing with visitors he now shows a better sense of proportion and quite a sense of humour. He has not yet gone contrary to the wishes of His Majesty's Government in any matter on which considered representations have been made to him; but he still occasionally acquiesces although unconvinced.

He has six sons, of whom the second, Ahmad, is at once his favourite and the most intelligent and promising. The question of the succession is at present unsettled, being confused by the presence of the sons of Hamad, who in their father's life time were considered his most probable successors.

5. Ali bin Ahmad al Ansari

Customs Director of Zakreet. A Sa'udi, in his middle thirties. The ablest, pleasantest, and as far as can be seen the straightest of the Arab officials of the Qatar Government. Is hostile to the Darwish faction, and in consequence not in great favour with the Shaikh.

6. Jasim bin Darwish

The eldest of the Darwish brothers, and an essential element in their system. The other brothers defer ostentatiously to Jasim, who is very much the "chef de famille." He is also of a pious disposition, and helps lend an air of respectability to a family sadly in need of it. He scrupulously avoids any appearance of mixing in "politics," but is of great use in translating into suitably Koranic language, for the benefit of Shaikh Ali, the latest questionable scheme hatched by Abdullah.

He is said to be very fond of his Syrian wife, whom he treats with customary cruelty (she suffered for a week with toothache before she could escape clandestinely to the mission hospital) and he is considered by the ladies of Dukhan to be "rather a dear."

7. Mohammad al Mani'

Born about 1875. He is a cousin of Salih al Mani', and rather like a benevolent old goat (with spectacles) in appearance, but is an old-fashioned and courteous man. He is one of the wealthiest men in Qatar, having first made his money dealing in pearls. He was the first contractor to the oil company, and for years occupied in fact, though probably not as offensively and certainly not as efficiently, the monopolistic position which Abdullah Darwish now seeks to obtain. He was ousted from his pre-eminent place in business and the counsels

of the Shaikh by Abdullah Darwish's greater thrust, ability and unscrupulousness, and has now firmly retired from politics and leads the life of a senior and respected member of the merchant community.

8. Mohammad bin Uthman

Director of Customs, Doha. He is related to the Darwish family and is married to their sister. He is of the al-Bu-Fakhroo family. He has been Director of Customs for about five years, and although his salary has only recently risen from 400 rupees a month to 800 rupees, he has just completed a house said to have cost 2 lacs. He is very much in the Darwish camp, and appears to have the complete confidence of, and considerable influence with the Ruler.

9. Plant, Group-Captain P. L.

Born in 1897. Adviser to the Qatar Government. His small stature, complete deafness in one ear and apparent lack of straight-forwardness put him from the very start, February 1950, into the position where no one had confidence in him. He has only recently begun to gain a little of the Ruler's confidence, but the rest of the Ruler's family and a good many of the locals do not really trust him or respect him. His poor administrative ability often gives him more work than is really necessary and those Qataris who resent British interference in their affairs are thereby given a peg on which to hang their complaints. His poor Arabic, his habit of losing his temper with Arabs, and his training as an Intelligence Officer in the Royal Air Force, which leads him to disbelieve openly what the Arabs tell him, do not help to improve his position. However he has accomplished quite a lot in his first year of office and begins to be more co-operative with His Majesty's Government than he was at first, though it may well be—because he is a man of very restricted perception—a mistaken idea of his position. He is a very difficult man with whom to associate either officially or privately. He has a French wife (his first wife he divorced after two or three years of marriage after she had borne him a daughter), who tries hard to help him and is active with the local women and school children. In fact she is his greatest asset. Although he is obviously not the ideal Adviser it may well be that he is as good as any likely to be available for Qatar and he could be a great deal less suitable than he is.

10. Salih al Mani'

Born about 1893, but despite his exclusively male household and the all-too-obvious presence of a still beneath his front staircase, he does not look his age. He is a Nejdite by origin, and started his career as a small pearl merchant, at the same time doing some clerking for the Ruler, whose secretary and "Representative" he became. He acquired great influence and wealth while he had the Ruler's complete confidence, but realised last year that he was being eclipsed by the Darwish, and after they had several times over-ridden him in the Shaikh's counsels, he quarrelled violently with Shaikh Abdullah at the time of his abdication, in the engineering of which he undoubtedly played a considerable part. If he thought that he had thus cut the ground from under the Darwish feet, and substituted a ruler more amenable to his own will, he was rudely disappointed. The Darwish consolidated their position with a flexibility and sureness of touch in marked contrast to his own touchy cantankerousness, and Salih's position has continued to deteriorate. He co-operates loyally with His Majesty's Government in most matters, both from conviction and from the clear realisation that only if things go our way does he stand any chance of survival. This enables the Darwish, who usually have more palatable advice

to offer, to represent him as the creature of the British. He is the only active counterweight to the Darwish at present, but his addiction to alcohol and a number of other practices of dubious integrity make him a vulnerable ally.

TRUCIAL COAST

1. Ahmad bin Rashid al Mua'lla, M.B.E., Shaikh

Ruler of Umm Al Qaiwain. Born in 1904 and succeeded in 1929. He is enormously fat and quiet and, to meet him in audience, one would imagine that he was anchored permanently to his chair; yet in his small way he is a wise, straightforward, peaceful and efficient administrator. He keeps his word and avoids interference in other people's affairs. Is, therefore, popular and much respected by the other Shaikhs who, with their tribes, regard him as an authority on their affairs and approach him often for mediation in their disputes. He has full authority in his territory and is very loyal to His Majesty's Government and uses his influence on other Shaikhs to be the same. Was awarded the M.B.E. in 1950 for his services as a pacifier and mediator in disputes between other Trucial Shaikhs. Is weakened in health by chronic diabetes which he can only check by a near-starvation diet.

2. Hazza' bin Sultan

Born about 1911. Brother of Shaikh Shahbut of Abu Dhabi (No. 14). He is popular, courageous and very successful with the tribes, and well up in tribal matters. He is a skilful (and very tiresome) negotiator, talkative, persistent and only half-literate. He often represents Shaikh Shakhbut officially and is a possible successor. He lives most of the time in Buraimi and occasionally visits Bahrain.

3. Juma bin Maktum, Shaikh

Born about 1888. Eldest brother of the Shaikh of Dubai. Is entitled to a salute of one gun. This old man, with his direct noisy manner, used to be regarded as a source of comic relief to the ceremonial visits to the Shaikh. During the Dubai-Abu Dhabi dispute in 1946 he revealed himself, however, as an influential intriguer carrying weight in the Dubai councils which was thrown into the scale against the interests of His Majesty's Government. To them he indeed professed loyalty, but he seems in actual fact to have even more than usually the Arab dislike of the unbelievers.

4. Khalid bin Ahmad bin Sultan al Qasimi, Shaikh

Born in 1878. Shaikh Khalid was the Ruler of Sharjah until he was deposed in 1924 by the late Ruler, Sultan bin Saqr. He then made several abortive attempts to retake Sharjah. He was appointed Regent of Kalba on 17th September, 1937, and his regency was terminated with the recognition of Shaikh Hamad in May 1950.

Shaikh Khalid has grown old, and lives most of the time in Hira (Sharjah) and in the last few years of his regency left the conduct of affairs in Kalba almost entirely in the hands of his dissolute and wilful nephew Humaid, whose death in February 1950 was the signal for his uncle's downfall. He receives a pension of Rs. 10,000 a year from the Kalba revenues, and an allowance from the Ruler of Sharjah. He was considered to possess Dhaid and Dibbah/Hisn independently, not as part of Kalba, but his influence there has also declined, and it is likely that on his death they will pass to Sharjah and Kalba respectively, who now exercise "de facto" control in them.

He is illiterate, but is an authority on the history of the Jawasim. He gets intermittent attacks of malaria. He is friendly with all other rulers and

tribal chiefs, and particularly with the Shaikh of Fujairah; he is well disposed towards the British Government.

5. Khalid bin Sultan

Born about 1914. Brother of Shaikh Shakhbut of Abu Dhabi (No. 14). He lives mostly in Abu Dhabi assisting the Shaikh, but is illiterate and not very talkative.

6. Muhammad bin Hamad ash-Sharqi

Shaikh of Fujairah. Born in 1906. Became Shaikh of Fujairah after the death of his elder brother in December 1940. This shaikh, who is not a ruler recognised by His Majesty's Government, is a better and more capable sort than several who have been. Much of the territory controlled by him used to be under Jawasim rule, but his father broke away from the Jawasim control and the latter exercise no influence in the Fujairah area now. Shaikh Muhammad is active and straightforward and his tribesmen, the Sharqiyeen, pay complete allegiance to him and he exercises full authority over them. He is friendly with the other Trucial Rulers and tribes with the exception of, of course, the Jawasim and the Beni Qitah, to whom he is hostile. The Jawasim he considers as his hereditary enemies and does not trust them. There is good security in his area and the robbers and marauders are chased and punished by the Shaikh himself. He is friendly towards His Majesty's Government and has frequently asked to be recognised as an independent Shaikh and to have a treaty with us. He is also very anxious that Petroleum Concessions, Limited, should take up an oil concession in his area, but so far the company has shown no real interest in it. He visited Muscat in 1951 and is reported to have been given a Sultanate passport.

7. Muhammad bin Saqr

Born about 1913. Acted as Regent of Sharjah during the prolonged illness of his brother the late Shaikh Sultan, in 1949-51. Announced his succession as Ruler on the death of Shaikh Sultan in April 1951, but subsequently allowed himself to be displaced by the former Shaikh's eldest son, Saqr (No. 13). He receives a larger allowance than his brothers, though it does not meet his expenditure. He owns some landed property in Sharjah and a date garden in Ras al Khaimah.

He is a well-meaning, rather ineffectual character who co-operated loyally with His Majesty's Government during his Regency provided he was not asked to do anything dangerous or unpleasant.

8. Rashid bin Humaid, Shaikh

Ruler of Ajman. Born in 1904 and became Ruler in 1928. He is tall with a long black beard, and a typical Bedouin in appearance. The saying that "he is too stupid to be dishonest" is probably true with him. He is even more parsimonious and avaricious than the average, but he is not unjust and is liked by his people. He spends a lot of time in the desert and is on good terms with the other Trucial Shaikhs and tribal chiefs, with the exception of Shaikh Saqr bin Sultan, chief of the Nai'm in Buraimi, who bitterly dislikes him. He gets around a great deal and visited Shaikh Sulaiman bin Hamyar of the Jebel Akhdhar in 1948 and again in 1950, and has been in Bahrain, Muscat and Saudi Arabia more than once. His territory is secure and he chases robbers himself. He can read and write Arabic fairly well and listens to the news on the radio (when it is in working order). He frequently visits the B.O.A.C. fort and Royal Air Force station at Sharjah, merely in order to pick up anything he can in the way of services and supplies.

9. Rashid bin Said bin Maktum, Shaikh

Eldest son of the Shaikh of Dubai (No. 10). Born about 1903. Is half literate and wild but not unattractive. He is married to the daughter of Hamdan bin Zayid, a former Ruler of Abu Dhabi. Adopted an uncompromising and defiant attitude towards His Majesty's Government during the Dubai-Abu Dhabi dispute, which he only changed after punitive measures against his father had been taken. He quickly becomes a victim to the intrigues of self-interested persons and, again like a Bedou, is always suspicious of good advice. He has lately shown signs of greater maturity and an ability to think for himself, and some disposition to judge cases on their merits. He is generous to the tribesmen and has a good deal of influence with them. He is much disliked by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi.

10. Said bin Maktum, C.B.E., Shaikh

Ruler of Dubai. Born in 1882 and became the Ruler of Dubai in 1912. He is a Bedouin in appearance and at heart, and is generous. He is conscious of the traditional duties and responsibilities of an Arab Shaikh, though he has now allowed these to devolve on his eldest son, Rashid (No. 9); he himself spending his time hawking, shooting and travelling in the desert and at sea. He has recently become interested in agriculture and devotes a great deal of his time in attending to his gardens in Ras al Khaimah, where he has installed water pumps and made other improvements. Shaikh Said's relations with the other Trucial Shaikhs and the tribes are good. His dispute with the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi which absorbed most of his shaikhdom's resources for three years has been finally settled. He is on particularly good terms with the Sultan of Muscat, whom he occasionally visits, and is also friendly with the Shaikhs of Qatar and Bahrain. He is well disposed towards His Majesty's Government and only persuaded to unwise courses occasionally by his son, and his brother, Juma (No. 3). Created C.B.E. in 1951.

11. Saqr bin Muhammad bin Salim, Shaikh

Shaikh of Ras al Khaimah. Born in 1920. Seized power from Sultan bin Salim (No. 15) in February 1948, and was recognised as Ruler in August 1948.

This one-eyed young man has so far showed himself a strong Shaikh, strict, impartial, truthful and dignified. He attends to his business and security and good order prevails in his territory and crimes are uncommon. He is supported in his rule by his father and his five brothers and is friendly with all the other local Shaikhs and tribes and loyal to His Majesty's Government. Although Sultan bin Salim made away with a large part of the funds of the Shaikhdom, Saqr has waived a number of taxes and reduced the customs duty.

He has a dispute with Shaikh Muhammad of Bakha (Muscat No. 8) over rights in the village of Sha'am which has led to general incidents. In 1950 he extended his rule near the village of Jazirat al Hamrah.

12. Saqr bin Sultan bin Salim al Qasimi

Born about 1927. Eldest son of the former Ruler of Ras al Khaimah (No. 14). Murdered Shaikh Hamad bin Sa'id al Qasimi, Ruler of Kalba, whose guest he was, on 4th July, 1951, and usurped the Shaikhdom of Kalba. His chief partner in the murder was Ali bin Amir, a former secretary of Shaikh Sa'id bin Hamad of Kalba and later of Shaikh Muhammad bin Hamad of Fujairah, and nominally a Muscat subject. Ali bin Amir was probably the prime mover in the conspiracy, and is undoubtedly the dominant figure in the new regime in Kalba.

Saqr is an unprepossessing character, whose manner is a compound of weak craftiness and ingratiating. He is seconded by his younger brother Khalid, a hysterical young man with protruding eyes. There were some signs of Saqr having quarrelled with his father as a result of this exploit, but it is not clear how deep the division between them is—if indeed it exists.

13. Saqr bin Sultan bin Saqr al Qasimi, Shaikh

Born about 1924. Officially recognised by His Majesty's Government as Ruler of Sharjah in succession to his father on 8th May, 1951, after having canvassed popular support for his claim to succeed instead of his uncle Muhammad (No. 7). Like all the Qawasim of Sharjah, he has an exaggerated notion of his own importance and a tendency to think of the glorious past of his family as though it had survived into the present day. However he is young comparatively energetic and modern in his outlook, and has a likeable personality. He undoubtedly enjoys more local popularity than did either his father or his uncle, and if he can come through the first few years of his reign without being dismayed by the realities of his situation, may make a very able Ruler. He is loyal and co-operative with His Majesty's Government.

14. Shakhbut bin Sultan bin Zayid, Shaikh

Ruler of Abu Dhabi. Born in 1904 and became Ruler in 1928. In many ways Shaikh Shakhbut is the best of the Trucial Coast Rulers. He is not an intriguer and does business in a straightforward way, though he is very stubborn. He can read Arabic but cannot write. He has full authority over his people and the tribes and enjoys the respect of other Shaikhs, which he indeed deserves; although he is parsimonious, he does not extort nor sell justice. He is fair in judgment. Security in his territory is exemplary.

Shaikh Shakhbut looks delicate, he has very small bones and may be consumptive; but he has an air of quiet dignity about him striking in an Arab Shaikh. After the death of his first wife, he took a second one, a young girl, one Hamdah bint Ahmad

bin Khalaf bin Utaibah, who left him after one night and never returned. In 1947 he married the daughter of Hamid bin Buti, his maternal uncle and in August 1948 he also married a young Bedouin girl whom he casually met near his fort.

Shaikh Shakhbut is well disposed towards His Majesty's Government. He is on ostensibly friendly terms with the other Rulers and tribes but dislikes the Ruler of Dubai and his son, because of their aggression against him. He seldom leaves Abu Dhabi except to go to Abu Dhabi Islands and Buraimi occasionally.

His mother, Salamah bint Buti, is said to have great influence over him. He has two sons, Said and Sultan. The former is a wretched creature, a drunkard, and has syphilis. The latter is still very young.

15. Sultan bin Salim al Qasimi

Ex-Shaikh of Ras al Khaimah. Born in 1891. An unpleasant character—thoroughly untrustworthy and intriguing. He neglected the interests of his Shaikhdom for years in order to squeeze money out of the people to aggrandise himself through trade. In February 1948, his nephew, Shaikh Saqr bin Muhammad bin Salim (No. 11) seized power with the people of Ras al Khaimah and the Khawatir tribe during Sultan bin Salim's absence in Dubai. He has not ceased unsuccessfully to intrigue and is at present, practically speaking, an outlaw. He is a wild creature, liable to take violent courses, one of which obliged His Majesty's Government to impose upon him a fine and a year exile in Muscat. The year having been completed he is now once more living in Trucial Coast, dividing his time between Sharjah, Dubai, and his date gardens in the Wadi al Qaur.

16. Zayid bin Sultan

Born about 1908. Brother of the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, he has a similar character to that of his brother Hazza' (No. 2), and probably a stronger one. He exercises a very great influence with the tribesmen. Resides at Buraimi.

CHAPTER II.—SAUDI ARABIA

ES 1022/2G

No. 6

ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS IN SAUDI ARABIA

(1)

Mr. Trott to Mr. Bevin. (Received 19th February)(No. 13. Confidential) *Jedda,*
Sir, *30th January, 1951.*

I have for some time felt that the question of Anglo-American relations in Saudi Arabia deserve special consideration particularly in view of recent events in regard to the Eastern frontier and Dhahran Airbase negotiations and I have the honour to transmit a memorandum in which my Counsellor, Mr. Scott-Fox, has described the background to the remarkable penetration of American interests and discussed the problem of how we should conduct our affairs in Saudi Arabia in relation to it and to the general interests of Anglo-American co-operation, as it appeared here at the close of 1950. I would also invite your attention to a despatch of one of my predecessors, Mr. Jordan (No. 88 of 6th September, 1944) and a despatch of the then Minister Resident in Cairo, Lord Moyne, of 29th September, 1944, on the same subject when the problems involved first appeared.

2. As explained in the enclosed memorandum, until 1942 British influence was unquestionably predominant in the political and economic affairs of Saudi Arabia. The turning-point came in 1943-44 when the Americans asked to share in the supply and subsidy programme by which we were keeping Saudi Arabia alive, and then indicated that they proposed to carry this further in what Mr. Jordan described as a "spate of philanthropy" towards Saudi Arabia: the Americans believed, according to the then United States Minister in Jedda, that the Moslem world would be grateful to the United States for improving the country and increasing its wealth and security. Lord Moyne expressed, at the time in his above-mentioned despatch, an interesting and, I think, still relevant view-point on this American policy: he felt that there was a serious risk of the Americans "adopting an excessively paternal and patronising attitude to Saudi Arabia from a failure to understand that a fanatical Moslem population does not take the same view of the blessings of American civilisation as they do themselves. If the results of misguided American benevolence should be to under-

mine the independence of the country and make it a satellite of the United States it would have serious reactions throughout the Moslem world and gravely prejudice British interests."

3. In his memorandum, Mr. Scott-Fox has stated the case for adopting a forthcoming attitude to American expansion in this country even if it must sometimes be at the expense of our own interests. That we wish to see the Americans firmly established in this area, and that we should not try to obstruct them, are I think axiomatic. It is my opinion, however, that the Americans are now so well established in Saudi Arabia and are perhaps still so prone to adopt the sort of dog-in-the-manger attitude which prevented us from meeting Ibn Saud's request for a financial adviser in 1944 and which is to some extent now preventing the Trucial Shaikhdoms from securing reasonable frontiers with Saudi Arabia, that I should not have thought it necessary or desirable from the broader point of view of our relations with the Americans in the Middle East and elsewhere that where our interests in Saudi Arabia conflict or compete we should give into them at the first huff.

4. I agree that cases have to be taken *ad hoc*. There have been many of them in recent months, including the frontiers question, the Saudi Arabian Air Force, the training of the Saudi Arabian Army, Currency Reform, the provision of agricultural, public health and financial advisers and the relations between the American construction company, the International Bechtels Incorporated, and British companies, where we have had competing or conflicting interests or endeavours; and we have differed on some policy matters such as for instance the efficacy of the Export-Import Bank loan and the generally rather excessively obsequious attitude of the Arabian-American Oil Company towards the Saudi Arabian Government. Similarly, we might find ourselves in opposition to the Americans if the negotiations for a British oil concession go through. In a country which the Americans tend to regard as their preserve and where they sometimes seem to

lack the inclination to understand our less tangible but nevertheless firm interests, such differences are bound to occur. A certain general difference of approach, best described in the quotation from Lord Moyne I have given in paragraph 2 above, is a further factor. The essential point I think is that we and the Americans should recognise our separate, as much as our mutual interests in this country and recognise our differences. And when these involve us in competing or conflicting endeavours we should do our utmost to find an accord before the Saudis get the chance to try to play us off against each other.

5. As I have suggested in another connexion (my despatch No. 3) a greater degree of understanding at Government level will now be in some respects desirable. I should welcome whatever guidance you may wish to give me in this difficult problem, which resembles that alluded to by Mr. Jordan in his above-quoted despatch, in which he deprecated "the undignified position of playing second fiddle".

I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Representatives at Washington, Ankara, Cairo, Tehran, Beirut, Bagdad, Amman and Damascus to the Head of the British Middle East Office, and to the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf.

I have, &c.

A. C. TROTT.

Enclosure in No. 6

British and American Interests in Saudi Arabia

If British interests tend to predominate over American interests in most of the Middle East, in Saudi Arabia there are two special factors which affect the position: the American air base and the large American oil activities at Dhahran. Whatever may be the pattern of Anglo-American co-operation elsewhere in the area, there is no question in Saudi Arabia of the Americans accepting us as the "senior partner." The working out of our partnership with them here raises special problems, therefore, which it may be of interest to review.

2. The record of the talks in London between Mr. Michael Wright and Mr. McGhee in November 1949 (Foreign Office despatch No. 183 of 29th December, 1949) contains the statements that—

"The United States has no desire to compete with or hinder the United Kingdom Government in its activities in the Middle

East" and, later, "Should the United States Government choose to assume a greater responsibility in the area, such a decision would be welcomed by the United Kingdom. . . ." The hard fact is that in Saudi Arabia, at any rate, the Americans are in competition with us over an increasingly wide field and any increase in American responsibilities must to some extent be at the expense of our own position here, although perhaps less so than might appear at first sight.

3. The Americans have been going ahead here very fast in the last few years, and their advance still seems to be gaining impetus. As recently as 1941 there was still no American diplomatic or consular representation in Saudi Arabia. For a long time we had ourselves enjoyed a pre-eminent position amongst the foreign Powers in relations with this country. Even to-day, we are, with the Americans, still a long way ahead of our nearest competitors here: the French (whose interests are primarily economic) and the Egyptians (with whom Saudi Arabia has been working very closely in the Arab League).

4. We were largely instrumental in liberating the Hejaz from the Turks and, despite the fact that we backed the Hashemites at that time, our relations with the rulers of the Hejaz became better rather than worse when their rivals, the House of Saud, defeated King Hussein and created a united Arabian Kingdom. At that time, no other Power had political interests in this part of the world which could compare with ours. Nearly all the land frontiers of Saudi Arabia marched with British-protected territories: Transjordan and Iraq on the north, Kuwait and the Trucial Shaikhdoms on the east and the Aden Protectorate on the south. Ibn Saud was for a long time a pensioner of His Majesty's Government, and he had an almost mystical respect for the superior wisdom of British foreign policy. I believe that somewhere in the archives of the Foreign Office in the mid-1930's there is a note addressed to His Majesty's Government by Ibn Saud, which starts off with the declaration that "After Allah, the British Government know best" which unexceptionable sentiment was no mere oriental hyperbole but really did express something of the King's mind. At that time he would hardly have contemplated taking any important political decision without asking our advice.

5. The first indication that a change might come over this situation was in 1933, when

the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey obtained their oil concession here. Ibn Saud himself even now continues to harp on his having offered the concession to us first and only given it to the American when he found that we did not want it. However that may be, the concession proved to be a very rich one, and once its development got under way towards the end of the war period, American economic interests almost inevitably became more powerful than ours in Saudi Arabia. Up to that date the bulk of Saudi Arabia's revenues had come from pilgrim dues, and as the majority of foreign pilgrims came from the British Empire, the dues were mostly received in sterling. In the past five years, on the other hand, by far the greater part of this country's revenues have been derived from the operations of the Arabian-American Oil Company. A pipe-line to the Mediterranean has been built at a cost of over 200 million dollars, and a great deal of American capital has been sunk in an industry which, important to America in peace-time, might be even more valuable to her in case of war. The replica of a small American town has grown up for the 5,000 Americans in the Dhahran area, and the American community in Saudi Arabia far outnumbers the total Europeans in the country.

6. Within a mile or two of the American Oil Company at Dhahran is the American air base. Although used chiefly for civilian purposes now, it remains the only American military base in Western Asia and an outward and visible sign of United States interests in the defence of the area. So far the Americans have only been able to lease the airfield from year to year, but they are now (whatever misgivings they may have as to whether a base so far north will be defensible in time of war) negotiating with the Saudi Arabian Government to put the lease on a more permanent basis.

7. In addition to the Dhahran airfield, there is one of the largest airfields in the Middle East at Duwaid, near the Saudi-Iraqi frontier. This was constructed by the Americans during the war and then handed over to the Saudi Arabian Government. It was subsequently taken over by Aramco, who were until recently using the airfield camp in connexion with the construction of Tapline.

8. Another legacy from the war years went, on the other hand, to His Majesty's Government when the war-time arrangement whereby a joint Anglo-American team helped in the training of the Saudi Arabian

army was replaced in 1946 by the arrangement for a British Military Mission. This mission is still working here (although strictly confined to Taif in the Hejaz), but the prospects of creating a Saudi army which would be efficient by modern standards still seem a long way off.

9. Another important British activity has been the Civil Air Training Mission, which has, however, recently come to an end. The Saudi Arabian Government now seem more interested in forming an air force and are at present considering a scheme which was drawn up for this purpose by two former members of the Civil Air Training Mission. This scheme provides for British assistance in training and supply of aircraft; it is, however, quite on the cards that the Saudis would accept any tempting offer of United States air assistance which might be made to them, for instance in connexion with the negotiations for the renewal of the lease of the Dhahran air base.

10. Largely as a result of the operations of Aramco, the post-war years have been prosperous ones for Saudi Arabia and a good deal of economic development has taken place. A 7-mile pier has been constructed on the east coast near Dhahran, and the Americans are building a railway from there to the King's capital at Riyadh. On the west coast a start has been made in providing the only four towns of importance—Jedda, Mecca, Medina and Taif—with amenities such as electricity, water and roads. There has also been a good deal of air transport development.

11. By and large, it might perhaps be said that the increase of American activities in Saudi Arabia has now brought them approximately abreast of us, taking the field as a whole. Although American economic interests already tend to predominate, we still have a rather special position in the political and military sphere. Moreover, if the ramifications of Aramco have led to a preponderance of American economic activities in the eastern part of the country, this has been largely counter-balanced by the contracts which have gone to British firms in the Hejaz, where, despite some disappointments for us, the Saudi Arabian Government seem to realise that British contractors can offer better value than what they have been getting out of the extravagant methods of the American construction company, Bechtels Incorporated. Similarly, in the case of internal air services: alongside

the Saudi Airlines, which are run by Trans-world Airlines, the Saudis have a unit of Bristol aircraft.

12. For the immediate future, however, it looks as though there will be a tendency for the present approximate balance between British and American interests to be upset in favour of the Americans, at least in the economic sphere. Although we have greater experience and a longer established position (and probably also greater popularity with the Saudi Arabians), the Americans hold some very strong cards. Firstly, there is the fact that Saudi Arabia is largely dependent for her revenues on the royalties which she gets from the American oil company. Indeed, the negotiations at present in progress for revising the company's concession will still further increase Aramco's contribution to Saudi revenues and, for Saudi Arabia, America will be even more what the Arabs call "the Mother of the Big Eggs." Moreover, the wide range of Aramco's oil operations requires various ancillary economic enterprise, for instance, in the field of communications, which have naturally a certain tendency to go to American companies.

13. The second main factor in America's favour is that not only has she invested far more capital here than has any other country, but she is probably the only foreign country which is to-day in a position to continue large-scale capital investment here. For instance, the Export-Import Bank loan which has recently been granted to Saudi Arabia can only be spent on American goods and services.

14. Thirdly, thanks principally to this large economic stake which they have here and to the Fourth Point Programme, the Americans seem more likely to be successful in persuading the Saudi Arabian Government to accept expert assistance than we have hitherto been. This applies particularly to the economic sphere. The mining adviser to the Saudi Arabian Government is already an American, and various American experts on agriculture, irrigation, &c., are starting to arrive here. The latest development is that the Americans have been asked to supply the Saudi Arabian Government with financial advisers. This may well prove to be the thin end of the wedge, since once American experts have installed themselves here, they will probably try to influence the Saudi Arabian Government in the direction of obtaining still further American advice and assistance. On the other hand, this may be to some

extent offset by the reluctance of the Saudis to seeing all their key posts go to any one foreign country.

15. A further factor which is likely to favour the Americans in the long run is that, as mentioned above, most of their economic interests are on the east coast whilst ours are predominantly in the Hejaz. Unless some exportable commodity can be produced in the Hejaz (and although the possibilities of mineral and agricultural development have not been thoroughly explored, this does not at present seem particularly likely), there must soon come a limit to the public works' development which is economically justifiable in the western part of Saudi Arabia (which has nothing to export now). On the east coast, on the other hand, the flourishing oil industry will probably continue to provide a basis for various economic developments over a longer period.

16. Finally, the Americans may find themselves obliged to offer help in equipping and perhaps training the Saudi armed forces in return for the long-term lease which they want for their air-base at Dhahran. Such assistance towards increasing the efficiency of the Saudi forces would be moreover a logical corollary to any hopes which the Americans may have of seeing the Saudis contribute something towards the defence of Dhahran in case of war.

17. So much for the present position. It naturally leads British people here to wonder what their attitude should be. Their first reaction is inclined to be disappointment at seeing our former predominance here increasingly threatened by the Americans. Apart from their personal feelings, they can argue with some show of justification that the methods of American big business, and even sometimes perhaps of American diplomacy as seen here, are a little heavy-handed and an indifferent substitute for what we, with our longer experience, are able to offer primitive countries such as Saudi Arabia. From that they may often conclude that we ought to fight back vigorously against the increase of American influence in this country and to try to reassert our former position.

18. There is, however, another way of looking at these developments. It is not merely the question whether we can, in the present international emergency, afford to run the risk of any local differences with the Americans cutting across the broad pattern of Anglo-American co-operation (and however excellent our personal relations with

them here, some risk of this remains so long as there is a tendency to regard a forward American policy here as trespassing on our preserves). From the point of view of the Middle East as a whole (and perhaps, indeed, of world strategy), it may be that we ought to be prepared to pay a certain price for ensuring that the Americans are deeply involved in one part of this important area. Even the most fervent of Republican "re-examinists" in Washington would be likely to hesitate before trying to liquidate American commitments in a country which contains so much American capital and boasts the largest single American community outside the United States themselves; and so long as America has large commitments in Saudi Arabia there can be no question of her disinteresting herself from the rest of the Middle East. If we were ever anxious to encourage the Americans to establish a token force in the Middle East, Dhahran might be the place where they could be most easily persuaded to do so. In general, it is arguable that anything that increases the American stake in this country, and leads to their taking a larger share of the organisation of its armed forces and its defence, and so "anchors" the United States Government in this part of the world, is, on the broad view, to our advantage, even if it means that we must ourselves renounce playing such a predominant part here as formerly. Such conditions might, incidentally, make us wish to review the future of the British Military Mission here if the Americans were to show (for instance in connexion with the Dhahran negotiations) any disposition to take over or supplement its activities; but this can be better examined separately after the forthcoming visit here of the Commander-in-Chief, Middle East Land Forces.

19. Moreover, if our rôle in the Middle East is fundamentally one of partnership with the United States in a joint effort to help the economic, social and political progress of those countries and in their defence, it is perhaps not unnatural that the Americans should seek to have an equal or even a leading share in the task in the case of one of the Middle East countries at least, when we have the greater share of the burden in the other countries concerned. Admittedly, it must sometimes seem to us here that their methods in this country are open to criticism and that their apparent assumption that "they can do everything better than we can" is, to say the least, a little premature; but they are relatively new

at the game and there is a lot which they can only learn by trial and error, so perhaps we ought not to cavell at seeing them in Saudi Arabia acquire (if sometimes rather painfully both for themselves and for others here) the experience which may help them to meet the responsibilities which they are increasingly having to take on in many backward countries. Nor need we assume that if the Americans here were now to fill positions which we hoped would fall to us that it will be a pure gain for the Americans at our expense; they are only too likely to discover that it is usually a rather ungrateful task to supply expert advice and assistance to the Saudi Arabians who are still so suspicious of foreigners that they usually neglect, when they do not actually resent, most of the advice they are given.

20. It is not easy for us here to put our local problems into precise perspective against the wider problems of Anglo-American relations and strategy which may be involved, but if the alternative view which I have endeavoured to outline above were in fact considered to be the nearer to the mark of the two, then it would, I think, follow that we ought to accept with a good grace the increase of American activities here, even if it must sometimes be at the expense of our own. It is not only that we should not go out of our way to try to obstruct this development (an attitude which would in any case be of doubtful efficacy, in view of the above-mentioned factors now favouring the Americans here; and to obstruct unsuccessfully, would, of course, be to have the worst of both worlds). It would also have a more positive aspect, for we should then come forward with what help we can to try to keep the increasing American activities and influence here on whatever seems to us to be the right lines. The more that we can show that we do not resent the American expansion here, the more likely we are to get the Americans to accept our advice and to be able to do something to steer that expansion into those channels where it would not only do most good to Saudi Arabia but also tend to supplement rather than to compete with our own activities here. In that way we ought to be able to turn the American strength here to our joint advantage.

21. If we were to adopt such an attitude towards American activities here it would not of course mean that we should abandon the defence of our own interests. Although we should not automatically oppose the advance of American interests all along the

line, there would equally be no general retreat from our established position here. Frank and full discussion with the Americans of all matters where our interests are likely to clash would be essential, particularly in questions like that of military assistance to this country where our activities might get out of step unless carefully co-ordinated. Each case would have to be considered on its merits, and the difference between the two attitudes outlined above is really one of emphasis: the second attitude suggested putting as much as possible the emphasis on collaboration rather than on competition (although competition there will in any case certainly continue to be). Indeed, in return for our co-operative attitude, we should be entitled to expect the Americans to refrain from abusing their position here by establishing any kind of monopoly, and to respect British economic interests. Nor should, of course, the collaboration be entirely one-way, and always at our expense. Incidentally, whilst we should join with the Americans in refusing to fall for the familiar Saudi technique of trying to play off the Americans and ourselves against each other, we can count on the Saudis nonetheless turning to us in order to counter-balance whatever increase may take place in the strength of the American position here. The Saudis would certainly not be prepared to become dependent on any one foreign country.

22. Politically, the policy outlined would be unlikely to do very much to disturb our present position in Saudi Arabia. The Americans would admittedly stand to gain something politically from any increase in their economic or military activities here; but our own position would not necessarily

be correspondingly weakened, since it derives its strength from factors which are quite different from those which are the basis of the American position: notably from our influence and long experience in the Middle East and Moslem world, and from our special position in the areas, like the Persian Gulf, which border on Saudi Arabia. Whatever may be the attitude of a clique of the King's foreign advisers who are only too pleased to exploit our present eastern frontier troubles, we have a fund of goodwill in this country, and so long at least as the present King is alive we are likely to retain the friendship and influence here which are required for our general Middle East policy.

23. The King's death when it comes is likely to mark the end of an epoch in Saudi Arabia and apart from whatever troubles may take place as regards the succession, it will probably be the signal for social and political changes to break-in very quickly on what is to-day still in fundamentals a mediæval State. We must hope that the position here of both the Americans and ourselves will be as strong as possible when that time comes. The closest Anglo-American co-operation will certainly be required if Saudi Arabia is to get the help and guidance she will need to get safely through what is bound to be a difficult transition period. If we can maintain intact the tradition of Anglo-American co-operation here in the interval (despite the complications of the probable impending growth of American interests here), it should stand us in good stead for what will certainly be a testing time for the policies of both the Americans and ourselves towards Saudi Arabia.

(2)

Mr. Morrison to Mr. Trott (Jedda)

(No. 35. Secret) *Foreign Office,*
Sir, *9th April, 1951.*

The analysis of the trend of Anglo-American relations in Saudi Arabia contained in your despatch No. 13 of 30th January has been read with interest. I am also grateful for the memorandum by Mr. Scott Fox which was enclosed in your despatch.

2. I feel that in our dealings with the Americans over Saudi Arabia we should not put too much emphasis on any local

differences we may have, lest they be magnified and influence adversely the general Anglo-American collaboration which we wish to maintain throughout the wider sphere of the Middle East. We are anxious, moreover, that the United States should increase their strategic commitment in the area, thereby giving them a greater interest in contributing towards its defence.

3. Your Excellency has drawn attention to a fundamental difference in approach between ourselves and the Americans to the

problem of dealing with Arab countries. The United States have shown a certain disposition to deal with such countries in the light of Western standards and ideals, whereas our own endeavour has been to reconcile our aims in the field of economic development and progress to the changes necessitated by indigenous methods, outlook and capabilities. It may well be that this difference of approach will be narrowed when the Americans are more used to dealing with Arab countries in questions of administration. The experience thus gained may bring the Americans to adopt a more practical approach in accord with our own thinking.

4. The immediate points of difference between the United States and ourselves in Saudi Arabia are related largely to military problems. Possible solutions of these questions are being considered with the Chiefs of Staff; and I hope that, now that the second session of the Malta Conference has also had an opportunity of examining the situation, I shall be able to let you know the result of this examination in the near future. Subsidiary points of difference will have to be dealt with as they arise, and I should be grateful for your recommendations on the attitude to be adopted on them as and when they emerge.

5. In your despatch under reference and in previous communications your Excellency has made reference to the predominance of American influence in Saudi Arabian economic affairs which has been evident since the last war. I should be interested to have your views on whether this predominance is likely to continue undiminished. As a result of the Caltex Agreement concluded between His Majesty's Government and certain American oil companies last year, the Arabian-American Oil Company will be paying large sums in sterling to the Saudi Arabian Government and the latter will consequently have a greater interest in sources of supply in the sterling area. It may therefore be expected that a certain revision of the balance of economic influence in our own favour may take place and, while it may be too early as yet for any indications of this development to have become apparent, I should be grateful if you would keep particular watch for any such signs and report them to me should they occur.

6. I am sending copies of this despatch to the recipients of your despatch under reference.

I am, &c.

HERBERT MORRISON.

ES 1011/1

No. 7

SAUDI ARABIA: ANNUAL REVIEW FOR 1950

Mr. Trott to Mr. Bevin. (Received 19th March)

(No. 28. Confidential) *Jedda,*
Sir, *1st March, 1951.*

I have the honour to transmit to you the accompanying Annual Review of events in Saudi Arabia for the year 1950, for which I am indebted to Mr. Scott Fox.

2. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Head of the British Middle East Office and to the Political Resident, Persian Gulf.

I have, &c.

(For A. C. Trott),

R. D. J. SCOTT FOX.

Enclosure in No. 7

The political situation in Saudi Arabia underwent no major change during the year under review. It has again to be recorded that the traditional system of direct personal rule, which was managed so adroitly by the King when he was in his prime, showed its

inadequacies now that it has to cope with the problems of a country which willy-nilly is no longer isolated from the modern world and has indeed become one of the most important sources of world oil supplies. Despite advancing years and failing health, however, the King still had sufficient prestige to make the primitive governmental machine function after a fashion, thanks largely to the lubrication provided by the liberal supplies of American dollars. There seemed no prospect of any fundamental change so long as the King was alive; speculation continued as to whether the Crown Prince's succession would be accepted by his brothers and, if it was, whether it would be the signal for major political and social changes to bring Saudi Arabia more into line with her neighbours. However, it cannot be said that the events of the year threw any additional clear light

on what the answer to either of these questions was likely to be, although some observers thought that the Amir Saud showed a gain in personal stature when he came to the Hejaz to represent his father at the Pilgrimage. Nor was there any great apparent change in the health of the King (who celebrated his Jubilee year by adding another young wife to his harem); and the consensus of opinion was still that whilst the possibility of his death at short notice could not be ruled out, there was organically no reason why he should not survive for a considerable number of years.

2. In the meantime, the life of the large majority of the people had still been hardly touched by their country's new wealth. It was not necessarily an unhappy life, but it was generally by our own standards, "nasty, brutish and short." The hard crust of the discipline of Wahabi morality was still almost entirely intact; admittedly, it seemed that, in the towns at least, the fanaticism which had been its inspiration was on the wane, but there was not much to suggest that more liberal ideals were filling the vacuum left by the recession. It was the incidentals of Western civilisation which had the readiest appeal: the Cadillacs, the Coco-Cola and the football (the latter being permitted this year for the first time). Any fundamental change in the people's mentality had evidently to wait for some broad measure of educational progress and a lead from the country's rulers; but at the close of the year there was little sign of either.

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3. In the absence of major political developments, the Pilgrimage remained in the centre of the picture of Saudi Arabia's *internal affairs*, and can be counted as a successful one. The number of pilgrims was the largest since the war. Administrative arrangements were slightly improved; and although it was preceded by a cholera scare (fortunately unfounded) and followed by a malaria epidemic (which was vigorously tackled by the British bacteriologist working for the Government), the Pilgrimage can be considered to have been reasonably satisfactory from the health point of view.

4. In general, it was economic rather than political developments which attracted attention. Abdullah Suleiman continued in charge of the Ministry of Finance, and the King apparently remained in ignorance of the way in which his bouts of whiskey drinking made him unable to pay anything

except the most erratic attention to his duties. At the end of 1949, however, Abdullah Suleiman had received a new lieutenant in Najib Salha, who has been making energetic efforts to put some semblance of order and more modern methods into the financial administration. The beginning of 1950 saw the Government in the throes of one of their periodical financial crises, caused by mismanagement and the extravagance of a system whereby the King's sons and their continually increasing families consider themselves entitled to a prior claim on the country's revenues. There was a good deal of grumbling, especially in the Hejaz, at the way the pay of soldiers and officials had fallen into arrears. The Government's immediate troubles were, however, relieved in the middle of the year by the renewed increase in the Arabian-American Oil Company's royalties, since the oil company were able to increase their production again, thanks to the Caltex Agreement for the sale of their oil in the sterling area and to the general increase in world demand for oil as a sequel to Korea. Aramco daily production had risen from 400,000 to 600,000 barrels by the end of the year, and tapline was completed in November in time to provide the means for exporting this additional quantity.

5. Not content with this, however, the Saudi Arabian Government increased their pressure on Aramco to negotiate a revision of the existing agreement so as to increase the Government's share of the profits. For some time the company tried to resist this, but eventually they gave way and agreed in the last few days of the year to waive their previous exemption from Saudi Arabian income-tax and to go half-shares with the Saudi Arabian Government on their net profits after American taxation has been deducted. If, as the company anticipate, the United States Treasury are prepared to exempt them from United States taxation in consideration of the taxation which they will in future be paying to the Saudi Arabian Government, then the new agreement of 30th December, 1950, should give the latter Government the extra income which they have been wanting without putting any heavy additional burden on the oil company.

6. In connexion with these negotiations with the oil company, the Saudi Arabian Government introduced in November an income-tax law which would in theory be an important step towards more modern financial procedure. No machinery had, however, been set up by the end of the year

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to apply this law and it remained to be seen whether, having served its purpose in extracting more money out of Aramco, it would now be forgotten. Earlier in the year Najib Salha had also put forward proposals to introduce some kind of budget system but nothing had come of this by the end of the year. There were the usual abortive discussions of the schemes for currency reform; the King remained firmly opposed to any paper currency, and the only concrete decision was to mint, in 1951, a gold coin called the Saudi guinea, with a view to remedying the increasing shortage of riyals.

7. Economically, the country remained to all intents and purposes entirely dependent on two sources of revenue: the oil industry and the pilgrim traffic. Agriculture still continued at a primitive level although some small progress was made with agricultural research stations managed by Palestinian refugees and with the installation of mechanical pumps for irrigation. By the end of the year two American irrigation experts had arrived, and further expert assistance was expected as a sequel to the Fourth-Point Agreement signed with the United States Government and an agreement signed with the Food and Agriculture Organisation.

8. Quite satisfactory progress was made with the Government's public works programme, which included the completion of the piers at the country's two main ports, Jeddah and Dammam. A start was made on the construction of roads from Jeddah to Medina and from Mecca to Taif, and part of the Dammam-Riyadh railway was completed and opened. Various electrification, water and hospital projects in the towns were shared in the main between the Government Agents, the International Bechtel Incorporated, and three British firms. Work continued on the airports at Jeddah, Riyadh and Hofuf; 13,000 pilgrims arrived at the former during the summer and there was abundant evidence of Saudi air-mindedness.

9. Whilst the work of the British Military Mission in helping with the projected creation of a small Saudi army on more modern lines continued to be a very uphill affair, and it was not until the end of the year that the Minister of Defence decided to accept the mission's advice and to order some of the arms most urgently required for training, there was a revival of Saudi anxiety to acquire an air force. At the request of the Saudi Minister of Defence, an air force training scheme was worked out by the head

and deputy head of the British Civil Air Training Mission (which had successfully completed its three-year tour in September). By the time, however, that His Majesty's Government had decided to give some official support to the scheme, it had apparently been shelved as a result of a rival offer made by the Americans in the course of their Dhahran air base negotiations, mentioned below.

10. In the field of *foreign affairs*, this was a difficult year for Anglo-Saudi relations. Ibn Saud became increasingly preoccupied with the frontier dispute with the Trucial Sheikdoms. Unfortunately, he appeared to have convinced himself that we were trying to question his sovereignty over lands which were part of his ancestral dominions and to interfere with the protection which he claims has been always extended by the House of Saud to the tribes in those areas. Whilst not hiding their disappointment at the exaggerated nature of the Saudi claims, His Majesty's Government indicated that they would be prepared to agree on certain conditions that a fact-finding Anglo-Saudi commission should visit the disputed areas. Whilst this proposal was still under discussion, however, the King's apprehensions were greatly increased by the news that we were about to establish the Persian Gulf Levy Force. Our explanation that this small force would be for police purposes only in no way disposed of Ibn Saud's fears that we were trying to bring pressure on him in connexion with the frontier negotiations. He particularly resented the fact that we were sending a nucleus from the Arab Legion to form the force, especially as he had never disguised from us his obsession with the possibility of Hashemite designs against his country. Further strong protests from the Saudis were caused by our insistence that the Petroleum Concessions Limited, the oil company holding rights on the Trucial Coast, should continue their work in the part of Abu Dhabi which the Saudis were now claiming; and it was becoming increasingly clear at the end of the year that it would be highly desirable in the interests of general Anglo-Saudi relations to make some progress with the settlement of the frontier problems.

11. Another outstanding territorial dispute concerned certain islands in the Persian Gulf claimed by Saudi Arabia and Bahrain and Kuwait respectively, and the removal of markers put up by the Saudis on some of these islands provoked a violent

protest from the Saudi Arabian Government. At the close of the year we were considering a proposal to hold a meeting with the Saudis to discuss the ownership of the islands. On the other hand, no suggestion had been made to the Saudi Arabian Government by the close of the year for dealing with the complicated problem of the division of the off-shore oil working rights in the Persian Gulf. Similarly, any questions of administrative arrangements for the Saudi-Kuwait Neutral Zone were allowed to remain dormant; the disappointing results of the oil prospecting in the area suggested that this might no longer have the urgency that had at one time been expected.

12. Despite our disputes, the King remained insistent on his faithfulness to his long-standing friendship with us and he certainly appreciated the fact that the Duke of Edinburgh was able to accompany the Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet on a visit to Jeddah in January. At the same time he seemed genuinely convinced that our attitude in the frontier disputes indicated that we no longer reciprocated his friendship as wholeheartedly as in the past, and he showed a tendency to turn accordingly to his more recent friends the Americans who, although they might be (as he complained) more remote, were prepared to provide abundant evidence of their increasing interest in his country.

13. As mentioned above the King's revenues received a useful addition from a new agreement with Aramco; in general, there was a continued expansion of American economic interests, particularly in the Eastern part of the country; and an Export-Import Bank Loan of \$15 million was secured by Saudi Arabia in August (and a provisional arrangement for the loan of American financial advisers was probably connected with these developments, at least in the minds of the Americans). In view of the deterioration in the general international situation and of the King's Hashemite fears, Ibn Saud found no doubt very welcome too the offers which the Americans were induced to make towards the end of the year when they started negotiations for putting the lease of the Dhahran air base on a more permanent footing. According to information supplied to us by the United States Government in strict confidence, these offers included the supply of equipment (on a cash-reimbursable basis) and training facilities, not only for a military force but also for a small air force and navy. On a more personal plane, the King can hardly fail to have

been flattered that when a team of American doctors came to Riyadh in the spring to examine his health it was headed by President Truman's personal physician. On the other hand, there was no evidence that the United States Government gave any encouragement to his suggestions that they might intervene with us in the frontier disputes.

14. Although on balance these American attentions were no doubt welcome enough, it did not by any means follow that the Saudi Arabian Government would abandon their habitual distrust of foreign encroachment and allow American activities a free rein. Similarly, whilst it no doubt suited the Government to keep the Americans in Dhahran, they could be relied to drive as hard a bargain as possible before giving the long-term facilities which the Americans wanted. By the end of 1950 the Americans had in fact made little progress in their negotiations for the Dhahran lease, and the existing temporary arrangements had had to be renewed for a further six months. It seemed already clear, however, that whatever arrangements might ultimately be reached would increase the American stake in this country and would make it necessary to co-ordinate carefully the military assistance which they would give with what we have been providing ourselves through the British Military Mission. American interests were already large; apart from the Dhahran air base, they were heavily committed economically in Eastern Arabia and were running the airports at Jeddah and Riyadh as well.

15. The events of the year naturally reinforced Ibn Saud's concern at the Communist threat. He prided himself on the absence of Communists in his own country, and in his relations with the other Arab States he continued to consider the Arab League idea worth supporting as a means of increasing the Arab unity which the critical times required. In practice, however, it was more his fears of Hashemite ambitions which governed his policy in his relations with his neighbours. For a time, a respite from the usual complaints to His Majesty's Government about Hashemite "provocation" suggested that the Tripartite Declaration of June 1950 might have gone some way to remove this old obstacle to Middle Eastern co-operation, but subsequent reports of statements by King Abdullah making it clear that he had not abandoned his claim to the Hejaz and our own above-mentioned proposal to send

Arab Legion personnel to the Trucial Coast provoked Saudi reactions which made it clear that their obsession had still very much to be reckoned with.

16. These fears explained the Saudi attitude to Syria where Saudi money and intrigues continued to work against Greater Syrian schemes. How strongly the Saudis felt on this subject was again shown when, at the height of Saudi Arabia's financial crisis in January, the Government borrowed 6 million dollars from Aramco and pledged it to Syria. Only 2 million dollars of this loan had been paid, however, when the Syrian Prime Minister came to Riyadh in November, and in return for his assurance that Syria intended to maintain her independence, he apparently secured a promise that the second instalment of the loan would be paid, and that Saudi intrigue in Syria would be curbed. The effect of this visit was somewhat marred by the simultaneous publication in Damascus of an official indictment against the Arab Redemption Association containing offensive references to Saudi Arabia, and the second instalment had in fact not been paid by the end of the year.

17. For the same reason Saudi Arabia's attitude continued to conform generally to that of Egypt in Arab League affairs, notably as regards Jordan's annexation of Arab Palestine and Egypt's Arab Collective Security Pact. She did, however, take a line of her own in supporting the Security Council's original Resolutions on Korea (and Ibn Saud claimed privately that Egypt did not understand the importance of keeping communism back); and in November, despite his anxiety at the political situation in Egypt and at the agitation against King

Farouk, Ibn Saud responded to our suggestion that he should counsel the Egyptian Government to bear in mind the defence interests of the Middle East in their negotiations with His Majesty's Government.

18. Even Saudi Arabia's hostility to Israel seemed in practice to be to some extent subordinated to her Hashemite complex, since Israeli strength might be a useful counterweight to Jordan. At the same time, she was still not prepared to take any positive action, as regards, for instance, refugees, which might bring her out of line with the attitude of the other Arab States. Similarly, if the Saudis agreed to go on keeping Rashid Ali in Riyadh, despite his increasing unpopularity there, it could be assumed to be not only to meet the insistent requests of ourselves and the Iraqis but also because he might one day offer a useful means of retaliating against possible future trouble from Iraq.

19. A distinguished Moslem visitor was the King of Afghanistan who came here in March 1950 on his way back from Europe. After visiting the usual Moslem Holy Places he went to Riyadh to see the King, but no special political importance was attached to the visit.

20. As regards non-Moslem countries, apart from Britain and the United States, mention should be made of France, who showed signs during the year of being anxious to play a more active rôle here. She secured a large contract for the construction of ammunition factories in Eastern Saudi Arabia, and the Bank of Indo-China continued its successful exploitation of the Jeddah foreign exchange market, and spared no pains to ingratiate itself with the financial authorities here.

economic affairs, to which I alluded in my despatch No. 13 of 30th January and other communications, is likely to continue undiminished. I consider that it is, despite the fact that sterling appears now to have to some extent reassumed the predominant position it held in Saudi Arabia's external trade before the war and has been introduced into Aramco's accounts and payments to the Saudi Arabian Government.

3. The basic fact is that American investment in this country now amounts in value

to probably not much less than British investments in China at the time of the Communist absorption of that country. Most of this investment is in an industry recognised by the United States Government to be of primary strategic importance. In addition the United States Government have, as I explained in my aforementioned despatch, come to regard this country as its foster-child so far as economic development in particular is concerned. Hence, for instance, the 1950 Export-Import Bank loan (with its exclusive provision of American services and equipment); the United States Government's apparent willingness to bear the financial burden of Aramco's new agreement with the Saudi Arabian Government; the pressure brought to bear over the last year or more on the Saudi Arabian Government to accept numerous American experts which has so far resulted in the signing of the first Point-Four Agreement in the Middle East, the provision of an F.A.O. Mission, and two water geologists, an agreement to provide a Financial Adviser, two accountancy experts and two customs experts, and the provision of aerial survey services; and now the efforts being made to form a Commercial college in the Hejaz with assistance from the American University of Beirut and under the Point-Four programme. All these are recent manifestations of the United States Government's determination to sustain and expand their interest in the economic development of Saudi Arabia and thereby their influence in Saudi Arabia's economic affairs.

4. At the same time Aramco, whilst expanding so widely and rapidly themselves, continue to foster all manner of economic enterprises in Saudi Arabia, generally under American guidance or control, in the province of al Hasa, which the Minister of Finance has been reliably quoted as having come to regard as an exclusive American area of interest; and to a lesser degree in each of the other provinces of Saudi Arabia including the Hejaz. I have on previous occasions listed the principal enterprises. In total there is, to my mind, no doubt that the Americans now play a much greater and more all-embracing part in the economic affairs of this country than for instance we, with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, were doing in Persia when we had that field to ourselves; and the expansion of their activities and influence continues unabated.

5. In the commercial field American firms and American goods secured a tremendous lead over others after the war. Public works

and building contracts constituted one of the main fields of foreign business in the country and in this field the International Bechtel Inc. had the advantage of substantial Aramco contracts and of becoming Government agents shortly after the war. They now act as maintenance engineers for the Government and for the numerous palaces in Riyadh, Jeddah, Taif and elsewhere, as well as construction engineers for numerous public works throughout the country. Their main competition comes from British and Egyptian firms. Both British and Egyptian firms are certainly maintaining their position in constructional work in this area and, as you will have seen from my recent economic and other reports, British constructional firms have made great headway recently. Bechtels, however, still remain the Government agents, and except in regard to the now completed Tapline contract their foothold is still fairly firm and broadly based. I have received information recently, in confidence, that both the Amir Faisal and Najib Bey Slaha have taken steps to try to get the Bechtel contract with the Government terminated. This may at least result in the Bechtel field of operations being reduced but they are still well placed by virtue of their close association with the 1950 Export-Import Bank line of Credit. I should here make it clear that at present British enterprise is almost entirely concerned with the western part of this country, *i.e.*, the Hejaz. The rest, by far the largest part, is more or less an American area, and the only British commercial interest therein is a few pumps at Riyadh and possibly the building of a palace for the King's brother. Hopes of introducing British enterprise by the side of American have been considerably lessened by the experience of Messrs. John Howard & Company, constructional engineers who tried to build a pier for Aramco near Qatif. The American opposition was too strong. The British company, owing to losses at sea, were behind their schedule: Americans came and offered to finish the job in less time than the British guaranteed to do; the British company had to leave, with the final result that the Americans finished the job about four months after the British would have done; and at the end the British firm lost £72,000.

6. In the matter of trade American exports to this country (including to Aramco) appear likely to continue to hold their predominant position. Their value fell from a total of around \$84 million in each of 1948 and 1949 to under \$40 million in

ES 1022/3G

No. 8

ANGLO-UNITED STATES RELATIONS

Mr. Trott to Mr. Morrison. (Received 13th June)

(Guard)

(No. 59. Confidential)
Sir,

Jedda,
2nd June, 1951.

I have the honour to acknowledge your despatch No. 35 of 9th April about Anglo-American relations in Saudi Arabia. I note that you will be advising me further about the military aspect of this question in the near future.

2. In the meanwhile you have asked my views on whether the pre-dominance of American influence in Saudi Arabian

1950, and may fall further to below \$30 million in 1951. But they are unlikely to fall much lower on account of the large demand for American cars and certain machinery, with which we, the next principal suppliers, cannot compete, particularly with the burden of our defence programme limiting our exports. British exports to this country actually fell last year from a total value of £3.4 million to a total value of £2.8 million (excluding arms). This was, I think, partly on account of greater competition from other countries facilitated by the extended use of sterling in third country trade, and partly on account of the fact that there was a gap during most of 1950 between the termination of certain British-held constructional contracts (and the supply of aircraft) and the opening of the several new contracts. Also some restrictions were imposed on imports on Government account generally during the first half of the year. The prospects for 1951 are better, despite the defence programme. But the total, even combined with those of other sterling area countries—India, Pakistan and Australia in particular—does not look like exceeding the total of American exports to this country in the foreseeable future.

7. These are the tangible factors in the question of the predominant influence in the economic affairs of this country. The principal factor is the massive presence of Aramco. Parallel to this is the personal influence wielded by the United States official and unofficial representatives through the United States Government's readiness to grant extensive assistance to the country (limited more by the reluctance of the Saudis to be pushed and controlled than by any lack of American enthusiasm and funds) and through the offices of Aramco, Bechtels, the International Telegraph and Telephone Company and those influential Saudi merchants and firms who, through profitable motor-car agencies and the like, are now irrevocably tied to American interests and American standards. The substantial gifts of arms and facilities which the United States Government are evidently ready to grant in return for the lease of the Dhahran Air Base is merely another instance of the point-4 process of Americanisation: no other countries need apply.

8. The strength of British economic interests in this country is still substantial but they are much less tangible. The pilgrimage brings in mainly British and Indian subjects; as a business enterprise it still ranks as an equal with business on behalf of the

Government and the motor-vehicle business so far as the large Hejaz merchant community is concerned; and it still contributes a fair proportion of the country's income (estimated around 16 per cent. this year) in sterling and allied currencies. But whereas before the war the pilgrimage constituted Saudi Arabia's main source of income and the main subject of foreign economic interest in the country, it is now secondary to oil. The extent to which the country's economy is now tied to oil was strikingly illustrated last year when the fall in oil production and resultant royalties and employment from 1949 brought all manner of internal troubles, political and commercial, at the beginning of the year, which the Saudis did not like. The subsequent rapid rise in oil production and the Export-Import Bank loan completely restored the Government and the wealthier members of the community to their complacent indifference to the anachronistic state of their financial administration and to the gross instability of the economy of the country, in the latter part of the year; but if the King attributed this change in his fortunes to the alleged wizardry of his Minister of Finance and to God, the more understanding Saudis manifestly did not fail to learn the lesson of their primary dependence on Aramco and the United States Government.

9. The 1950 pilgrimage also contributed to the restoration of Saudi Arabia's fortunes, but the Saudis merely took that for granted subject to the will of God. They do not regard the pilgrimage as an economic interest largely sustained by the British and associated Governments. We even have the greatest difficulty in convincing our American colleagues that we have an important economic (and political) interest in the pilgrimage. That is what I mean by our interests being less tangible than those of the Americans; and what I had in mind in stating in my aforementioned despatch that the essential point in maintaining Anglo-American co-operation in regard to Saudi Arabian affairs was that we should recognise our separate as much as our mutual interests in this country (and recognise our differences).

10. The same argument applies in regard to the relative importance of the dollar and sterling to the economy of this country. There are no statistics available, but a local banker recently hazarded the guess that, excluding motor vehicle imports, probably as much as 70 per cent. of Saudi Arabia's imports are now paid for in sterling. Saudi

account sterling can now be used fairly freely and widely and it is cheaper to use it than the dollar when the exchange rate in the local markets averages around \$2.6 to the £ or less. Likewise the introduction of sterling into Aramco's payments to the Saudi Arabian Government at the rate of about £500,000 per month since August 1950 (a total of over £4½ million in the nine months August 1950 to April 1951) and the sterling-mindedness of Aramco since the Caltex Oil Agreement of July 1950 was under negotiation, having greatly contributed to the importance of sterling in the economic affairs of this country. As we found in November last, however, when we tried to persuade the Saudis to adopt a correct sterling-dollar cross-rate in calculating their sterling royalties, the Saudis do not readily accept the idea that Saudi Arabia's more extensive use of sterling entitles us to claim a greater interest in and influence over the country's economic affairs—comparable, say, to the increased influence the Americans will wield through the appointment of an American financial adviser. Even if they do the point is that at the same time the Americans are constantly expanding their interest and influence in most other spheres of Saudi Arabia's economic affairs. A more significant factor in limiting the American predominance is, in fact, the feeling that seems to have grown recently in the Hejaz, at any rate, that the Americans are muscleing in far too much and that the maintenance of balancing British influence has become more than ever desirable (particularly of course as that gives the Saudis competing factions to play off).

11. In discussing this question of the predominant economic interests in Saudi Arabia I have considered it mainly from the Saudi point of view. It is their attitude which ultimately determines how much influence we or the Americans can exert over the country's economic affairs; and since the nature of this country and its Government is such that the Government takes a minute and frequently controlling interest in the economic affairs of the country, it is largely the Government and those Saudis who have influence in Government circles whose attitude is the determining factor. For the reasons I have given earlier in this despatch this Saudi attitude is, with some justification, that American economic interests unquestionably predominate, and are likely to continue to do so for so long as Aramco remains to dominate the scene and the

Americans maintain their present policies. Such possible developments as an increase in the proportion of sterling in Aramco's payments to the Saudi Arabian Government appears unlikely to affect this position noticeably unless Aramco make sterling the principal currency in all their accounts, and there is no prospect of that in the foreseeable future. Thus, for instance, in a question like currency reform in Saudi Arabia, as I have said in previous communications, the time has now long passed when we could realistically expect the Saudis and the Americans to accept the idea of a Saudi currency based on sterling alone.

12. I am writing this despatch just before leaving this country definitively: and in view of my four years' service as head of this post I feel I should endeavour to hazard a guess as to the future. What will eventually come out of the quite unprecedented American invasion of this country depends on many unknown factors. Dhahran and the Tapline settlements are already exactly like towns in the United States, with practically no Arabic character at all. All ordinary services are done by Americans. The life of the Bedaween is being completely changed by the coming of the oil. I think this was quite inevitable as the Americans had to start from practically nothing. But it appears to bring with it certain very grave dangers for the future. I foresee endless arguments with local authorities. The example of the Persians will surely be followed. Hundreds of hungry and untrained Saudis will pretty soon begin to clamour for some of the highly-paid jobs now done by Americans. Moreover, it may not always be the case that the United States Treasury will pursue what appears to be their present policy of letting the Saudis have the income tax which they (the Treasury) used to get. I can foresee even greater trouble than we are now having with the Persians. The 50-50 agreement with Venezuela is said to have proved a stable factor, but I very much doubt whether this will be so in this grasping country, which lives on advances and always expects next year's revenue to be half as much again as the previous one's. In fact, I can see the Americans being faced with the unpleasant dilemma of either yielding a great part of their comfortable monopoly to the hands of Arabs, or else controlling the country directly themselves. (Mr. Young's appointment as Financial Adviser seems to be the first step in the direction of the second alternative.) That dilemma might perhaps lead to one of those explosive changes of

policy in which the Americans seem to delight, and if they suddenly began to leave this country alone our position and prospects would be quite different.

13. Finally, I think I should emphasise that throughout the whole of the time I have been in charge of this embassy I and the whole of my staff have made every possible effort to co-operate with the Americans, and I cannot help attributing any failures there may have been to the Americans. Mr. Hare, a most cultured and enlightened man, lectured us before he came here on the anachronistic nature of our arrangements in the Persian Gulf, an area in which he had not served. Other Americans are even more self-confident and certain that they know the answers, and that we do not. Many of the members of the embassy seem to have anti-British complexes in their very marrow. The idea that there might perhaps be ways of doing things which are just as good, in fact even better, than the American way, may perhaps enter their minds some time, but that time is not yet. But while always striving for mutual understanding and co-operation, I have never believed in letting the Americans get away with things in which we were also able to make a reasonable offer: once we start to do that I imagine that not only our protégés on the Persian Gulf but also very many of our Saudi friends would be gravely surprised and disappointed. The most unpleasant feature of the present foreign policy of the United States in this country is its exclusiveness; perhaps even that may change in course of time, but until it does, it seems clear to me

that we must assert ourselves against that exclusiveness whenever we have a chance. And in ending I feel I must draw attention to another feature of American policy which is constantly obtruding itself on our notice: that is, that American policy here seems often to be revealed, not through the agency of their diplomatic representatives, but through that of their enormously powerful oil interests. Whatever the State Department may say or imagine, Aramco is constantly at work, often on policies which are at variance with official United States policy. Three instances of that occur to me: (1) the secret oil agreement of 1948, which was successful in keeping British oil interests out of the waters of the Persian Gulf though the American embassy here said only a short time ago that it had never received a copy thereof; (2) Aramco's lawyers drafted the territorial waters decree for the Saudi Government, an enactment which, though suiting very well the Aramco interests formed the subject of protests not only from His Majesty's Government but also from the United States Government; and (3) the extensive work which Aramco have done and are still doing for the Saudi Government with the object of establishing the Saudi Government with the object of establishing the Saudi claims to large areas of the eastern part of this country which we maintain belong to others.

14. I am sending copies of this despatch to the recipients of your despatch under reference.

I have, &c.

A. C. TROTT.

ES 1016/7

No. 9

REPORT ON RECENT TRENDS IN SAUDI ARABIA

Mr. Trott to Mr. Morrison. (Received 22nd June)

(No. 61. Secret)
(Guard)
Sir,

Jedda,

4th June, 1951.

On the eve of my departure from Jedda after a residence there of nearly four years I feel it might be of interest if I recorded some of the recent trends which I have noticed in this country during that time. I had originally thought of putting them in the form of "debits" and "credits," but that plan seems inappropriate to the very complicated changes which have taken place,

and I find it very difficult to describe them in logical sequence.

2. I propose first of all to mention the material and social changes which have occurred. Then I propose to make some remarks about the future, though I shall not claim to be able to answer the question which everyone in this country is asking—"What will happen when the King dies?"

3. To begin with the King, there is outwardly little change to report. The patriarchal régime which is the only way of

governing known to our monarch still persists. It means of course absolute tyranny. The King's sons never venture to sit down in the presence of their father unless he tells them to do so. No one ever dares to question anything the King has decided. But he is not the man he was. Not only is he ageing, but there is a good deal of evidence that his nature and character have changed. The renegade Englishman Philby, whose opinions are always personal and usually unreliable, actually said to me once "the King is the biggest crook of the lot"—strange words for a man who has based the whole of his life on a sort of mystical adulation for the great Saudi monarch, whose mission was to spread the benefits of the *pax Saudiana* to all the Saudi peninsula, and for a man who still keeps up the absurd pretence of being one of the King's official advisers. At any rate, the King has changed. Sometimes he is lethargic and almost somnolent. At others he wakes up and shows some signs of his old fire. He is now practically incapable of walking alone. His deafness is increasing. Whether the aphrodisiac injections of the notorious Dr. Midhat Sheikh el Ardh still go on is doubtful. But the cheerful Arabic communications which used to reach this mission between 1937 and 1940 (when I was here before) have all stopped. I used to enjoy trying to translate their picturesque arguments, though as the amanuensis never ventured to alter a single letter of the Royal remarks sentences seldom ended in the same way as they had begun. The dry communications which we now get are not of the same nature, and seem to come from another pen. The King cannot now be bothered, and no one ventures to tell him anything which might excite him.

4. The King's advisers have not changed much: Youssef Yasin, Fouad Hamza, Khalid Gharganey and one or two others seem to do the important business, with Rushdi Malhas running the papers, and Abdullah Suleiman running the finance. But they are older, richer, and even less liable to give the King any valuable advice than previously. One new counsellor, Rashid Ali, has joined the court: a strange guide for a friend of ours, but I suppose the chance of a stick to beat the Hashemites was too tempting for the King to miss. In the background is the egregious Philby, still banging the Saudi drum and pretending that he guides the monarch: whereas in private he knows that the whole administrative machine is rotten, the principles of the

Wahhabis forgotten, and even those of Islam flouted in secret. He must be living in a hell of his own, but he is still arguing with the King, writing books proving that he was always right, and pursuing amateur researches in ancient Himyaritic graffiti, scribbled on stones before Islam was ever thought of.

5. Turning to obvious economic changes, anyone who comes to Jedda can see that things have changed, and are changing. Jedda has the most expensive and perhaps the worst hotel in the near east: anyone desiring a single room will have to pay about £6 per day, with everything extra. Large buildings are going up rapidly: ribbon development extends along the coasts to north and south, and along the Mecca Road. The Medina Road is beginning. The Mecca Road has been widened and the asphalt has been re-laid. There is a jetty at which a couple of ships can berth. There is also an income-tax law, though it is not yet in force: it applies only to foreigners, because the local inhabitants pay, or ought to pay, the ancient muslim tithe called zakat. Young Jeddawis, as visiting ships of His Majesty's fleet know to their cost, are passionately devoted to football. Many of them are also devoted to whisky and cinemas, but hitherto those two delights are frowned upon. There is a water-supply which brings more than half a million gallons of good water to Jedda every day: a large proportion of that water is either wasted owing to taps being left on or devoted to excessive watering of gardens, or to the coca-cola plant. Cadillac cars are seen by the dozen.

6. But when we come to examine things like public education, hygiene, government offices, engineering projects, etc., we find that there is no progress. The King knows what education *he* had, and he considers that enough for anybody. The princes are not encouraged to study the west. No intelligent young Saudis are being educated to fill governmental posts. Nobody quite knows how the Ministry of Finance, for instance, works: the Minister is a worn-out old toper, who cannot last much longer: and under him there are a few Syrians and some Saudis, very few of whom are capable of taking responsibility. There is a budget but nobody imagines that it will be adhered to. The Government funds are always spent in advance and there is hardly ever any cash available. It is regarded as a matter of course that the Americans will produce more oil revenues every year, and that the present substantial revenue from

the pilgrimage will go on for ever. As for hygiene, as long as the present Syrian doctors have the ear of the King nothing will really be done. As for engineering, the only form of Government enterprise which is at present working is a most expensive contract with an American firm, which must be making enormous profits but which does not seem to do very much in return.

7. Perhaps the most characteristic feature of the present form of government in 1925, when it began, was its religion. The stern, puritanical Wahhabi sect, which nearly exterminated the Bani Harb for pillaging pilgrims, is still the nominal religion of the country. The King at Riyadh goes in person to see the principal "ulema" every Thursday, and delights in scattering silver or gold coins to the poor and needy, thereby literally fulfilling one of the main obligations of Islam. The old punishments still crop up: only a short time ago two men are reported to have had their hands cut off for stealing in Jedda: two years ago at Dhahran a man was by order of the local authority buried in sand up to his middle and stoned till he died: his offence was adultery. Chauffeurs of Aramco have been savagely lashed for exceeding the speed limit: three men at Hasa were decapitated publicly for murder not long ago. That is the law of the land, and as we have no extra-territorial or capitulatory right in this country our nationals are perhaps, in strict law, subject to such penalties.

8. But the whole basis of Wahhabism is, in actual fact, shaken if not destroyed. If all thieves were to have their hands cut off, there would be very few hands left in Saudi Arabia. Even under the King's nose at Riyadh there are wild parties at which whisky and methylated spirit are drunk. Few young men now think of going to the mosque. Everyone knows that the highest in the land are lining their pockets while times are good, and the great hope of almost all Saudi officials is to own valuable house property in Egypt or Syria. The Princes set that example. Speculation in land values goes on merrily and no one knows or thinks that some day it must stop.

9. In fact the present boom, the present prosperity, is most superficial. The bubble may soon be pricked. An American financial adviser is on the point of arriving and he will have at any rate to try to set things in some sort of order. It is unlikely that he will get anything done while the

present two old gentlemen, the King and his Minister of Finance, are alive, and even when they are gathered to their fathers Mr. Young's task will be very like Hercules' job of cleaning the Augean stables. The whole governmental façade reminds one of Hans Andersen's fable of the "Emperor's Clothes" except that in this case there seems to be no little boy to point out the obvious fact that there are no real clothes at all.

10. How do His Majesty's Government stand with regard to this very curious situation? Fortunately, they do not seem to be greatly involved. The King, while paying lip service to the old friends who he always says are the best politicians and supporters of the Arabs, has done very little for us in the last few years: indeed whenever we have offered him any advice he has seldom done what we wished him to do and he has often done the exact opposite: his agents have caused great trouble in Syria, he has not really made friends with his ancestral enemies, and he seems determined to stand by Egypt whatever that country does or says. A perusal of the despatches written by Sir R. Bullard about the pilgrimage will bring out the way in which in the early days, say 1925 and 1926, we hoped that pilgrims would be treated with more consideration and the enormous pilgrimage dues reduced: in fact we received promises that whenever some stable source of revenue of another kind were to be found, the pilgrimage dues would be lowered to what they used to be in the days of the Turks. Another source of wealth, far beyond any dreams in 1926, has now been found, and the Government is rich: but the dues are just the same. The eastern part of the country is becoming more and more like a piece of America every day, and the Americans are just about to obtain a firm hold on the vital air base of Dhahran: it is on them that the trouble will, in the first place, fall, if my analysis is right. But whether the Americans yet realise this danger and whether their present method of giving still more gifts to this already over-wealthy country is the right one, is another question.

11. I am sending copies of this despatch to the British Middle East Office, to Washington and to the Political Resident Persian Gulf.

I have, &c.

A. C. TROTT.

ES 1113/5

No. 10

ECONOMIC SITUATION

Mr. Riches to Mr. Morrison. (Received 7th August)

(No. 76 E. Confidential)
Sir,

Jedda,
22nd July, 1951.

With reference to Mr. Trott's despatch No. 90 E. of 29th May, 1948, about the first published budget in Saudi Arabia's history, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copies of the second Saudi budget to be published, which is for the Moslem years 1370-71 (September 1951-September 1952). Footnotes have been added, and in some cases categories redesignated, after conversations with Shaikh Mohammed Suroor, Deputy Minister of Finance, who took part in the later stages of the budget's compilation and who is the Minister effectively in charge of the matter.

2. Paragraph 2 of the despatch under reference suggested that the first budget was published at American insistence and in order to prepare public opinion for the establishment of a Currency Board and the possible issue of a paper currency. In the event these proposals came to nothing; now again, however, American interest in the matter would be natural having regard to American economic assistance to this country, and the Saudi Government, whose improvident financial operations led them to complete insolvency at the end of 1949, may have felt that they might best impress the public with their desire for a reform of the financial system by the publication of a national balance-sheet. The present gold coin/riyal currency stabilisation scheme now looks as though, like other schemes before it, it may come to nothing. This was not, however, the case when the budget was under consideration and there may have been some desire on the part of the Government to persuade their public that the inconveniences and novelty of the scheme were offset by the possible contribution it might make to financial stability here.

3. There is good reason to think that the budget in the form in which it has now been published is very different from that contemplated by its instigator, Najib Bey Salha. You will recall from earlier correspondence that when Najib Bey became virtual economic dictator here at the end of 1949, he gave it as his opinion that a budget which would, *inter alia*, restrict Royal expenditure and be adhered to in its major provisions was a prerequisite of financial stability.

Loans from the Arabian American Oil Company (Aramco) and the United States generally, however, the providential increase in oil production subsequent to the outbreak of war in Korea and, above all, the revision of the oil company's agreement with the Saudi Arabian Government in the latter's financial favour, both eased the Government's financial position and tended to give the impression to people only too ready to believe it that the financial crisis of 1949 was due to some temporary dislocation and that now once again the country might expect to receive more and more money for no more effort than before. This is not to say that those in charge of the finances since Najib Bey's powers were curtailed would not like to see them put on a proper footing; it can, however, be reasonably inferred that the less their immediate difficulties, the less the determination of the officials of the Ministry of Finance to tackle the basic questions of expenditure, taxation and financial administration without whose solution no stability is possible. The budget is, therefore, in essence a compromise between the lamentable financial reality and the good intentions of the Ministry of Finance. The Royal family's extravagance and irresponsibility have been with the country ever since its formation and the allocation to them of nearly three-quarters of the estimated revenue merely recognises that nothing basic can be done in the King's lifetime to curb it. By setting this enormous sum at the Royal family's disposal the authors of the budget obviously hope that at least they will at the end of the year be able to say that the Royal family's budget, of which Shaikh Mohammed Suroor is in personal charge, has not been exceeded. So negative a claim will not, however, even if substantiated, conceal the fact that the major difficulty has been formalised rather than tackled; the obvious disparity between the Royal family's share and, for instance, the meagre 6 million odd riyals allocated to Public Health, will not, moreover, be lost on more intelligent members of the Saudi public.

4. With the best will in the world it is unlikely that the Saudi Arabian Government, lacking administrators and government machinery worthy of the name, will

be able to adhere to the precise provisions of the budget except by accident. It is, for instance, true that the budget has been based on an admitted under-estimate of anticipated revenue from oil. It is, however, equally true that all receipts and expenditure are shown in riyals, a currency which continues to fluctuate against the foreign currencies in which by far the greater portion of the national revenue is collected, and that the progressive hardening of the riyal against those other currencies may offset much of the revenue, surplus to the budget estimate, which may accrue in oil royalties and taxes on oil profits. In these circumstances any analysis beyond that provided in the footnotes I have added to the budget is pointless.

5. Our main interest, therefore, is in the indication which the budget gives of the increase in the national income since 1948. The budget published in that year showed a revenue and estimated expenditure of 214,568,500 riyals. The present budget shows revenue and expenditure to be more than twice this figure; and the present estimates may well be exceeded in revenue and, on past experience, will almost certainly be exceeded in expenditure. Whereas in the earlier year oil revenue was expected to yield 140 million riyals (paid in gold and at the rate of 4s. gold to the ton), oil royalties this year are estimated at 180 million riyals and are supplemented, in the form of taxes on oil profits and income tax on Aramco employees, by perhaps three-quarters of the 160 million riyals shown under the heading of income tax and taxes on movable property. This is the central feature of the budget. It has its obvious implications for United Kingdom exports to Saudi Arabia, but it should be remembered that in a country lacking any form of native industry, a lot of the increased revenue is dissipated in inflation and does not represent a net gain in purchasing power. It only remains to add that at the moment when Saudi Arabian income is higher than ever before, her indebtedness, both internally and externally, is also greater than ever before, and that various categories of Government employment are having as much difficulty in getting their salaries as in the days when oil revenue was half its present figure. Merchants, too, complain that they cannot get their credits to the Government repaid; the oral complaints of many of them in private about the Royal family's expenditure should not, however, blind us to the

fact that they, too, are making greater profits than ever before and that they take a middleman's profit of anything up to 100 per cent. on the same extravagant spending by the Royal family which by general consent is the country's chief curse.

I have, &c.

D. M. H. RICHES.

Enclosure in No. 10

(Translation)

Government Budget for the Year 1951-52 = 1370-71

The following are the full details and items of the Government budget for the year 1370-71 as sanctioned by Royal Decree No. 5/1/3/8497:—

Government Revenue for Financial Year 1370-71

PART 1		
Item	Description	Saudi Riyals
1	Livestock tax	1,500,000
2	Tax on cereals and fruit	7,000,000
3	Income tax and tax on moveable property (Zakat)	160,000,000
4	Resident permits revenue	200,000
5	Estate taxes	500,000
6	Factory taxes	5,000
Total of Part 1		169,205,000

(i) Including tax on profits by Arabian-American Oil Company (Aramco) as distinct from royalties at IV (31).

PART 2		
Item	Description	Saudi Riyals
7	Customs duties	60,000,000
8	Port dues	450,000
9	Quarantine fees (entry tax)	7,500,000
10	Harbour duties (ii)	1,500,000
11	Notary and judicial fees	460,000
12	Registration of cars and trade marks	60,000
13	Probe dues	20,000
14	Fees on certification of documents	5,000
15	Stamp duties	700,000
16	Pilgrimage affairs (iii)	14,000,000
17	Passport and visa revenue	1,000,000
18	Car drivers' licences	210,000
19	Registration of motor transport	340,000
20	Public security	15,000
21	Markets (iv)	Nil
Total of Part 2		86,260,000

(ii) 450,000 riyals harbour dues; 7,500,000 riyals port handling charges and landing dues.

(iii) Not including proportion of dues to Wakf, which have a separate budget.

(iv) A tax on transactions at markets in the interior, now rarely levied.

PART 3		
Item	Description	Saudi Riyals
22	Telegraphs	2,500,000
23	Posts	1,500,000
24	Telephones	340,000
25	Revenue from distillation of water	13,000
26	Government Printing Office	900,000
27	Revenue from official newspaper	22,000
28	Revenue from air services and fees levied at airports	4,789,915
29	Railway revenue	270,000
30	Electricity earnings	2,500,000
Total of Part 3		14,334,915

PART 4		
Item	Description	Saudi Riyals
31	Oil revenue (v)	180,000,000
32	Gold mining revenue	765,085
33	Pearl fishing fees	1,000
34	Salt production tax	10,000
35	Tax on export of washing clay	4,000
Total of Part 4		180,780,085

(v) Royalties at four gold shillings per ton; exclusive of I (3).

PART 5		
Item	Description	Saudi Riyals
36	Sales from Government stores	7,800,000
37	Rentals of Government properties	100,000
38	Government farms' profits	150,000
39	Value of fuel imposed on Oil Company (vi)	3,400,000
Total of Part 5		11,540,000

(vi) Supplied in lieu of tax or royalties; does not count as "exaction" under Aramco/Saudi Agreement.

PART 6		
Item	Description	Saudi Riyals
40	Issues of currency (vii)
41	Refunds of overpayments by Government offices	300,000
42	Value of confiscated material	20,000
43	Miscellaneous income	100,000
44	Fines	140,000
45	Currency differences (viii)	600,000
46	Government investments in companies	210,000
47	Pension deductions from Government salaries of 9 per cent.	1,600,000
Total of Part 6		2,970,000

(vii) No profit on issue of currency owing to high cost of silver.

(viii) Difference between official and free market rates for foreign currencies.

PART 7		
Item	Description	Saudi Riyals
48	Extraordinary revenue (ix)	25,000,000

(ix) Loans from United States.

TOTALS OF REVENUE		
Part	Description	Saudi Riyals
Part 1	...	169,205,000
Part 2	...	86,260,000
Part 3	...	14,334,915
Part 4	...	180,780,085
Part 5	...	11,450,000
Part 6	...	2,970,000
Part 7	...	25,000,000
Grand Total		490,000,000

Government Expenses for Financial Year 1951-52 (1370-71)

Item	Description	Saudi Riyals
1	State Palaces, Princes and Royal Cabinet	313,383,219
2	Viceroy's Cabinet and Council of Deputies	690,000
3	Sharia Legal Establishments	2,314,573
4	Ministry of Defence (x)	87,468,712
	(A=39,468,712 Regular Army)	
	(B=48,000,000 Tribal Army) (xi)	
5	Ministry of Finance	7,105,000
6	Ministry of Foreign Affairs	4,777,940
7	Emirates and Dependencies	9,840,000
8	Hejaz Advisory Council	218,500
9	Education	9,785,000
10	Health	6,519,670
11	Pilgrimage Administration	660,000
12	Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones	8,095,000
13	Public Security	11,520,000
14	Road Construction Department	821,700
15	Customs	3,616,500
16	Statistics Department (xii)	169,000
17	Coast Guard Department	1,903,000
18	Government Press	1,385,320
19	Official newspapers	67,460
20	Water Distillation Department	337,500
21	Public Notaries	183,000
22	Societies of Virtue (xiii)	1,070,000
23	Commercial Council	27,500
24	General Transport	18,526,000
25	Miscellaneous	26,000,000
26	Broadcasting Station	959,200
27	General Directorate of Agriculture	7,300,000
28	Tribal subsidies and personal salaries	34,292,125
29	Pensions	250,000
30	Holy Shrines of Mecca and Medina and other maintenance of religious charities	6,660,000
31	Aviation Department	12,255,050
32	Food-stuffs and alms [sic]	19,298,656
33	High Cost of Living Allowance (xiv)	13,500,375
34	General and Constructional schemes	91,000,000
35	General Dept	70,000,000
Total		490,000,000

(x) Does not include aviation though latter administratively under Ministry of Defence.

(xi) Allegedly separate from tribal subsidy at 28, but almost certainly includes a major element of subvention.

(xii) Registry of births, nationality and deaths, &c.

(xiii) A Muslim institution for the protection of the Muslim ethic, way of life, &c.

(xiv) 25 per cent. of salary in cash in case of Government employees.

Details of Expenses under Item 34
Development Schemes

Description	Saudi Riyals	Item	Description	Saudi Riyals
(a) At Mecca—		(e) Taif—		
Water scheme	3,000,000	For surfacing the road from the	airport to the town	2,000,000
Sewage system	4,000,000	Dam construction	1,500,000
Construction of dam Wadi Ala'shi	2,000,000	Preliminary work on Mecca-Taif	Road	500,000
	9,000,000	(f) Schemes for Ministry of Defence	...	18,000,000
(b) At Medina—		(g) Aviation Department—		
Electricity scheme	1,500,000	Completion of Jeddah and Riyadh	airports	2,500,000
Jeddah-Medina Road	5,000,000	Completion aircraft maintenance	workshops	1,000,000
(c) Riyadh—		Purchase of radio equipment	900,000
Extension for electricity	2,000,000	Vehicles and fire-fighting equip-	ment	400,000
For widening streets and expro-		Houses for officials	800,000
riation of property	1,900,000	(h) Public Health Department—		
Water schemes and construction of		New quarantine buildings	3,000,000
dams	5,000,000	A model hospital at Medina	1,500,000
For paving the streets of Riyadh		For completion of construction of	the commemoration hospital at	
and for miscellaneous services	2,000,000	Mecca and the building of the	general store	750,000
For Dammam-Riyadh Railway...	10,000,000	For completion of the commemora-	tion hospital at Medina ...	250,000
(d) Jeddah—		(i) Jizan—		
Additional work to new pier ...	5,000,000	Water scheme and electrification	...	1,000,000
Building for Ministry for Foreign		(j) Yanbu—		
Affairs	1,000,000	Water scheme	1,500,000
Extension of electrification ...	2,000,000	(k) Government buildings and con-	structional services—	
Completion of work on Jeddah-		For Government buildings, con-	structional services	6,000,000
Mecca Road	2,000,000	Total	91,000,000
Equipment for International				
Bechtel Inc. and for general				
maintenance	2,700,000			
Water Sewage surveys	300,000			

ES 1053/8

No. 11

ANGLO-SAUDI-PERSIAN GULF STATES RELATIONS

Mr. Attlee to Mr. Pelly (Bahrain)

(No. 132)
Sir,

Foreign Office,
28th August, 1951.

As reported in my telegram No. 267 of 25th August to Jeddah, discussions were held with the Amir Faisal and Shaikh Yusuf Yasin, during their visit to London on some of the chief problems of mutual concern to Saudi Arabia and Persian Gulf States, namely; (a) the islands and shoals in dispute between Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Kuwait, (b) the delimitation of the seabed area between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, and (c) the frontier dispute. Detailed discussion of these matters had not been anticipated, but in the course of the talks it became clear that it might be worth while seeing whether a settlement of the outstanding questions could be effected forthwith. For this reason it was not possible for you or the Rulers concerned to be informed beforehand of the actual points being discussed.

2. I enclose copies of the records of each of the meetings held which give full details

of all the matters discussed and of the conclusions reached.

3. The position now is as follows:—

A.—Bahrain

4. We have claimed both the Bainah islands and the Fasht-al-Jarim and Fasht-bu-Sa'afa shoals for Bahrain. Neither side is very interested in the Rennie shoal and we offered this to Saudi Arabia as a concession.

5. Saudi Arabia proposed that Bainah-as-Saghir island and Fasht-al-Jarim and Rennie shoals should go to Bahrain and Bainah-al-Kabir and Fasht-bu-Sa'afa shoal to Saudi Arabia. Their claims to these places were made on similar grounds to the claims of Bahrain and especially on the fact that both the places which they claimed lie nearer to the Saudi Arabian coast than to Bahrain.

6. No further progress was made on this and the Amir Faisal has agreed to submit our recommendation to King Ibn Saud. In

the hopes of achieving an overall settlement we offered to make a big concession over the Kuwait islands where our claims are weaker, but the Saudis were not prepared to give way and we felt that the time was not appropriate to suggest any modification on our part over the Bahrain proposal.

7. We have ascertained from the Bahrain Petroleum Company representative here that even half the Fasht-bu-Sa'afa shoal would represent a commercial proposition for them if oil is found there. We would therefore be prepared to concede half the shoal to Saudi Arabia if this would provide for a final settlement. We consider this shoal to be important for Bahrain economically as it is her only other potential source of oil. Although Bainah-al-Kabir has virtually no economic value to Bahrain we are not prepared to concede this island unless the Shaikh should be willing to do so in the interests of a friendly settlement with Saudi Arabia. We appreciate however the strong sentimental attachment of the Shaikh to this place.

8. The Saudi Delegation agreed in general with our proposed method for delimiting the seabed area. The drawing of the line will, however, be dependent on the ownership of the foregoing islands and shoals. The Saudis proposed an alternative method of delimiting the area but its practical effect was almost the same as our own and we do not expect much difficulty in reaching agreement on this.

B.—Kuwait

9. The eight islands claimed on behalf of Kuwait were Farsi, Arabi, Harkus, Qran, Qrain, Jana, Jaraid and Maqta. The Amir Faisal said that they did not consider that the Shaikh of Kuwait had any rights whatsoever to these islands and in the circumstances they could not admit that there was any dispute over them since they were clearly the possessions of King Ibn Saud. He added that his instructions were not even to discuss this subject at all since there could be nothing which would justify the Shaikh of Kuwait putting forward such a claim. After much discussion we offered to recommend that seven of the islands should go to Saudi Arabia provided that the Saudis recognised the Shaikh of Kuwait's rights to Farsi. Our reasons for this were that all the islands lie within the Saudi seabed area and some are very close to the Saudi shore. The evidence in support of Kuwait's claims is not strong and the Saudis can produce similar evidence to support their claims.

The islands are uninhabited and have only been used by Kuwaitis for fishing, pearling and anchorage of shipping and the use of the islands by Kuwaitis for these purposes will still be permitted in future, irrespective of their sovereignty. As we wished to obtain an overall settlement which will put an end to the disputes and differences between Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf States, we felt that there was some justification for making a generous concession here which might at the same time influence the Saudis to modify their attitude over Bahrain territory which we consider to be of greater importance.

10. When the Shaikh of Kuwait is informed of our proposal, it should be pointed out to him that the Saudis are only claiming islands immediately opposite their own shore and they have never claimed any island opposite Kuwait such as Umm-al-Maradim and Kubbar, though they could do so if they wished on similar grounds to those on which Kuwait bases her claim to the other eight islands. No indication should be given to the Shaikh however that we are prepared to make a concession over these islands in the hopes of effecting an over-all settlement of both the Kuwait and Bahrain questions, nor should the Shaikh be told of our proposals for Bahrain. We wish to retain Farsi as we feel our claims here are stronger and its retention would also provide a face saving point for the Shaikh.

11. Despite his earlier instructions the Amir Faisal has agreed to submit our proposal to King Ibn Saud.

C.—Frontiers

12. The Amir Faisal suggested that a possible way of settling the frontier dispute with the Trucial Oman States would be to hold a form of round-table conference attended by a Saudi Arabian Delegation and also by the actual Shaikhs concerned who would be led by a United Kingdom representative. This would enable each person concerned to explain his own case and produce evidence on tribes and allegiance which it is difficult for others to provide. After consulting Sir Rupert Hay we agreed to such a conference which should take place in the coming winter. We were informed later that King Ibn Saud had also agreed to this suggestion. On our side the Shaikhs of Qatar and Abu Dhabi would be included and a representative of the Sultan of Muscat if he so wishes. We shall discuss the question of a United Kingdom representative

with Sir Rupert Hay before his return to Bahrain.

13. The place and agenda for the meeting and the necessity or otherwise of having a Fact Finding Commission before or after the meeting will be considered later and we should be glad of your views on these points.

14. The results of the Amir Faisal's report to King Ibn Saud are now awaited. Meanwhile, unless you see objection, you should cause the Shaikhs of Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and Abu Dhabi to be informed at an early date of the relevant parts of the discussions which concern them and their agreement should be obtained to the proposals made on their behalf. It should be explained to them that no final decisions have yet been made but that His Majesty's

Government consider that these proposals offer the best chance of coming to a friendly settlement with Saudi Arabia over the various disputes and differences between that country and the Persian Gulf States, so that it is in the interests of the Rulers themselves to agree to them.

15. I should be glad if you would let me know the Rulers' views on the proposals as early as possible.

16. I am sending copies of this letter with enclosures to Kuwait, Jedda, British Middle East Office and Washington and without enclosures to Sir Rupert Hay, Bagdad and Tehran.

I am, &c.

C. ATTLEE.

ES 1892/2

No. 12

PRESENTATION OF CREDENTIALS TO KING IBN SAUD

Mr. Pelham to Mr. Eden. (Received 28th December)

(No. 107. Confidential) *Jedda,*
Sir, *8th December, 1951.*

I have the honour to report that I presented my credentials to His Majesty King Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud on 28th November. I was accompanied by Mr. Maynard and Mr. Oliphant and my wife was accompanied by Mrs. Riches. The Saudi Arabian Government gave us transport from Jedda to Riyadh on one of the regular Saudi aircraft on the morning of that day. Before leaving the aircraft my staff and I donned Arab robes for our formal reception at the Riyadh airport by Dr. Rushdi Malhas, Chief of the Royal Diwan, Sheikh Khalid el Qarqany, counsellor to the King, and a number of lesser officials. We were then escorted to our temporary home, a guest house in the Palace grounds, distinguished by its most modern amenities, the use of which was obviously little understood by those in waiting. Accompanied by Messrs. Maynard and Oliphant I was, at about 4.15 p.m., received in audience by His Majesty and managed, with some effort, to avoid tripping over the voluminous skirts of my robe or losing my strange but princely headgear. The guard of honour drawn up outside the Palace, which I was invited to inspect, was remarkably smart and soldierly and I understand that these troops and the regular Palace guards are now much keener and better turned out than they were a year ago—a tribute to the work of the British Military Mission.

2. I have already reported the gist of His Majesty's remarks, which were mainly concentrated on the problem of Middle East defence, in my telegram No. 265 of 30th November. King Ibn Saud showed satisfaction at the message I conveyed to him from you, Sir, when I reminded him of your visit to Riyadh and his remark that, as long as the United Kingdom and the United States stood together they would have his good wishes and support. He also expressed gratification that his old warrior friend Mr. Winston Churchill was back again as Prime Minister and said how sorry he had been to see him relinquish office towards the end of the war. On several occasions during the audience the King remarked that Britain was his oldest friend and the first foreign country with which he had come into contact in his early days in power in Nejd. His dealings with the United States had begun more recently and his contacts had been far more materialistic, being concerned largely with oil. King Ibn Saud also mentioned the importance of Egypt, which was by far the biggest and most advanced Arab Power. His Majesty's remarks about France and Turkey were somewhat scathing. He asked me why we had picked up odds and ends who would be of no use to anyone. We should go ahead with America alone to settle the Middle East defence problem.

3. The King was in good form and though his voice was low, as I understand it usually

is, he spoke with great sincerity and conviction and at times with considerable vehemence. Some of the more forceful remarks on the subject of Middle East defence and Egypt were delivered in the direction of his brother the Amir Abdullah and the Crown Prince Amir Saud, who were sitting lower down the throne-room and spoken in a lecturing, indeed almost hectoring tone. Each time they brought in response rapid and submissive expressions of agreement. On two occasions, notably once when I was endeavouring to ensure that the Saudi delegation to the United Nations Assembly fully understood that they should take no hasty action in Paris to reject the Four-Power proposals, the King glared around him and announced that what he said in this country went and was final and absolute. Though the statement may be basically true, from his defiant tone I felt that the King may realise that a lot goes on behind his back of which he hears nothing.

4. The audience, which lasted well over an hour, terminated not long before evening prayers, after which His Majesty gave a banquet in my honour. This was, of course, for men only. As is usual on these occasions, the long tables groaned under some fifteen sheep roasted whole and resting on dishes of rice. The intervening spaces were taken up by smaller tit-bits. As is now his custom the King toyed only with a little rice and a glass of milk. He remarked that he no longer drank goat or camel's milk but had his milk flown over specially from America. The conversation turned eventually to the inevitable subject of women—one of His Majesty's principal interests and occupations—Ibn Saud remarked rather smugly how satisfactory it was that Moslems had the special privilege of being allowed four wives. When I ventured the humour that this might mean a multiplication of one's afflictions His Majesty, looking pointedly at the Crown Prince, said that he at any rate never had any trouble of that sort, he knew how to deal with women. The whole thing was to let them know from the start that you wouldn't stand any nonsense.

5. After dinner the customary ritual was observed and Arab coffee was frequently poured until I shook my cup for the flow to stop. Since His Majesty is forbidden by his Wahhabi tenets either to smoke or drink, coffee is the strongest stimulant allowed to him, but of this he took full advantage in countless cups and said that he much enjoyed it. Our hands were then sprinkled

with rose water supplemented as a modern touch by eau de cologne and a slave presented an incense burner from which we wafted the fumes into our robes and under our beards. Finally, another slave produced a phial of attar of roses with which the King anointed my right hand. Later His Majesty called the slave back and graciously presented me the phial for my wife. It was a spontaneous and most pleasant gesture though I fear His Majesty's taste in scent is a trifle more pungent than that of my wife.

6. On the following morning I was told that the King was not well enough to receive me and that my second and final audience would be that afternoon or evening. It is possible that his alleged indisposition may have been connected with the visit of Bashir es Saadawi (Saudi Arabian Personalities, No. 80), which coincided with my own. His Majesty was at any rate well enough to conduct business that morning as he told me later that he had sent off a telegram congratulating King Farouk on advising his Ministers not to flirt with Russia.

7. During the morning of 29th November it was possible to find time between talks with the King's advisers for a car trip round the sights of Riyadh, namely, the end of the railway line, the American power station and finally squeeze through the narrow winding streets of the old town. Work on the buildings and sidings of the new railway terminus has not yet started properly, but it is evident that the work planned is on a large scale and that the effect of the railway on the life of Riyadh will be considerable. The first trickle of goods arriving by railway has already caused a general lowering of prices and a good deal of money has been lost by those merchants holding large stocks of goods brought by road or by air.

8. That evening I was driven out to the gardens of the Nasariyah Palace, where I was to be given a banquet by the Crown Prince. The Amir Saud received me in a pavilion in front of a large swimming pool designed according to the best Hollywood standards and fitted with submerged lights. The whole gardens indeed were fitted with lights on so vast a scale that they must have used up a respectable proportion of the output of the Riyadh power station.

9. The Crown Prince opened conversation ingenuously with a flood of highly elevated sentiments; how the gardens were really an experiment to show the public what could

be done with water if one tried. He did not seem to see any irony in the situation as he sat in his lavish pleasure gardens in the midst of a desert country where every gallon of water is worth gold. He went on to deplore the fall in the old standards of morality and the weakening hold of religion over the people.

10. The banquet, which followed an interval for prayers, was an interesting example of the extent to which Ibn Saud's sons have strayed from their father's early simple puritanism. While the King's feast is of sheep and rice and other traditional dishes, the Crown Prince's ideas are on much more sybaritic lines. There seemed to be few of the innumerable dishes whose ingredients had not been flown in from America. The Amir Saud's highly paid American cook excelled himself, and the style in which his master attacked each dish gave strong support to at least half of the popular theory that his chief hobbies are food and women.

11. During that afternoon my wife and Mrs. Riches had been conducted to the harem and received and entertained at tea by Um Talal, the favourite wife of the King, who now generally assumes the position of Queen. My wife reports that she is a beautiful and gracious woman, whose conversation bore mainly on the theme of my wife's wide travel in foreign countries in which she expressed great interest. She indicated some regret that she could not travel herself. Interpretation was partly performed by her son the Amir Talal, who speaks good English.

12. Later that evening I had a prolonged farewell audience with His Majesty at which he again set forth at length his views on Middle East defence.

13. This visit to Riyadh was to a certain extent overshadowed by the question of the punishment of the Amir Mushari for the murder of the British Vice-Consul, Mr. Cyril Ousman, M.B.E. For the reasons given in paragraph 1 of my telegram No. 266 (of 30th November), I did not take up this question directly with His Majesty. I did, however, exchange messages with him on the subject through Sheikh Khalid al Qarqany, who proved himself a worthy companion of Sheikh Yusuf Yassin and the rest of the gang in the Saudi style of diplomacy. It was made quite evident to me that though nobody at Riyadh may dare to contradict the King or disobey him too flagrantly, there is tortuous scheming behind the scenes.

14. Before our departure the inevitable presents were handed to us. Arab "robes of honour" for us all. A gilt sword for myself, a gilt dagger for Mr. Maynard, a wrist watch for Mr. Oliphant and pearl necklaces for my wife and Mrs. Riches. My wife sent presents to the Queen and her daughter, a gilt clock in the form of a lighthouse and a fountain pen and pencil set.

I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Representatives at Cairo, Tel Aviv, Amman, Beirut, Damascus, Bagdad, Ankara, Paris and Washington, and to the head of the British Middle East Office.

I have, &c.

G. C. PELHAM.

APPENDIX

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

ES 1012/1

No. 13

LEADING PERSONALITIES IN SAUDI ARABIA

Mr. Trott to Mr. Bevin. (Received 1st March)

(No. 19. Confidential) *Jedda,*
Sir, *17th February, 1951*

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith a revised report on leading personalities in Saudi Arabia for the year 1950.

I have, &c.

A. C. TROTT.

Enclosure in No. 13

Leading Personalities in Saudi Arabia

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Note on Titles, &c.

1. *Sherif*.—Said to apply strictly in Arabia to persons recognised as being in the direct male descent from Hasan, the son of the Caliph Ali. There is, however, much confusion as to the exact meaning of this and the following term.

2. *Seyyid*.—Said to apply in Arabia, though much abused in some other countries, only to persons recognised as being in the male descent from Huseyn, the son of 'Ali.

3. *Amir*.—Given as a title to all princes of the blood and describes the office of practically all provincial governors.

4. *Sheykh*.—Applied very widely, but not indiscriminately, not only to tribal personages, but to townsmen of consequence, especially, perhaps, though not exclusively, to those in official positions, e.g., Sheykh Yusuf Yasin.

5. *Bey*.—Still used, sometimes in preference to Sheykh, by persons who would have been so called by right or courtesy in the Turkish system and who may dislike the association of "Sheykh" with age or desert life, e.g., Fuad Bey Hamza.

6. *Hajji*.—Convenient, in a country where every Hejazi adult has made the pilgrimage, for certain persons not otherwise easy to give a title to, e.g., Hajji Yusuf Zeinal.

7. *Effendi*.—Still applied to persons hardly entitled to be called Sheykh or anything equally honorific.

8. *Ibn, &c.*—Means, like its variant, Bin, "son of," or by extension, "descendant of." Replaced sometimes by the article "al," which it is not always easy to distinguish from "al," meaning "of the house of." All four forms are illustrated by the name of the King, "'Abdul-'Aziz ibn (son of) 'Abdurrahman al (son of) Faysal al (of the house of) Sa'ud," and the abbreviated names ibn Sa'ud or bin Sa'ud. The use of the patronymic "Ibn So-and-So" is so common as often to make a man's personal name difficult to trace.

9. *Abu*.—Means "father." Used in combination with the name of an actual son or the name of an object to form a familiar name or nickname, which

sometimes becomes an accredited surname. Thus, Brigadier Glubb Pasha is known in the desert as "Abu Hunaik," or the father of the Little Jaw. Similar names are sometimes formed from other terms of relationship.

10. *Composition of Names*.—The most normal formation is to build from a person's own name by adding that of his father and sometimes names of remoter ancestors and/or a family name. It is not uncommon to omit at least the first Ibn and place the father's name immediately after that of the person described, e.g., 'Abdullah Ibrahim al-Fadhl. It cannot be assumed, however, that the second of two unseparated names is that of the father, especially if the first be Muhammad, which is often little more than a prefix.

11. The following index gives, except in two cases, the first name of all living Arabs mentioned otherwise than incidentally in the report, but where Muhammad appears to be no more than a prefix it is reduced to M. and ignored for purposes of alphabetical order. Secondary entries have been made in many, but not in all, cases, where a patronymic or a family name seems likely to help to trace particular individuals:—

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1. Royal Family

(1) 'Abdul-'Aziz ibn 'Abdur-Rahmán al-Faysal al Sa'úd.—King of Sa'údi Arabia, commonly known as Ibn Sa'úd.

Born in November 1879. Accompanied father on flight from Riyádh upon its occupation by Ibn Rashid in 1891. Grew up under tutelage of Sheykh Mubárák of Kuwait, who gave asylum to family.

Seized opportunity in course of local warfare in Eastern Arabia to deliver surprise attack on Riyádh in January 1902 with very small force and retook it. Became recognised head of the family although his father 'Abdurrahmán survived until 1928. Extended his authority gradually over whole of Nejd and Qasim and in 1914 took the coastal province of Hasa from the Turks, who then made an agreement with him. Entered into treaty relations with His Majesty's Government through the Government of India in 1915. Took Háil in 1921 and finally destroyed power of Beni Rashid. Next fought King Huseyn, an old enemy. Took Mecca in 1924 and completed conquest of Hejaz by compelling abdication at end of 1925 of Huseyn's son and successor 'Alí. Acquired suzerainty over 'Asir in 1926. Converted position into one of practical sovereignty in 1930 and later reduced 'Asir to status of ordinary province, following on repression of a rebellion there. Consolidated this position by the Sa'údi-Yemen Treaty of Taif of the 20th May, 1934, which secured his legal title to 'Asir and Najrán. Has thus become ruler of territory, seaboard of which extend from just south of Aqaba to just north of Medi in Yemen and from Kuwait neutral zone to north of Qatar Peninsula.

Ibn Sa'úd has measured his titles by his acquisitions. He became in 1902 Amir of Nejd and Umám of the Wahhábis; in 1921 Sultan of Nejd and its Dependencies; in January 1926 King of the Hejaz; in 1927 King of the Hejaz and of Nejd and its Dependencies; and finally in September 1932 King of the Kingdom of Sa'údi Arabia, defined as a single and united State, comprising his existing dominions, though without express mention of 'Asir.

The hero of this spectacular aggrandisement is a man of fine presence, some 6 foot 3 inches in height and handsome except for a blotch across the left eye due to neglected leucoma. He combines a strong character with courage, much native shrewdness and a charm which, though now a little stereotyped, is still attractive. He is feared rather than loved by his subjects on all of whom except those of the Shi'a persuasion he imposes at least the forms of Wahhábism. His own Wahhábism is sincere, but tempered by a readiness to compromise when his temporal position requires innovations contrary to the prejudice of extremists or sometimes even to the original principles of his sect. On his own ground he is an efficient ruler and a hard one, a Napoleon of the desert, but too much of the desert to cope quite successfully with the problems with which his conquest of the Hejaz and his attainment of an international position have confronted him. In diplomacy he is normally fairly honest, but difficult. He is as well disposed towards foreigners as is compatible with his fundamental belief that Islam is all in all. He has tried a strong constitution very high by living hard and by innumerable marriages. It was reckoned some years ago that he had already had over 200 wives, though never more than the permitted four at a time. He is known to find the natural decline in his powers in this direction disconcerting.

Was made a G.C.I.E. in 1920, but does not now greatly prize an honour which he considers too reminiscent of a past connexion with the Government of India only and in some sense vassalish. Received the G.C.B. in November 1935, at the time of the visit to Riyádh of Sir Andrew Ryan. His relations with Great Britain have been mainly friendly, and since 1939 he has acted as though he firmly believed in his repeated asseverations, that his interests and those of the Arabs in general are bound up with those of His Majesty's Government. In earlier editions he was described as expecting much for love, but his attitude throughout the Palestine crisis of 1937-39 and during Rashid Aly's rebellion in Iraq in 1941 entitles him to the cancella-

tion of that description. He was unwavering in his sympathy for the Allied cause throughout the 1939-45 war and he proved by his acts that he is ready to give "his friends, the British Government," every support possible. In January 1945 King Farouq of Egypt visited Ibn Sa'úd at Yenbo. The visit was ostensibly a private one, but was marked with much oriental pageantry and much publicity. This was followed by a visit from the Syrian President, Shukri Kuwatly, early in February. In the same month, Ibn Sa'úd, at the invitation of President Roosevelt, who was on his way home from the Yalta conference, went to Egypt on a United States destroyer and met the President at the Bitter Lakes. As Mr. Churchill was also in Egypt at the same time, the King was very anxious to see him, and a meeting was arranged in the Fayoum on the 17th February. He returned to Jeddah on a British cruiser, His Majesty's Ship *Aurora*, after an absence of eight days. On the 1st March, Ibn Sa'úd declared war on Germany and Japan (with reservations in respect of the Holy Places) thus qualifying Sa'údi Arabia for membership of the United Nations and participation in the San Francisco Conference. A personal visit by the Viceroy of India to Riyádh, on his way to India, in early June gave the King great pleasure. British army medical specialists who examined the King in February at his request, found that his general physical condition was excellent and his expectation of life unusually good for a man of his age, but warned him against abuse of the stimulants upon which his private life now depends for its satisfaction and prestige. He is, however, much crippled by arthritis in both knees and cannot, for instance, walk up or down any stairs.

The strains set up by Rashid Ali al Gailani's unfortunate arrival as a suppliant for sanctuary in Riyádh in September 1945, and by the elevation of Ibn Saud's dynastic enemy, the Amir Abdullah of Transjordan, to independent Kingship, increased Ibn Saud's unsleeping suspicions of Hashemite designs against him; and the abandonment of His Majesty's Government's 1939 White Paper policy in Palestine was a grievous shock to him. He used his influence constantly, however, to urge caution and a realistic outlook upon other Arab leaders, and to avert at all costs a hostile Anglo-Arab confrontation.

A State visit to Egypt lasting from 10th to 22nd January, 1946, considerably exhausted Ibn Saud, but a few weeks in his desert camp at Rawdat Khafs availed to re-establish his health and vigour. He made his first aeroplane flight, from Afif to Taif, in September 1945.

Though the King has said that he has no intention of delegating any of his powers so long as God gives him life and strength to rule, and though he still follows his erstwhile official routine with the same determination as he attempts to maintain his philo-progenitive activity, his energy and mental alertness are now very noticeably declining. At occasions ranging from a Pilgrimage banquet at Mecca in 1946 to interviews with His Majesty's Ambassador in 1950 the proceedings have been cut short as the ageing monarch has fallen asleep; and the use of a wheel chair, to which he refused to resort until he saw President Roosevelt in one, has enabled the arthritis in his knee to get so great a grip that he now seldom walks. He is respected and feared and still the undisputed master of the country, but no longer the all-seeing arbiter of its destinies. He is now the benevolent despot in decline. His grip has slackened but he maintains his reluctance to delegate authority. The resultant malaise afflicting the form and spirit of his administrative system, which even in normal circumstances would be difficult enough to keep pace with the rapid economic development of the country and its emergence from

medieval obscurity, appears to be beyond his comprehension; and any criticism of it he now regards as a personal affront to himself, a reflection on his life's handiwork. His shrewdness is now tempered by his tendency, in old age, to nurture memories of individual loyalties and hatreds to the point of obsession: thus his hatred of the Hashemites now exceeds all reason, whilst he tends to suspect all criticism, constructive or otherwise, as being the product of disloyalty, especially when it is pointed at any of his trusted friends or his enormous parasitic family. He never tires of asserting his friendship for Britain and, despite the considerable displacement of British by American influence resultant upon the preponderance of American economic interests in the country, there is no doubt as to his sincerity. The less tractable and understanding attitude he has demonstrated towards the case presented by His Majesty's Government on behalf of the Persian Gulf Sheikdoms in the prolonged frontier negotiations is clearly more the product of senility and prejudiced advice than of any genuine distrust of His Majesty's Government.

In his latter years, as since 1902, Ibn Saud has spent most of the time at Riyadh, though in 1948 and 1949 he spent long periods in the Hejaz—where in 1950 he received His Royal Highness the Duke of Edinburgh and the Commander-in-chief Mediterranean Fleet. At Riyadh he has received many distinguished foreign visitors including the Prime Ministers of Syria and the Lebanon, the Secretary-General of the Arab League and the British Commander-in-chief, Middle East Land Forces, General Sir John Crocker. In consequence of an invitation, delivered by Fuad Bey Hamza (*q.v.*), Ibn Sa'ud was visited by his old enemy King Abdullah of Transjordan at the end of June 1948, and though no outstanding question was settled the two monarchs achieved a temporary reconciliation.

The King's eldest son Turki died in 1919, leaving issue. The following is a list of the King's immediate relatives, many of whom also have issue. Philby's *Arabia* is probably the best English authority on the Sa'ud family as a whole, but does not claim to be absolutely accurate.

Sons. All Amirs.

(2) *Sa'ud ibn 'Abdul-'Aziz.*—Born at Kuwait in 1901 or early 1902 of a lady of Sa'udi stock. Has for many years been Viceroy of Nejd, and until 1934 seldom visited the Hejaz. Until 1935 he was less travelled than his half-brother, Amir Feysal, having only left the country once when he went to consult an oculist in Egypt shortly after the "Mahmal" incident of 1926. In 1935, however, he visited Europe and visited several capitals including London where he stayed about five weeks (he received the G.B.E. on that occasion), and he represented Sa'udi Arabia at the Silver Jubilee and at the Coronation of His Majesty King George VI. In 1940 he visited India.

Sa'ud's designation as Heir to the Throne was formally announced on the 11th May, 1933. He resembles his father in appearance and physique. Also suffers from eye trouble, but has inherited Ibn Sa'ud's "magnetic smile." Said to have had some schooling from Dr. 'Abdullah Damluji and Sheykh Hafiz Wahba, but to be in the main untutored. May in other respects be a chip of the old block, but has had little opportunity of displaying his quality to Europeans. Is strongly Islamic, but since his return from Europe has shown many signs of a broadened outlook and little, if any, of the fanaticism which seemed to characterise him earlier. Had commanded on the Eastern front in the Sa'udi-Yemen war. He now affects a European style of entertain-

ing—even serving afternoon tea to his English visitors—and prides himself on his skill in the management of Christian cutlery, to the amusement of his father, who calls him "Sa'ud the Civilised." He professes a desire to see Sa'udi Arabia progress on Western lines (*e.g.*, introduction of air communications, modern architecture, &c.). He claims that he himself designed his country house at Badia near Riyadh, the amenities of which include a swimming pool. He owns a cinema projector and shows British news films. When His Majesty's Minister visited Riyadh in February 1942 Sa'ud broke with Arabian custom by inviting the ladies of the party to dinner.

Though the scale of his own building and expenditure and the arbitrary commands to attendance on him which he is accustomed to make show that he apes his father in many ways, his outlook is undoubtedly more modern than that of the King; and in matters of administrative and financial reform which the King will not countenance he is avowedly sympathetic and believed to be biding his time. Despite his father's refusal to consider him as an experienced Counsellor and reluctance to delegate authority to him, he is increasingly taking responsibility upon himself, and is assuming more and more the representational functions of the King. Appointed Commander-in-chief of the Sa'udi army in March 1944. Came to Mecca on pilgrimage in November 1945 and acted as Viceroy during his father's visit to Egypt, January 1946. Attended the meeting of heads of Arab States in Egypt 28th–30th May, 1946, but as a figure-head only, King Farouq having been appointed as Ibn Saud's spokesman.

In January 1947 flew to the United States for a visit as the guest of the United States Government and of various American firms with Arabian interests. On the return journey visited the United Kingdom between 20th February and 1st March, as the guest of His Majesty's Government. Unfortunately, this visit coincided with a spell of exceptionally cold weather in England, and keeping the Amir and his party adequately fed and warmed, let alone entertained, created a considerable problem for those who were responsible for their programme.

Performed the pilgrimage in 1947 and 1950, taking in the ceremonies the place of his father who, for reasons of health, apparently, decided at the last moment to remain in Riyadh. He is still nominally Commander-in-chief of the Saudi Arabian army. He has on several occasions indicated that his father's policy of friendly relations with His Majesty's Government is emphatically his own also.

His eldest son, Fahd, who was born about 1925, has had a Sudanese graduate of Gordon College as tutor for some years and speaks fluent English; he married a daughter of the Amir Faisal in May 1943 and generally is well thought of. Saud's family is said to number over thirty, some of whom are known to be born of slaves, of whom the Crown Prince is one of the largest owners in the country. He is a notable gourmand.

(3) *Faysal ibn 'Abdul-'Aziz.*—Viceroy of the Hejaz in his father's absence and permanently President of the Council of Ministers, Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Interior, and, in theory, War. Born of a lady of the family of 'Abdul-Wahhab in or about 1905. Educated partly by Sheykh Hafiz Wahba. Intelligent and has at least had more opportunity than most of his brothers of cultivating his intelligence and powers of observation as he has lived mostly of late years in the comparatively civilised surroundings of Mecca and has travelled in Europe: in 1919, when he was in England; in 1926, when he visited England, France, Holland and perhaps other countries; and in 1932, when he headed the Sa'udi mission which visited London and many

other capitals, and often since. In physique a much feebler version of his father and elder brother owing to excessive delight in the harem from his youth upwards. At first very listless and rather nervous in European company, but could rise to an occasion, as he showed in 1932 by playing his part in London, albeit that of a figurehead, with a good deal of distinction. Believed not to see eye to eye with his father and joined in the onslaught by Fuad, Philby and others on Ibn Sa'ud's principal henchman, 'Abdullah Suleyman, in October 1931. Although 'Abdullah Suleyman had the best of this in the end, the King has continued to treat Faysal with consideration. Received many decorations during his tour in 1932, including G.B.E.

In 1935 showed surprising dash as a horseman in races held at Riyadh on occasion of Sir Andrew Ryan's visit. Reported to have married in October 1935 a daughter of his aunt Nura. Represented Sa'udi Arabia at the London discussions on Palestine in 1939, and seems to have played the part well. In the last few years he has acquired much more self-confidence and tries to fill his rôle as Foreign Minister by showing an up-to-date knowledge of events. He talks freely and intelligently in the company of Europeans whom he knows. He has none of his father's picturesqueness of language, but speaks a very pure Arabic, clearly enunciated, with little trace of the Nejdî accent which all his brothers possess. On occasion he is capable of acting with firmness within the instructions given to him by the King, as was shown in the expulsion of the Italian Minister in February 1942. Visited America and England from September to December 1943 with his brother, Khalid (No. 1 (5)). The two Amirs, who were accompanied by the Shaikh Hafiz Wahba (No. 25), travelled all the way by air. On their return journey, in December 1943, visited the battlefields in North Africa. Headed the Sa'udi delegation to the San Francisco Conference in April 1945 and to the Preparatory Commission and First Assembly of the United Nations, November 1945 to January 1946. Represented his father at celebration on 17th April in Damascus of withdrawal of foreign troops from Syria and went on to pay an official visit to the Lebanon.

He spent some time in England on his way back from San Francisco in August 1945 undergoing treatment for severe gastric ulcers and alternating dignified appearances at the Dorchester Hotel with the entertainment at a country house near Dorking, on strictly non-Wahhabi lines, of the more dubious disjecta of Mayfair. After a brief visit to Saudi Arabia, he returned to England in November 1945 until late February 1946 and now appears to have recovered from his ulcer trouble.

Represented Saudi Arabia at the London Conference on Palestine, October 1946. At the end of the year visited Amman as the guest of King Abdullah. His Majesty's Government had hoped and suggested that the opportunity might be taken for a friendly discussion of the Saudi-Transjordan frontier question, but in the event no politics were discussed.

In 1947 represented Saudi Arabia at U.N.O. meetings in the United States. Is tending increasingly to spend long periods in the United States—possibly in order to see as much as possible of a Californian girl for whom he is said to have fallen.

He again went to the United States in 1948 to attend the United Nations meetings on Palestine and showed a certain amount of discontent at the current United States policy. On his return journey he visited the United Kingdom at the invitation of His Majesty's Government and had discussions at the Foreign Office with the Secretary of State. He entertained the Commander-in-chief of the Mediterranean Fleet at Jedda in February 1948 and showed

that he had acquired a remarkably fluent and intelligent knowledge of English.

He has since attended two further meetings of the General Assembly, and on returning in bitter frame of mind from the first of these, in the autumn of 1948, made a somewhat irresponsible speech in Mecca about the attitude to be adopted towards Britain and the United States after the alleged tolerance shown by those powers towards Zionist aggression. He has also, like his son Abdulla Faisal, spoken to His Majesty's Ambassador and other members of the Ambassador's staff of the dangers of Jewry and Communism and the necessity of His Majesty's Government taking a stronger and more determined line in the Middle East (by which, however, it appears that both he and his son mean only that Britain should pull the Arab chestnuts out of the fire). As Minister for Foreign Affairs his authority seems to pass more and more into the hands of his nominal Deputy, Sheikh Yusuf Yasin (No. 59), and as administrator of the Hejaz he now delegates a good deal to his son. He still seems bothered by intestinal ulcers and piles, and also, perhaps, by his present consort (the seventeenth), a masterly Turkish woman who aspires to wearing a crown.

(4) *Muhammad ibn 'Abdul-'Aziz.*—Born in or about 1913. Headed the Sa'udi forces which entered Medina in 1925. Was made acting Viceroy when the Amir Faysal went abroad in 1932, but got beyond himself and was replaced by his brother Khalid. Met Faysal at Kuwait on his return and shared in the bout of dissipation there. Visited the United Kingdom with the Amir Sa'ud in 1937 and 1938. Said to be popular with the tribes. Appears to be being brought gradually into his father's counsels; was present, together with the Amir Sa'ud, at several interviews between His Majesty's Minister and the King at Riyadh in March 1942. Visited India for health reasons in June 1943 together with Mansur No. 1 (9) and Shaikh Abdullah Suleiman (No. 12). Owing to their indiscreet and extravagant living their visit was not a success. Returned in October 1943. Accompanied his father to Egypt for the meetings with President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill in February 1945. He, together with two other joy-riding princes (Fahd and Nawwaf—see list of sons below), accompanied the Sa'udi delegation to the San Francisco Conference in April 1945. Emir of Medina and was reported in April 1948 to have visited sections of the Harb and Billi tribes said to have been mobilising for the forthcoming war in Palestine. Has spent the greater part of 1950 in Paris, reportedly for medical treatment and on an expensive scale. Stated to resemble his father as a young man, to be Anglophile and to have concerted with Saud and Faisal early in 1949 with a view to curtailing United States influence in Saudi Arabia. Often quoted in the Hejaz as the dark horse of the Saud family and, as something of a mystery figure, has become to some extent, but with little manifest reason, the focus of Hejazi discontent.

(5) *Khalid ibn 'Abdul-'Aziz.*—Born in or about 1916. Acted as Viceroy of the Hejaz in 1932 (see (4) above). Visited the United Kingdom with the Amir Faisal in 1939. Full brother and constant companion of Amir Muhammad (4) above. Accompanied his brother Faysal when they visited America and England in the winter of 1943.

(6) to (27). Sons of 20 and less in 1939 numbered twenty-two. The following is a correct list in order of age: Nasir (1920), Sa'd (1921), Fahd (1921), Mansur (1921), 'Abdullah (1922), Bandar (1924), Sultan (1924), Musaid (1927), Mish'al (1927), 'Abdul-Muhsin (1928), Mûshari (1932), Mutayyib (1933), Talâl (1933), 'Abdur-Rahman (1933), Turki

(1934), Badr (1934), Nawwâf, (1934), Fawwâz (1936), Mâjid (1937), Salmân (1938) and (?) (1939). Further children are known to have been born to his wives and concubines, one as recently as 1946, and the total surviving sons and daughters are believed to number 35 and 22 respectively.

Mansûr, No. 1 (9), deserves separate notice. His mother, a Caucasian concubine, was the King's favourite until her death in 1938. A favourite of his father, he is perhaps alone among the King's sons in being interested in something other than political gossip, field sports and domestic pleasures. He likes machines, personally sees to the maintenance of his cars and spends a good deal of his time at the Royal garage in Riyâdh. Usually in charge of arrangements when the King moves from Riyâdh to the Hejaz or to camp, and is said to be responsible for the maintenance of the electrical installation at the Royal Palace at Riyâdh. Visited Egypt in March 1942 as the guest of the British Commander-in-chief. On his return to Jeddah he gave an interview (with his father's approval of his remarks) to a representative of the B.B.C., which was recorded in the Royal Palace at Jeddah and later broadcast from London. He owns a cinema projector. Visited India, for health reasons, in June 1943 with his brother, Muhammad and 'Abdullah Suleiman. In October and again in November he visited Palestine for further medical treatment, returning with Faysal, whom he joined in Egypt, in December 1943. Appointed Minister of Defence in March 1944. Visited Khartoum in December 1944 to arrange for the training there of Sa'ûdi army personnel in driving and maintenance. Accompanied his father for the meetings with President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill in Egypt in February 1945. Acting Viceroy during the absence of the Amir Faysal at the San Francisco Conference, and from November 1945 to February 1946.

The Amir Mansour prevailed upon Ibn Saud to ask His Majesty's Minister to request His Majesty's Government to provide a military mission to train the Saudi Arabian army. As the result of this request, a small military mission was established early in 1947 at Taif, the headquarters of the Saudi Arabian armed forces, where the Amir is generally in residence.

Relations between the Emir and the Mission have on the whole been cordial, but fruitless of real progress, since the Minister's parsimony, obstinacy, and lack of realism have prevented him from translating more than a small portion of the Mission's experience and advice into active reforms. His relations with the British Civil Air Training Mission, partly because of his personal *entente* with its Head, were better, though during its three year term (ended September 1950) the British Civil Air Training Mission had (unlike the Military Mission) the advantage of having no serious vested interests to contend with. He is also in charge of civil aviation, in connexion with which his performance has been capricious and inefficient and has betrayed his lack of understanding of its problems.

Though as the son of the King's former favourite wife, he still enjoys the King's favour, this very favouritism together with his meanness and his lack of courage have brought him considerable unpopularity and, noticeably in recent months (1950), the contempt and distrust of his brothers Saud and Faisal. He has also been at loggerheads with the Minister of Finance (No. 12) who has on more than one occasion in 1950 had Mansur on the mat before the King. He claims to have amassed fortunes in Egypt, France and the United Kingdom, to which it is expected he will resort on the death of his father.

He is on the whole Anglophile.

Nâsir (6). Reported to have been dismissed and disgraced after taking part in a wild drinking party outside Riyadh in 1947 which resulted in several deaths; the still from which the liquor had been drawn was found in his house. The King ordered the burning of his house and his decapitation, and it was only, paradoxically, the intervention of the fanatically puritan Wahhabi *ulema* on his behalf which induced His Majesty to commute the death sentence to banishment. He reappeared at the King's banquet for the Duke of Edinburgh in January 1950, and since then seems to have regained his standing in the Royal fold.

Sultan (12). Emir of Riyâdh.

Talâl, No. 1 (18). The King's favourite son by the lady, Umm Talâl, who was originally a concubine but has for many years been the favourite and for some time past the King's ranking wife. Talâl is an animated, intelligent and friendly young man whose chief danger in life, as he himself has admitted to members of the Embassy, is boredom through having no work to do. He is much too fat in consequence of being spoilt and inactive, but seems genuinely anxious to obtain real work—the creation of a Ministry of Communications has been mentioned in this connexion—and is at present performing the work of Controller of the Royal Household, a task he seems to be tackling energetically and meticulously but, it is to be feared, somewhat prodigally. He has learnt to speak passable English and is receptive to some extent of western ideas and to a great extent of western paraphernalia, gadgets and sports equipment. He is altogether a likeable character who with proper education and training might have been outstanding, and who may still, with responsibility if he is allowed to assume it in time, develop into a good ruler in a country where ministerial office is largely the preserve of the Royal princes and the King's old favourites. He has been hoping to marry Raschid Ali al-Ghalani's daughter, an accomplished young woman with European education, but his father has so far forbidden this, possibly out of deference to His Majesty's Government's attitude to Raschid Ali and in consideration of the additional trouble with Iraq which the match might provoke.

Brothers. All Amirs.

(28) and (29) Sa'd and Sa'ûd, who died in 1916 and 1939 respectively. The former left three sons: Faysal, Sa'ûd and Fahd; and the latter two: Muhammad and Faysal.

(30) 'Abdullah ibn 'Abdurrahmân.—Born about 1894. Accompanied King on his visit to Egypt in February 1945 for the meetings with President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill. A friendly and intelligent little man who often gossips with the King's visitors at Riyâdh and gives the King advice.

(31) to (34) Ahmad, Musâ'id, Sa'd and 'Abdul Muhsin.—Younger men, the children of the old age of 'Abdur-Rahman ibn Faysal.

Grandson.

Abdulla Faisal bin Abdul Aziz (35). This handsome and intelligent young man, born about 1923, is coming increasingly into prominence as his father takes less and less active part in his duties as Viceroy. He was rumoured in 1949 to be in line for the post of Minister of Defence when Mansur (No. 1 (9)) was in bad health. This did not come to pass but he came into both real and formal prominence when in 1950 he was made acting Viceroy of the Hejaz during his father's absence at the meetings of the Arab League in Cairo. While acting Viceroy he took a real interest and part in the work of the Viceregal Office and in formal and informal public appearances, and took precedence over Mansur (No. 1 (9)) at the parades and ceremonies which marked

the "triumphant" return from Egypt of the Saudi troops who, under Egyptian command, were routed in Palestine. He is understood to be ambitious to revive the Ministry of the Interior, dormant in his father's Viceroyalty, and he has in the meantime become more or less the patron in the Hejaz of the younger generation and of more liberal pursuits than the official Wahhabi basis of Saudi Arabia would hitherto have allowed. He was for instance instrumental in securing the final removal of the ban on football in the Hejaz and Nejd and has taken a personal interest in the development of football in Saudi Arabia; he is also the focus of attention of thwarted cinema enthusiasts and at least one Egyptian cinema magnate.

He is free and accessible in his dealings with foreigners, and members of the Embassy have found conversations with him of interest as reflections of his father's views. Though in his expressions of opinion he betrays all the Arab failings of factiousness and resentment of western policies, and typically suggests that it is up to Britain (and no doubt America) to intervene in some unspecified fashion to remedy matters which the Arabs, even where able to do so, have failed to tackle themselves, he is above the average in intelligence and education and repays cultivation. He has learnt English "on two occasions and forgotten it" according to his own account, and invariably speaks Arabic with more than a trace of his father's clear and cultivated diction. Like most of the younger princes he is no teetotaler; he is however rare in having only one official wife, to whom he has been married for over ten years, and unique among the Al Saud family in having stated to members of the Embassy that he hopes she will be spared the strain of further child-bearing.

'Arâif Branch. Also Amirs.

Certain of the King's cousins are dealt with in separate notices, but a general mention may be made of the 'Arâif as being members of a senior branch of the family by virtue of descent from Sa'ûd ibn Faysal, an elder brother of the King's father and a former ruler at Riyâdh. Their generic name of 'Arâif is one applied to raided camels subsequently "recognised," as the root implies, and recovered by their owners. It seems to have been given to them because they had remained in the hands of the Beni Rashid, but escaped to Ibn Sa'ûd in the course of battle in 1904. Some of them rebelled against him in 1910, but the present members of the family form portion of the King's posse of satellite princes. Although inconspicuous, they might produce a claimant, by right of senior descent, to the throne. Various names are given in the *Almanach de Gotha* and Philby's *Arabia*. The most important of these princes, who bear individually the surname of al-'Arafa, would appear to be—

(35) Sa'ûd ibn 'Abdul-'Aziz ibn Sa'ûd ibn Faysal.—Married the King's sister Nûra. Seems to play a certain rôle in Ibn Sa'ûd's entourage. Probably the same Sa'ûd al-'Arafa who was described in a report from Kuwait as being, according to a reliable informant, a friend of the 'Ajmân tribe and secretly hostile to Ibn Sa'ûd. Daughter reported to have married Amir Faysal (q.v.) in October 1935.

2. 'Abdul-'Aziz ibn Ibrahim

Governor of Medina (technically Acting Governor *vice* the King's son Amir Khâlid, who never actually held the post) until May 1936, when he was replaced by Abdullah as Sidayri (No. 50 (1)). Had the reputation of being a severe and arbitrary Governor. Was Governor of Abha in 1926 at the time of the clash between the Akhwân and the Yemeni pilgrim

caravan, the 'Usba, in the Wadi Tanuma. In 1936 appointed a member of the Council of Ministers.

3. 'Abdul-'Aziz ibn Mu'ammâr

Governor of Jeddah until June 1935, when he was appointed Governor of Taif in the room of Amir 'Abdullah, maternal uncle of Amir Faysal (No. 1 (3)). Born in or about 1904. Comes of a former ruling family of Nejd, apparently the same Beni Mu'ammâr of Ayaina, who were prominent in the early days of the Wahhâbi movement and are mentioned several times in Philby's *Arabia*. Brought up principally at Riyâdh. Was Governor of Yanbu' for some time and earned a good reputation there. Was appointed to Jeddah in August 1932, with the title of Amir, on the death of Hajji 'Abdullah 'Ali Riza, a leading local merchant who had been governor with the old title of Qaimmaqam since King Huseyn's time. He is good-looking and pleasant, but pretentious, probably on the score of his blue blood. He was keen on riding and other forms of sport until afflicted by paralysis in 1939. He went to India for special treatment in March 1941, but returned incurable in October 1941. Now completely deaf and unable to walk.

These disabilities and a speech affliction apart he is apparently a competent administrator as Emir of Taif and is well spoken of there both by the Arabs and the British Military Mission, with whom he co-operates readily.

4. 'Abdul-'Aziz ibn Musâ'id ibn, Jiluwi ibn Sa'ûd

Born about 1892. Second cousin to the King. Governor of Hâil since 1925 or earlier. Said by the Sheykh of Kuwait in March 1932 to be only 40, but to have aged greatly owing to worry. Was much in evidence in 1929 as one of the King's right-hand men at the time of the Akhwân rebellion. Came into prominence in February 1930, when, apparently without the King's authority, he conducted a raid on the scale of a punitive expedition, which it was, in fact, intended to be, into Transjordan. Disavowed by the King at the time, but maintained in his governorate. Was in November 1932 put at the head of the principal force despatched to reduce the 'Asir rebels, and proceeded from Riyâdh to 'Abhâ and Jizân, where he assumed supreme command of the forces in 'Asir. Said then to be intended for the Governorate-General of the whole 'Asir area, but eventually returned to Hâil. A man for occasions requiring drastic action. Appointed inspector of the frontier area on the Sa'ûdi-Iraq frontier in 1936, duties he combines with those of Governor of Hâil. In 1939 was said to have aroused suspicion at Riyâdh as having designs on the throne which he might try to carry out on the death of Ibn Saud. Reported in 1948 to be well preserved. Medium height, good figure, a sensitive mouth with large hawk-like nose, full black beard and refined features; easy assured manner and is both courteous and pleasant to foreigners. He is a very strict Wahhâbi and carries powers of life and death without prior reference to the King. Rules all the Jebel Shammar district.

5. 'Abdul-'Aziz (ibn Hamûd) ibn Zeyd

Inspector of Bedouin in Transjordan frontier area. Born probably about 1897. Comes of a Hâil family been educated in Constantinople. Sent to 'Ammân in summer of 1926 to discuss claims in respect of raids, and attended with two other Sa'ûdi delegates an abortive conference at Ma'an in September. Was one of the two Sa'ûdi delegates on tribunal which sat at Jericho from February to May 1927 in accordance with the Hadda Agreement. Was later an Assistant Governor of Jeddah. Sent to 'Ammân in August 1930 as Sa'ûdi agent at the MacDonnell investigation regarding raids. Appointed Inspector of Bedouin in the frontier region in January 1931, and held meetings at long intervals with Captain

Glubb, his opposite number in Transjordan. Personally amiable, but will take no responsibility without reference to the King. From 1936 to 1938 was inspector of the whole Transjordan-Saudi frontier, under a scheme for dividing the northern frontier area into three sectors under inspectors with wide powers. In May 1943 was appointed Saudi Consul at Damascus. He was promoted to be minister to Syria in 1944. He is now a semi-invalid and rarely leaves his bed.

6. Abdul Hamid al-Khatib

Born about 1905. The family is of Malayan origin and settled in Mecca about the beginning of the 19th century. He has a reputation as an 'Alim and has written several theological works in Arabic. His elder brother, 'Abdul Malik Khatib Pasha was Hashemite Agent in Cairo until 1925. He himself was mixed up in Hashemite intrigues, and in particular in the preparation of Ibn Rifāda's raid in 1932. He returned to the Hejaz in 1936 under the amnesty of the previous year. Was made a member of the Mecca Majlis ash-Shura until his appointment as Saudi Arabian Chargé d'Affaires in Pakistan in May 1948. He knows no English, and according to some reports may still be in touch with the pro-Hashemite "Hejaz Constitutional Party" in Cairo. He is no relation to Fuad al-Khatib (*q.v.*).

7. 'Abdullah ibn Blayhid

A leading figure among the Wahhābi Ulama. Comes from Hāil. Qādhi of Mecca after its occupation by Ibn Sa'ūd, and was described in Eldon Rutter's account of him (1925-26) as a "bent and wizened little man." Appointed Grand Qādhi of the Hejaz in January 1926. Was instrumental in May 1926 in obtaining a *fatwa* from seventeen Ulama of Medina in support of the Wahhābi policy of destroying tombs. Head of the Nejd delegates at the Moslem Congress of June 1926. Again visited Medina in November of that year in attendance on the King and in the company of 'Abdullah ibn Hasan (see 12 (1)), bent on purging the place of iniquity as Mecca had been purged. Vacated post at Mecca in 1928 and returned to Hāil. Was thought at that time to favour the extremists of the Akhwān movement. Still visits Mecca at intervals. Thought to be embarrassing in high places owing to his frankness and fanaticism. Signed the pronouncement by the Ulama of Nejd in favour of Jihād at the time of the Ibn Rifāda rebellion in 1932.

8. 'Abdullah Kāzim

A Hejazi said to be of Cossack origin. Born about 1887. Was employed in the Mecca Post Office in King Hussein's time. Appointed Sa'ūdi Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs in 1926 and still holds the post. Went to Port Sudan in March 1926 as one of Ibn Sa'ūd's delegates to negotiate about the E.T.C. cable and showed himself an obstructive negotiator. Was again pretty sticky in taking delivery of Marconi wireless in 1931-33, but created a good impression at the time of the cable and wireless negotiations in the spring of 1935.

9. 'Abdullah ibn Muhammad ibn 'Aqil (or 'Aqeyil)

In 1926 Governor of Jauf, but had vacated the post by March 1928, when he was put in command of a force sent to quell the disturbance created at Wejḥ by Hamid ibn Rifāda. Probably identical with the ibn 'Aqil who was mentioned in May 1931 as a possible candidate for the governorship of Tebūk, but was not appointed. 'Abdullah ibn 'Aqil commanded the Ikhwān mobilised in June 1932 to repress the further rebellion of Hamid ibn Rifāda.

10. 'Abdullah ibn Muhammad al-Fadhil

Vice-President of the Legislative Council and Assistant Viceroy. Probably born about 1883.

Principal member of the Fadhl family *q.v.* Was formerly a merchant in Jeddah. Described in 1917 as "anti-Sherif and pro-English" and as going by the sobriquet of "Englisi" in Jeddah. Put in prison at that time in Mecca for some unknown offence. Played no particular rôle subsequently (and was so little valued for brain-power as to be known as "the Sheep") until ex-King 'Ali sent him on a delegation to negotiate with Ibn Sa'ūd at Mecca. Went over definitely to Ibn Sa'ūd and acted as his representative at Rabigh for the 1925 pilgrimage, in which employment he is said to have feathered his nest. Attached to the King's son, Muhammad, as adviser when the young Amir occupied Medina later in 1925. Figured as a Hejazi delegate at the Moslem Congress in Mecca in June 1926. Obtained about the same period, in partnership with Indians settled in Mecca, a contract for motor transport, but lost it. Did better as purveyor to the Government. Sent on an unsuccessful mission to Eritrea in 1927 in connexion with negotiations for the recognition of Ibn Sa'ūd by Italy and proposed treaty arrangements. Also had some part in the treaty negotiations with Great Britain. Became assistant to the Viceroy at Mecca and so on to appointment to his present post in or before 1929. Went in that year on a mission to Persia. Alleged in the same year to have done nicely in the company of 'Abdullah Suleymān by cornering benzene, &c., just before new duties were imposed. Appears to enjoy the King's confidence in a high degree and to steer an even or waggly course between rival factions. Not impressive in appearance or conversation; still somewhat of a sheep; but wore his dignities with an acquired air of dignity, sobriety and sagacity, which may be a part of his success. May still have commercial interests, but has long been dissociated from the business of the other Fadhlis. Acting Viceroy during Faisal's absence in 1939 and again during Faisal's absence in the winter of 1943.

11. 'Abdullah an Nafisi

Important as being Ibn Sa'ūd's agent at Kuwait, where he is established as a merchant and once did a large business in rice, &c. Now elderly and less active. Seems sensible.

12. 'Abdullah ibn Suleymān al Hamdān

Minister of Finance. Born about 1887. Of plebeian Aneyza origin. Started life in a small way with the Qusaibis, originally, it is said, as a coffee boy. Spent ten years as clerk in their Bombay office. Returned to Nejd about 1919. Said to have gone bankrupt as a broker. Recommended by the Qusaibis to replace his brother, who had died, as a clerk in the King's Diwān. Rose to be head of the Diwān. Became Director-General of Finance and had acquired complete control of all financial matters by September 1928, when it was remarked that he travelled in greater state than the King himself between Mecca and Jeddah. Has since been the most powerful of the King's advisers. His position was strongly assailed in October 1931 by a cabal, which included the Amir Faysal, Fuad Hamza, 'Abdullah al Fadhl (perhaps a doubtful enemy) and Mr. Philby. Was sent for a time to lend a hand with the Tawil mission in Hasa, but had his place kept warm for him and returned to it. Was promoted in August 1932 from being Director-General of Finance to the post of Minister of Finance for the Hejaz and Nejd and its Dependencies, thus obtaining the title of Wazīr, hitherto enjoyed only by the Amir Faysal. Continues to be supreme in the financial administration and has his finger in many other pies, being in effect Comptroller of the Privy Purse, Grand Master of Ordnance, Quarter-Master-General on occasion, general manager of the King's establishment of slaves and pilgrimage-organiser. Appointed in 1935

to the specific additional post of Deputy Minister of Defence. Probably entirely faithful to the King, whose needs he supplies at the expense of others having demands on the Treasury, and who gives him a free hand in finance regardless of the effect on public opinion. A man of rather mean appearance, but emphatically a "live wire." Ready and energetic in conversation and full of ideas about development. Has spent long periods at Jeddah acting as the representative of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The main burden of dealing with the Italian Minister's procrastinations and evasions in January and February 1942 fell on him and he acquitted himself very creditably. He was the originator of the agricultural development scheme at Al Kharj and showed great energy and enthusiasm in the face of much hostility, envy and ill-natured criticism from his brother advisers. A keen fisherman and a tireless traveller, his other pleasures include tobacco, and the bottle. He has a good sense of humour and repartee sharpened in many verbal battles with his rivals. His position was weakened in 1944 by the dismissal of his friend and protégé Najib Ibrahim Salha (No. 67 and see below) and the latter's eventual replacement by Sheikh Mahommed Suroor as-Sabaan (No. 60) and he has failed almost completely since that time to cope with the changed post-war world. Was a very harassed and worried man during 1944 when faced with the prospect of having to reorganise the country's finances and economy on sounder lines. Accompanied the King to Egypt in February 1945 for the meetings with President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill. Is cultivated by the Americans whose increasing tendency to play the rôle of Lady Bountiful to Saudi Arabia naturally appeals to him as Minister of Finance. The abuse of his official position by his brother Hamad, and the latter's sons, is gross and scandalous.

In August 1946 visited the United States, accompanied by a rabble of official and unofficial hangers-on, for the purpose of negotiating a loan to be used for purchase in the United States of essential supplies and rehabilitation equipment. A 10 million dollar line of credit for these purposes was granted by the Export-Import Bank, secured by an assignment of royalties due from the oil company but the credit was not in the event exhausted because of the very different ideas of the lenders and the beneficiaries on the way in which the money should be spent. On this occasion the Minister and his entourage, as in India during the war and in Egypt since, incurred heavy expenditure on private account which had nothing to do with the welfare of Saudi Arabia.

Since the war the Minister, whose knowledge of finance is limited and whose position has always been an uncomfortable one between a lavishly spending royal family and a Treasury whose resources are exiguous, has found the task beyond him. Although however, he now (1950) has Najib Bey Salha back as his assistant as well as Muhammed Suroor he is still the undisputed Minister of Finance and also the most influential man in the Hejaz. But he is now conscious of his waning prestige. His chronic addiction to the bottle and his old age and failing health (he has twice been at death's door during 1950) have increased the unbalance of his mind and made him generally unamenable to reason and subject to uncontrollable outbursts and prejudices which make him a man very difficult to deal with.

13. Abdul-Wahhāb, Descendants of

The following seem to be the most notable of the descendants of the founder of Wahhābism:—

(1) 'Abdullah ibn Hasan.—Is one of the leading Wahhābi Ulama in Mecca. Played a rôle in 1926,

with 'Abdullah ibn Blayhid (*q.v.*), in the Wahhābi purging of the Holy Cities, and was in 1929 thought, like him, to favour the Ikhwān extremists. Signed the pronouncement of the Ulama in favour of Jihād at the time of the Ibn Rifāda rebellion in 1932. Now Grand Qādhi. Proud and fanatical.

Known as "Shaikh al-Islam," he is thought to exercise considerable influence over Ibn Saud in religious and non-religious matters.

(2) Muhammad ibn 'Abdul-'Aziz ibn Sheykh, nicknamed as-Sahābi, formerly Governor of Taif, transferred to Riyādh in 1932 as Assistant to the Amir Sa'ūd.

(3) 'Abdul-Latif Family.—Four sons and a probable grandson of a descendant named 'Abdul-Latif were among the ten signatories of the declaration of Jihād referred to under (1). No. (2) and the mother of the Amir Faysal (*q.v.*) also probably belong to this connexion.

14. 'Abdul-Wahhāb Abū Malha

A personage of consequence in 'Asir, possibly of the Sheykhly family of Malha near Sabya, although this cannot be affirmed. Was described in 1927 as Director of Finance in 'Asir, and was in that year one of four delegates sent by Ibn Sa'ūd to negotiate with the Imām Yahya. Probably still has the title of Director of Finance and commanded the Sa'ūdi forces which entered Sabya in November 1932.

15. 'Abdur-Raūf as-Sabbān

Born in the Hejaz probably between 1888 and 1893. Grandson of an immigrant from Egypt. Educated in the Hejaz and in Egypt. Associated with his father, Hasan, and others in what was in 1917 the principal hide and skin business in Jeddah and Mecca. Impressed the Hejazis at that time by his knowledge and European manners. Was made Director of Education in Jeddah, but was dismissed and reverted to trade in cotton goods and skins. Edited in 1925 the anti-Sa'ūdi paper *Al-Umma* in Cairo with the help of one of the Dabbāghs. Given a post by the Amir 'Abdullah as manager of his estates in Transjordan in or before 1931. Was an active supporter of the Hizb-al-Ahrār-al-Hijāzi, and was concerned in 1932 in the press propaganda and financial arrangements of the outside promoters of movements against Ibn Sa'ūd. Seems to have gone at least once to Eritrea in this connexion. Was dismissed by the Amir 'Abdullah in the autumn of 1932 as a result of these political activities, but went on with them. Excluded from Egypt, Palestine and Transjordan, whereupon he retired to Bagdad, where he was understood to have become a private secretary to the late ex-King Ali. Returned to the Hejaz with or at the same time as Ahmad-al-Mujallid in July 1935, and was appointed in 1936 a member of the Legislative Council. In 1938 did some propaganda for Ibn Saud in Egypt. Appointed Director-General of Waqfs in December 1942 in succession to Seyyid Abdul-Wahhab. Appointed president of the Mecca Municipality in November 1945. Reported to be one of the founders of the illegal *émigré* "Hejaz Constitutional Party."

16. Muhammad Sa'id al Kurdi

Formerly Director of Police in Jeddah. Of Kurdish origin, from Zakho. Was previously Director of Police at Rabigh and gave offence to the legation by trying to commandeering a car which was taking the Nawab of Bahawalpur to Medina. Was transferred to Jeddah in 1932 and confirmed in the post early in 1933. Was removed from his post in Jeddah and apparently reappointed to Rabigh in 1933. Officer Commanding troops in Jeddah in 1936, in which capacity he was in charge of aviation during the presence of the Italian Air Mission 1937-39. According to a Russian pilot, showed ability and

real desire to learn about aviation. Was cultivated assiduously by the Italian pilot, probably received bribes from him, and learned Italian. Very anti-British when the Palestine trouble was at its height in 1938. Commanded the Saudi contingent which went to Palestine to fight the Jews in May 1948.

After the débâcle he remained some time in Egypt and then returned in 1949 to Taif where he became Chief of Staff. He has since fallen out of favour and though he is still (1950) Chief of Staff his appointment is only nominal.

17. 'Abdur-Rahman al-Bassâm

Formerly Second Assistant in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Educated in Egypt. Speaks English. Helped Sheikh Yusuf Yasin with the English versions of the Sa'ûdi-Koweit Agreements signed at Jeddah in April 1942.

18. 'Ali Taha

Assistant Governor of Jeddah since 1928. A Hejazi born about 1894. Rose from a small post as secretary to the Governor. Cadaverous and unhealthy. Speaks Turkish well. Well meaning, and not without intelligence. Acted as Deputy Governor of Jeddah from April 1944 and showed himself helpful and co-operative over routine matters with His Majesty's Legation. Has a working knowledge of French. Reverted to his former post of Assistant Governor on the appointment in April 1945 of a new Governor, Abdurrahman Sidayri (*q.v.*), all of whose work, both in the latter's rare presences and lengthy absences, he continues to do.

19. Bujâd (or Humayd) Family

A leading family in the notoriously fanatical Ghutghut section of the 'Ateyba tribe.

For an account of individual members of the family see Personalities Report for 1946.

20. Dabbâgh Family

A Mecca family of "Moorish" (*i.e.*, some North-West Africa) origin. Appear to be Seyyids. Became prominent in 1932 in connexion with plot behind the revolt of Ibn Rifâdah and the preparations for the retarded revolt in 'Asir. The family is numerous.

For an account of individual members of the family see Personalities Report for 1946.

21. Dawish Family

A leading family in the Mutayr tribe. Its best-known member, Faysal ad-Dawish, famous as a raider, as one of Ibn Sa'ûd's principal lieutenants and as a rebel against him, died as a State prisoner at Riyâdh in October 1931. It is said that when his ankles were raw from the friction of his shackles molten lead was poured into the wounds and that his death was of resultant gangrene. His name is, however, still potent in Eastern Arabia, where he was regarded as more than an ordinary sheykh—a kingly man and a king maker. This gives importance to his sons, two of whom have figured in reports from Kuwait.

(1) *Bandar ibn Faysal ad-Dawish*.—Said to be looked to by the Mutayr as the leader they desire, but to be himself very cautious and unwilling to move at present. Reported in December 1932 to have countered a question by Ibn Sa'ûd as to whom the Mutayr wanted for a leader by saying "No one but Your Majesty."

(2) *Al-Humaydi ibn Faysal ad-Dawish*.—Visited Ibn Sa'ûd at Riyâdh in the autumn of 1932, when the King was making efforts to reconcile the ex-rebel Mutayr and 'Ajmân, still hostile to him, and was well received and rewarded.

The ladies of this family seem to count. The political agent at Kuwait, who had befriended them when Faysal was surrendered to Ibn Sa'ûd in January 1930, was visited by various of them on several occasions in 1932. They included Faysal's mother, who hid bitter hatred of the King beneath copious praises; a sister, whose rumoured marriage to a Harb Sheykh was regarded as an augury of reconciliation between his tribe and the Mutayr, but was afterwards denied; and a cousin, still a woman of considerable charm and humour, who had been married to Sheykh Mubârak of Kuwait, to a deceased son of Faysal ad-Dawish and, lastly, as prize of war, to Ibn Sa'ûd's brother 'Abdullah.

22. Fadhl (al-Fazal) Family

Nejdis of 'Aneyza origin long settled in the Hejaz. An original 'Abdullah had at least five sons, all now deceased, with one possible exception. Each of these had issue. Members of the first and second generations after the original 'Abdullah were concerned in firms doing important business in the Hejaz and India, where they had a high reputation, enhanced by their position as business agents of Ibn Sa'ûd, until 1930. Family differences and bad trade led to the collapse of their business at Bombay and Karachi in that year. The two partners most actively concerned in the business in India absconded to the Hejaz, where a third tried to dissociate himself from the partnership. The affairs of the family have for some years been the subject of very complicated litigation and have engaged the attention of various British authorities for reasons too long to recapitulate. The family still have influential connexions in the Hejaz, and several members of it have been given employment by Ibn Sa'ûd. Apart from 'Abdullah ibn Muhammad ibn 'Abdullah, who is the subject of a separate notice, the following deserve mention:—

(1) *Muhammad*, son of the 'Abdullah just mentioned. In business in Jeddah and did a tidy trade in grain. Disinherited by his father in 1943 as a result of a quarrel. Died in 1946.

(2) *Ibrahim ibn Abdurrahmân*.—One of the two who absconded from India in 1930. Appointed a member of the Legislative Council in October 1930. Became later a secretary to the Amir Faysal. Was called on to resign, ostensibly on grounds of ill-health, by Amir Faysal. He is now living in Mecca and engaged in trade in an unimportant way; but is still said to enjoy the confidence of Amir Faysal.

(3) *Muhammad ibn Abdurrahmân ibn 'Abdullah*.—Was a partner in the firm which collapsed in India in 1930, but resided in Jeddah and tried to dissociate himself from the other partners, his brother and cousin.

(4) *'Abdullah ibn Ibrahim ibn 'Abdullah*.—Private secretary to the Amir Faysal in 1926. Afterwards one of the partners who absconded from India. Selected in 1931 for the post of chargé d'affaires in Holland, under scheme which did not materialise for having a legation there with the Sa'ûdi Minister in London as minister. Appointed Treasurer to the Government later in 1931, as a result of the cabal against 'Abdullah Suleymân. Later became Director of Finance in Jeddah, then Government representative to the Arabian-American Oil Company at Dhahran and Sa'ûdi representative for supply matters in Bahrain. Speaks English. Appointed member of the Council of Ministers in February 1946. Appointed Saudi Consul-General at Cairo during 1946 and promoted to minister in December 1946 on the retirement of Fauzan as-Sabiq (*q.v.*).

(5) *Ibrahim ibn Suleymân al-'Aqil*.—Son-in-law of father of (4), and has taken the place of (2) as Rais-ul-Diwân of the Amir Faysal. Is an important official and enjoys Amir Faysal's complete confidence. Accompanied him to London in 1939 for the Palestine discussions. As a young man spent

considerable time in India. Speaks a very little English and some Urdu. A man of culture and pleasing manners. Accompanied the Amir Faysal to the San Francisco Conference in April 1945. Has been suggested as a possible minister in London; but for some reason Ibn Saud does not like him. Now (1948) has the personal rank of minister-plenipotentiary. Accompanied the Emir to the United States and to the United Kingdom in the summer of 1948.

23. Fahd ibn Zu'ayr

Late Governor of 'Asir. Was head of the mission sent to 'Asir in May 1930 to make the arrangements which subsequently culminated in its practical annexation by Ibn Sa'ûd. Was later appointed Amir, though probably not the first to hold the post. Reported to Ibn Sa'ûd with increasing urgency in the autumn of 1932 that the Idrisi was getting beyond himself. The Idrisi, professing complete loyalty to the King, complained bitterly of Fahad's rough treatment. The King, anxious to placate the Idrisi, steered a middle course and sent a commission to investigate. Before it could reach the spot the Idrisi had gone into open revolt and Fahad had to escape from his seat of government at Jizân. Was little heard of for some time afterwards, but was appointed Governor of Qunfida in or about June 1933. Now (1948) no longer holds this post.

24. Fawzan as-Sabiq

Formerly Sa'ûdi Chargé d'Affaires in Egypt and consul-general in Cairo. Appointed in August 1936 upon the conclusion of the Sa'ûdi-Egyptian Treaty of May 1936. Previously Sa'ûdi agent in Egypt. Born about 1888. Belongs by origin to the 'Uqeyl, the guild, as it were, of recognised caravan-guides. Educated in a Turkish school at 'Ammân. Said to have lived for many years in Bombay. Is by profession a dealer in camels and horses and still appears to do this business. Was Ibn Sa'ûd's agent in Damascus before 1924. Is described by Sir Walter Smart as a devout Moslem, plain, slow, courteous and old-fashioned; politically rather innocent, but possessed of a certain native shrewdness. He is never used by Ibn Saud for important political work. A keen race-goer who spends much of his time at the races in Cairo and Alexandria. Promoted to rank of minister in January 1946 during Ibn Saud's visit to Egypt.

During the last years of his mission became quite deaf and probably rather feeble-minded. He resigned in December 1946 on the grounds of ill-health.

25. Fuad Bey Hamza

Born about 1900, he is a Druze of Abeih, in the Lebanon, where the family are less prosperous than they were. One brother Sa'id was accused of complicity in the murder of a Christian priest at Abeih in 1930, but was finally acquitted in April-May 1934. Educated in Turkish schools in Syria, the Teachers' Training College, Beirut, and the Syrian Protestant College, Beirut. Was Inspector of Schools at Damascus for a time. Obtained a post as clerk under the Palestine Department of Public Health in 1921. Resigned after a few months and took service under the Department of Education as a teacher in Acre. Transferred in 1922 to a secondary school in Jerusalem as teacher in English and remained until 1926. Studied simultaneously at the Law School, got a certificate of Legal Studies in 1925 and qualified in five subjects, including Constitutional History and Public International Law, for the Diploma, but did not complete the course. Had a uniformly good record in Palestine, but was mixed up in politics and the Druze insurrectionary movement. May have feared arrest, although he was not, in fact, in danger of it. Left for Egypt on the

2nd December, 1926. Apparently was to go to India on a Syro-Palestinian delegation, but was drawn to the Hejaz, where, after giving English lessons for a time, he was taken into the Ministry for Foreign Affairs by Yusuf Yasin, then acting for Dr. 'Abdullah Damlûji. Became Acting Minister in July 1928, when Dr. Damlûji left on a mission, never to return. Had probably worked earlier to undermine Damlûji's position. Remained Acting Minister until the Amir Faysal became titular Minister with Fuad as Under-Secretary, but still effective head of the Ministry in December 1930. Retained his post, with a seat on the Council of Ministers when the latter was constituted early in 1932. Visited Europe for the first time as a member of the Sa'ûdi Mission under the Amir Faysal in the spring of 1932 and did all the real business. Was made an honorary K.B.E. during the visit to London, and for several years carried a passport in which he and his wife appeared as Sir Fuad and Lady Hamza. Visited Europe again in 1934 and 1935 and conducted important negotiations with the Foreign Office, and in 1939 went to London with the Amir Faysal and took a prominent part in the Palestine discussions.

Fuad Hamza is alert, intelligent, well informed on matters pertaining to his work and industrious. Speaks English and French well and Turkish and some German. Equally devoted to his own ambitions and to the cause of Arab nationalism, serving Ibn Sa'ûd as its exponent, though inclined sometimes to despair of the system of which he has made himself part. Keeps in touch with other Nationalists in Palestine, and probably Syria. Very hostile to 'Abdullah Suleymân and took part in the unsuccessful drive against him in 1931. Is a very poor Moslem, and conforms to Wahabism no more than he is obliged to. Would like to see Sa'ûdi Arabia, a name of which he was one of the authors, develop on modern, more or less constitutional lines. Rather bumptious and sometimes difficult to deal with, but responds to personal handling. His attitude towards foreign Powers is determined by Arab nationalism, and if, as there is some ground to believe, he accepted a large bribe from the Italians at the time of the Ethiopian war, it does not follow that this affected his advice to Ibn Sa'ûd. Possesses a splendid villa in the best part of Beirut which could not have been built out of legitimate savings, even supplemented by a sum of £3,000 which Ibn Saud is said to have contributed to this object.

In 1939 was appointed first Sa'ûdi Minister to Paris. Removed to Vichy after the collapse of France in 1940, where his record was not reassuring. Withdrawn from there and appointed first Sa'ûdi Minister in Angora where he proceeded in April 1943. The King did not want him to return to Sa'ûdi Arabia, and the great power he once wielded passed entirely into the hands of his rival, Yusuf Yasin.

Incurred the King's displeasure by intrigues and attempts at mediating between the French and the Syrians and the latter and the Lebanese when on a visit to the Lebanon during the troubles in November 1943. Was permitted to return to Sa'ûdi Arabia in April 1944 and was present at most of the interviews between His Majesty's Minister and Ibn Sa'ûd in April and May. Left for Angora again in the autumn of 1944 but lingered on in Beirut on the way and meddled in the abortive Franco-Syrian negotiations early in 1945, before returning to Turkey. After a brief visit to Saudi Arabia in the autumn of 1945, he left again for urgent medical treatment (heart trouble). Returned, rather unwillingly, in April 1946 and has since completely re-established himself in the King's confidence as His Majesty's adviser on foreign affairs, in Riyadh. Ibn Saud twice went out of his way to assure His Majesty's Minister in May and June 1946 that Fuad Hamza is an able and much-maligned man.

In 1947 was appointed Minister of State with the duty of regularising the Saudi Arabian Government's relations with the concessionary companies and the contractors engaged upon the various public utility projects. He seemed to set about his new duties energetically and with an uncompromisingly legalistic approach to all matters in dispute but after a month or two he vanished, apparently to Beirut. This new appointment was held concurrently with that of minister to Turkey until March 1948 when his brother Tewfiq, an amiable nonentity, was awarded that post. He soon returned his attention to foreign affairs and acted as translator during His Majesty's Ambassador's visit to the King in January 1948. In April 1948 he again left for Beirut for health reasons but soon recovered sufficiently to attend the meetings of the Council of the Arab League at Amman and to accompany King Abdullah on his visit to Ibn Saud in June 1948.

Since then he has spent rather more time outside the country than in it; his health remains poor and further heart attacks as well as dislike of discomfort have induced him to spend as little time as possible in Saudi Arabia during the summer, the Pilgrimage season, and the month of Ramadhan. He showed himself in some off the record remarks to the British Chargé d'Affaires in June 1949 as being still rabidly Anglophobe, and at that time a disinterested and friendly Arab close to the King described him as such. He has been described as two-faced by a prominent Saudi Arabian personality, who said on one occasion that what Fuad Bey Hamza told the King and what he told others he had told the King were often very different. Even when this does not apply his advice is biased and variable, and there is more than a suspicion that he is often more concerned with his private and political interests than the interests of Saudi Arabia. He appears for instance to have forced Ibn Saud's hand and assisted the Syrians to secure the dollar loan from Saudi Arabia in 1950 by a public announcement in Beirut that the loan would be made at a time when, it is believed, no decision had been taken by the Saudi Arabian Government.

26. Fuad al-Khatib

Born in the Lebanon about 1875. Educated at the Syrian Protestant College (now the American University at Beirut). Became a teacher at Gordon College, Khartoum. Joined King Hussein about 1915 and later became his Foreign Secretary. Left the Hejaz with King Ali in 1925. Acted as an agent for some British intelligence agency in Cairo. Used these connexions to extract a pension of £120 per annum from the Emir Abdullah of Transjordan who used him as a court poet and buffoon. Believed to have been in communication with the French in Syria in 1940 and 1941. Broke with the Emir Abdullah in 1943 and retired to the Lebanon. Returned to the Hejaz in 1947 to go on Pilgrimage. Made his peace with Ibn Saud and was appointed Saudi Arabian Minister to Afghanistan in June 1948. Said to be showing signs of senile decay. No relation to Abdul Hamid al-Khatib (*q.v.*).

27. Hâfiz (Hâfidh) Wahba

Sa'ûdi Minister in London. An Egyptian born probably between 1885 and 1890. Educated at Al-Azhar. Mixed up in Nationalist and pan-Islamic politics in early manhood and was closely associated with 'Abdul-'Aziz Shawish. Definitely anti-British at time of Great War and said to have been deported from India. Said to have been in Bahrein at one time. Started a school at Kuwait and passed thence in Ibn Sa'ûd's service. Became tutor to the Amir Faysal and accompanied the prince to London in

1919. Was one of Ibn Sa'ûd's delegates at the abortive Kuwait Conference in 1923-24. In supreme charge of the civil side of the Administration at Mecca in 1925, with a viceregal title, and did well. Read the King's inaugural address at the Moslem Congress in Mecca in June 1926. Much employed on missions and negotiations during the ensuing years. *Inter alia* took part in negotiations with Sir G. Clayton in 1925, 1927 and 1928 and expounded Ibn Sa'ûd's views and fears regarding Italian policy in the Red Sea, Bolshevik activity and Hashimite sovereignty in neighbouring countries to the Residency at Cairo early in 1928. During all this period waged a ding-dong struggle against the Syrian influences around the King, and had ups and downs. Was occulted towards the end of 1926, but returned to favour soon after and became Assistant Viceroy beside the Amir Faysal. Thought to have indisposed the Amir by his masterfulness as a tutor and his disregard as Assistant Viceroy for the Amir's position. Relegated in July 1928 to the post of Director-General of Education. Went to London in 1929 to represent Ibn Sa'ûd at the International Postal Congress. While there was selected for the post of Minister in London, but did not take up the post for over a year, during which interval he went on a sort of undefined mission to Kuwait and was also employed much about the King's person, though he appeared on the whole to have lost ground to the Syrians. He and Fuad Hamza are deadly enemies. Has during his tenure of the legation in London represented his country on international occasions, at Geneva and elsewhere. Was designated in 1931 to be Minister at The Hague, but the arrangements have never materialised for reasons of economy. Represented Sa'ûdi Arabia at the opening of the Tokyo mosque in 1938.

Hâfiz Wahba has sown his political wild oats. His anti-British sentiments are supposed to have undergone a change in or before 1928, when he was reported as being accustomed to say that, as regards Egypt, he would always be against Great Britain, but, as a servant of Ibn Sa'ûd, believed the King's interest to lie in friendly relations with His Majesty's Government. He has certainly shown himself well-disposed in London, and has been distinctly helpful. He is a good propagandist for Ibn Sa'ûd on the lecture platform and in society. Neither taciturn nor talkative, he appeals by his sense of humour and looks anything but a Wahhâbi (except that he abstains from alcohol and tobacco) at the Hyde Park Hotel or the Savoy. Likes the theatre too, and alleged to have a passion for night clubs to which he gave full rein in New York in 1938. Speaks good English. A useful servant to the King, whose respect and confidence he commands. He was on leave in Sa'ûdi Arabia early in 1940 and returned via Koweit, where he settled with the Political Agent the temporary form of the Sa'ûdi-Koweit Agreements, which were then brought into force pending the drawing up and signing of the final texts. Accompanied the Amirs Faisal and Khalid on their visit to America and England in the winter of 1943. He returned with them to Sa'ûdi Arabia in December 1943 and was present at most of the interviews between His Majesty's Minister and the King in March and April 1944. Showed himself genuinely concerned at state of country's finances and general corruption of Sa'ûdi officials. The King appeared to consider him as one of his most trustworthy counsellors. He returned to England in April 1944. Visited the King again in January 1945 and accompanied him to Egypt in February for the meetings with President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill. Was a member of the Sa'ûdi delegation which attended the San Francisco Conference in April 1945. Was Assistant Saudi delegate to Preparatory Commission and First Assembly of

United Nations. Made a K.C.V.O., 10th May, 1946. Promoted to be first Saudi Arabian Ambassador in February 1948. Was present during the abortive treaty negotiations in Riyâdh in 1948, and on his own saying quarrelled with Fuad Hamza over the latter's interpretation to the King of certain of His Majesty's Ambassador's remarks.

He has continued to date as Ambassador, returning periodically to Saudi Arabia to see His Majesty and, if his own account is to be believed, to give advice which, however, is now usually disregarded by the King, whose personal esteem for his Ambassador is not allowed to affect His Majesty's judgement of affairs.

28. Hamad Suleymân

Under-Secretary of State for Finance, brother of 'Abdullah Suleymân, *q.v.*, and has worked under him. Once a petty trader in Bahrein and fled the country to evade payment of debts. Acted for his brother as Director-General of Finance during his relegation to Hasa towards the end of 1931. Was appointed Wakil or Under-Secretary when Abdullah was made Wazir or full Minister in August 1932. Has been employed on missions in 'Asir, notably in November 1932, when he was sent with Khâlid-al-Qarqani to investigate the differences between the Idrisi and Ibn Sa'ûd's Governor. They were too late to reach the spot before the Idrisi went into open revolt. Went with a Sa'ûdi mission to the Yemen in 1933, and was reported to have been detained by the Imam at San'a on the situation with Sa'ûdi Arabia deteriorating. Returned well before the outbreak of hostilities in 1934. In 1935 was a member of a Sa'ûdi delegation which visited Bahrein, to negotiate the Transit Dues Agreement, and to Kuwait, to discuss the question of the Sa'ûdi blockade of that neighbouring State. Whilst at Bahrein he was sued by a local Persian merchant, the political agent reported, for an old debt. Fell into disgrace with Ibn Sa'ûd in the spring of 1936 (as he had done at least once previously) but was apparently begged off by his brother 'Abdullah. Of even meaner appearance than his brother, a poor talker and not, apparently, very intelligent. He disclosed to His Majesty's Minister at Taif in 1942 that his favourite outdoor sport was throwing stones. His eldest son, Suleymân-al-Hamad, born about 1917, takes some part in public affairs: he was for a time director of the agricultural project at Al-Kharj, and early in 1943 he went to Egypt to buy machinery and spare parts for the Minister of Finance; Suleyman represented Shaikh Yusuf Yasin as Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs during the latter's absence in October and November 1943. Visited Egypt again from May to July 1944, ostensibly on Government business, but managed to find time to indulge in lavish personal expenditure on the Government's account. He is a shallow, self-seeking man. He has recently (1948) gone into partnership in a trading venture with Ahmed Ashmawi (*q.v.*) a director of the British firm of Gellatly, Hankey and Company (Saudi Arabia) Limited who has other business ventures of some importance with Hamad Suleiman's rival, Najib Salha (*q.v.*). Though curbed by the latter in his ministerial capacity, Hamad, like other relatives of Abdullah Suleiman, has continued to practice corruption as much as he dares.

29. Hamdi Bey

Formerly Director-General of Military Organisation. Born about 1892 to 1896. Believed to be an 'Iraqi Kurd and to have risen to non-commissioned rank in the Turkish army. Was a colonel in the army of King Huseyn, but passed to the service of Ibn Sa'ûd and was officer commanding troops at Yanbu' before 1928. Became officer commanding

in Jedda in that year. Appointed Director-General of Military Organisation in 1931 in succession to Fawzi Bey Kawokji. Hamdi seems to be a man of indifferent character, with a gift for intrigue, which he displayed in connexion with the vicissitudes of the British staff of the Hejaz air force in 1931-32. Now insignificant, having ceased to hold any important military position and to be confined to duties as A.D.C. to the Amir Faysal. Stated in 1939 that he had resigned and wanted to return to Iraq, but was not allowed by Ibn Saud to leave the country. Boon companion of the Amir Faysal's Albanian step-father-in-law, Ibrahim Adham. In spite of a gorgeous uniform gives an impression of seediness and has been known to touch a member of the legation for a loan of 2 riyals.

30. Seyyid Hamza al Ghauth al Madani

At one time consul-general designate for Java. Became first Sa'ûdi Minister to Bagdad 1938. A Hejazi of Medina, born perhaps 1895. Said to have been educated in Turkish schools and to have frequented Turkish society. Sided with Turks at time of Arab revolt, and edited an anti-Huseyn paper at Medina in their interest. Continued to be anti-Huseyn after the success of the revolt and fled. Said to have been sentenced to death by default during his absence. Seems, nevertheless, to have been given an important post at Damascus, which he continued to hold under King Faisal's régime there, even after King Huseyn had launched against him an accusation, probably trumped up, of having stolen valuables from the Prophet's Tomb. According to Philby (*Arabian Days*) was in the service of Ibn Rashid of Hâil for a period. Was in Ibn Sa'ûd's service by end of 1923 and was one of his delegates at the abortive Kuwait Conference of 1923-24, an appointment which led to a revival by the 'Iraqi delegates of the robbery charge. Became Assistant Governor of Medina after its occupation by Sa'ûdi forces in 1925. Was later employed in the Palace. Selected in 1931 for the proposed consulate-general at Batavia, to the creation of which the Netherlands Government agreed, but which has never been opened, probably owing to financial difficulties. Filled in time as a member of the Legislative Council, whence he was transferred to the Amir Sa'ûd's Diwân in September 1932. Came in King's train to Mecca in March 1933. Much of a palace man evidently. Fell into disfavour during his visit to Medina in 1941, but was later pardoned and reinstated in the King's entourage, and was frequently present at meetings of the "cabinet." Appointed Saudi Arabian Minister to Persia early in 1948 and presented his credentials in May, thus healing the diplomatic breach between the two countries caused by the reported desecration of the Ka'aba by a Persian in 1940.

31. Hithlayn Family

People of importance in the 'Ajman tribe, much concerned in the Nejd revolt of 1929. Its principal member, Dhaydân ibn Hithlayn, was slain treacherously in April of that year.

For an account of individual members of the family see Personalities Report for 1946.

32. Huseyn al'Awayni (or Aoucini)

A Syrian by birth who has been Lebanese Minister of Finance since 1928. Came to the Hejaz shortly after Ibn Saud's seizure of the country and, with the friendship of both Yusuf Yasin (*q.v.*) and Fuad Hamza (*q.v.*) and the naturalised British, Syrian-born head of a company in Manchester, as a backer in trade, ('Abdul-Ghani Ydlibi) established himself in business at Jedda. The Manchester backer overreached himself and the association broke up in 1932,

when it was thought that Aoueini was leaving Saudi Arabia for good, but he has since that time returned periodically on business visits. In association with Ibrahim Shakir, Muhammed Suroor, Abdullah Suleiman, and Najib Salha he did well in the war and formed, in 1948, a firm called the Arabian Trading Company which is now one of the most important in the country by virtue of the Government business it handles.

He was for a long time on the British list of suspects, and when Ibn Saud thought of making him first Saudi Minister at Beirut he desisted after consultation with His Majesty's Government.

He is more modern in his outlook than any Saudi Minister except Najib Salha and possibly Yusuf Yasin; in the early summer of 1950, while visiting Saudi Arabia, he claimed in a conversation with His Majesty's Ambassador to have lectured Abdullah Suleiman on the scientific way of running a budget, and adhering to it.

33. M. Huseyn Nasif

A well-known Hejazi of Jeddah of Egyptian origin. Born about 1882. Inherited much property from his father, 'Omar Nasif, who was a notable personage in Turkish times, as well as the agency in Jeddah of the Sherifs of the 'Abadilah branch. Owns the largest house in Jeddah and was once very prosperous, but is now probably less so. Was said in 1917 to have lost favour with King Huseyn, who had previously been accustomed to stay with him when in Jeddah. Was said also to be desirous of British naturalisation at that time. Described as having been a Wahhâbi by conviction, even before the Sa'ûdi invasion. Deported to 'Aqaba during King 'Ali's short reign. Figured as a Hejazi delegate at the Moslem Congress in Mecca in June 1926. Was given the privilege of putting Ibn Sa'ûd up during the years following the fall of Jeddah. Has not held office, as was expected, under the Sa'ûdi régime, perhaps owing to doubt as to his trustworthiness. Rather a dark horse nowadays and may both dislike and be disliked by the régime, but keeps quiet. Said to be a good Arabic scholar and possesses what passes in Jeddah for a remarkable library. An aldermanic figure. His eldest son, Husain Nasif, has written a book on the history of the Hejaz and has held the post of Director of Waqfs, Jeddah, which he has now relinquished in order to become a director of the Arab Car Company. He is a nasty piece of work. A cousin, M. Salih Nasif, was the figurehead president of the Palestine Defence Committee in Mecca in 1937-38. Reported to have been pro-Axis during the war years.

Said to be the only man in Saudi Arabia who has ever refused the hand of a daughter in marriage to Ibn Saud.

34. Ibrahim al Mu'ammâr

Qaimmaqam of Jeddah 1937. Identical with the Ibrahim al Junaifi mentioned in *The Heart of Arabia* and, according to the author, Mr. Philby, has a very doubtful claim to the historic name of Mu'ammâr, which he subsequently assumed. In early life travelled much in India, Persia, Egypt and elsewhere in the East, as trader and probably also as journalist and propagandist. About 1926 became head of Ibn Sa'ûd's diwan; transferred to that of the Amir Sa'ûd in 1932. In 1933 was appointed Chargé d'Affaires at Bagdad. His alleged undiplomatic activities were the subject of complaint on several occasions, and in 1937 necessitated his removal. An active, able man, interested in world affairs and with a great sense of humour. Improved Jeddah considerably, was useful in pilgrimage matters, and was helpful to foreigners within the limits of his powers.

At one time was the principal channel of communication between the legation and the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

He was dismissed from the Governorate of Jeddah in 1944 as a result of a scandal involving a slave girl and of speculation and smuggling activities. He was however re-employed on a special Mission to the Yemen at the time of the Imam Yahia's assassination in 1948 and his retention of the King's favour is evident from his ever closer association with the King; he now lives at Riyadh except when the King is elsewhere, and has become one of his closer advisers and representatives; he was for instance deputed to look after the Sheikh of Kuwait during the latter's visit in 1950. In 1948 he had a severe attack of malaria, which cost him a lot of weight, but his health was completely restored within a few months.

His eldest son, Abdullah, born about 1920, after a period of tutelage in the Political Bureau at Riyadh under Yusuf Yasin, entered the diplomatic service in 1943 and returned to the Political Bureau in 1948. His younger son, Abdul Aziz, is of increasing stature in his own right—see No. 87.

35. Ibrahim Shâker

Born of Turkish-Syrian parents in the Hejaz about 1903. He started business life, after employment as a clerk in the Quarantine Administration under the Hashemites earlier on, as a partner of Hussein Aoueini (*q.v.*) in 1927. In partnership with Aoueini and later Najib Salha (*q.v.*) he has over the years become one of the most important merchants in the country; he owns property in Cairo and Turkey and, as a Director of the Arabian Trading Company, handles a good deal of government business, especially as agent for Dodge cars, Banque Misr and other Egyptian concerns, and is associated with American big business. He is a close friend of Yusuf Yassin and is a private business associate of Abdullah Suleiman. He is an important personal and business enemy of the Ali Ridha family (*q.v.*) and a project for the formation of a million pound import-export concern foundered on their rivalry in 1949.

Personally Shakir is a friendly, intelligent man who speaks Arabic and Turkish. He has a reportedly very beautiful Turkish wife and has determined that his children, two of whom are now at English schools in Egypt, shall be educated abroad and that his daughter shall remain abroad rather than be forced into wearing the veil and into harem life. In 1950 he told His Majesty's Ambassador that one cure for the evils of this country might be the establishment of a Victoria College at Jeddah where young princes and others unable to go abroad for their education could receive instruction and given some constructive training, and said that if such a plan became feasible he would be prepared to subscribe substantially.

36. Izzeddin Shawa

Born about 1905 in Gaza. Palestinian of a well-known family. Educated at St. Catherine's College, Cambridge, where he took a diploma in agriculture. Speaks flawless English. Joined the Palestine administration and as District Officer at Jenin earned the reputation of a very capable civil servant. He was caught however in 1937 betraying to the Arab rebels the secrets of an anti-rebel conference he had been attending half an hour previously; he then joined the rebels and took an active part against the British during the Palestine troubles in 1937-38. Was at one time private secretary to the Mufti. Violently anti-Jew. Came to Iraq in 1940 with his wife, who is French, and joined Rashid Ali's

rebel army in May 1941. Escaped after rebellion had been crushed and was granted asylum by Ibn Sa'ûd provided he refrained from political activities. He kept his word. Appointed Director of Agriculture at Al Kharj early in 1944 and in April Director of the Office of Public Works at Jeddah in succession to Najib Salha. A sincere Nationalist, he is outspoken about his views on Palestine, but is not really anti-British. The legation found him to be an intelligent and co-operative colleague in his new job, and therefore a pleasant change from the majority of Sa'ûdi officials. Has a son at Victoria College. He found the task of cleaning out the Augean stables of the Directorate of Transport, while fighting against Nejdî and Syrian influences, too much for him and, in June 1945, resigned.

He claimed at that time that he remained one of the King's personal advisers, but, with constant intrigue against him, left the country and was thought to have severed all but a tenuous connexion with it. After lecturing in the United States in 1946 and becoming representative in London of the Arab Higher Committee (1948), however, he returned unexpectedly to Saudi Arabia in the van of the Amir Faisal at the end of 1949. For a while he had no work, but in February 1950 was appointed to be assistant to Mohammed as-Sidayri (No. 52 (4)), the newly appointed "Protector of the Trans-Arabian Pipeline" (Tapline). Took up his appointment on the pipeline in the autumn of 1950 and is acting, in effect, as chief Saudi Liaison Officer on the Tapline.

37. Muhammad 'Id Rawwâf

Formerly Sa'ûdi Consul in Damascus. Born about 1898. One of a Sherari family which migrated from Jauf to Damascus in 1910. Family not highly considered in Damascus, but 'Id's father maintained close connexion with Ibn Sa'ûd and was helpful to him in negotiations with the Turks. He, the father, made a fortune in camel-dealing and left wealth to his two sons. According to his own account, Muhammad made a large sum of money during the Great War by buying up English banknotes in Damascus at a discount of 20 per cent. to 40 per cent., stealing away to Bagdad as soon as it fell into British hands, and cashing the notes at par. Appointed to his Damascus post in 1929 in succession to his brother Yasin. Had then only had primary education, but was stated last year to be busily improving on it. Was considered by His Majesty's Consul in Damascus rather stupid, though pleasant and useful. Well informed on local currents of thought and pushes in Syrian Nationalist circles, without apparently carrying much weight, the idea of an Arab Empire with Ibn Sa'ûd as a suitable ruler for it. The brother Yasin Rawwâf, whom he succeeded, is said to have become Governor of Medina in 1929-30. He was appointed second assistant to the Viceroy of the Hejaz in September 1930, but faded out of Sa'ûdi official life and went to live in Damascus. Muhammad 'Id Rawwâf was superseded as consul at Damascus by Rusheyd Pasha (*q.v.*) in May 1933 and appointed an Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. In 1935 was appointed Acting Governor (Kaimakam, not Amir) of Jeddah, but in 1937 exchanged posts with Ibrahim ibn Mu'ammâr. Ceased to be chargé d'affaires at Bagdad in 1938, when a Sa'ûdi Minister was appointed, and was made a member of the Council of Ministers. Now (1948) resident in Syria.

38. Idrisi Family

Founded by Ahmed al Idrisi, a native of Fez, who became a notable religious teacher at Mecca and created a Tariqa, or school of religious doctrine. Moved on to Sabya, in 'Asîr, where he acquired land

and died in the odour of sanctity about 1837 and where his tomb is still venerated. The Idrisi supplanted the Sherifian family, which had ruled at Abû 'Arish in the time of his son Muhammad and Muhammad's son 'Ali.

All members of the family have the title of Seyyid. There is a close connexion between the family and the Senûsis, whose founder was a disciple of the original Ahmed al Idrisi. The spiritual relationship has been reinforced by intermarriage at various times. The Idrisi have also a connexion with the Mirghâni family, whose head resides in the Sudan, and is chief of yet another Tariqa, once powerful and still important.

For a fuller account of the family see Personalities Report for 1946.

39. Kaaki Family

The war has brought into the limelight the previously unknown family of Kaaki. Reputedly of Syrian origin but long resident in the Hejaz, this family followed the traditional family calling of baking, as their name suggests. They dabbled in the money market and various members of the family were small independent money changers. They are now the real financiers of Sa'ûdi Arabia, and no large money transaction ever now takes place without the Kaakis being directly concerned. They owe their present position first to Najib Salha (*q.v.*), the venal right hand man of Abdullah Suleyman and former Director of Public Works, and to Abdullah Suleyman himself. While His Majesty's Government were paying an annual subsidy to Ibn Sa'ûd the Kaakis made money at will. A high proportion of the subsidy goods that came into the country were dealt with by this family, and through their machinations and those of Najib and of Abdullah Suleyman much of the gold presented by His Majesty's Government eventually found its way into the coffers of one or other of the various Kaaki firms. In 1944 Sadaka and Siraj Kaaki, the most important combination, were discovered in an attempt to smuggle £.gold 25,000 to Egypt. This money was confiscated and there were rumours of dire reprisals on the law-breakers. These however gradually faded into the background and when Ibn Sa'ûd arrived in Jeddah after meeting King Farouq at Yenbo. Sadaka and Siraj Kaaki petitioned His Majesty on the grounds that they did not know that they were doing wrong and the King, fresh from his successful entertainment of King Farouq, pardoned the Kaakis and returned them the money. It is certain that Abdullah Suleyman arranged this, Sadaka and Siraj having advanced the money by which Ibn Sa'ûd was able so royally to entertain King Farouq. A rough estimate of the family fortune is about £.gold 300,000 of which Sadaka and Siraj have, at the very least, £.gold 175,000, besides valuable property in Mecca. In April 1945 they started to interest themselves in real estate and began by purchasing from the Minister of Finance, Abdullah Suleyman, the Banque Misr Hotel and several other buildings in Mecca. The Banque Misr building alone cost £.gold 30,000.

The most important members of this family are:

(1) Sadaka Kaaki and

(2) Siraj Kaaki.—Brothers, these two are partners in the most lucrative business in the country. They are the Government brokers and are represented in every town in the Hejaz and the Nejd with the exception of Medina where the financial activities of Sheikh Mohammed-al-Khuraji are protected by his son-in-law, Sheikh Abdullah Suleyman. The firm of S. & S. Kaaki is by far the most important of the Kaaki firms. Its 1940 capital was about £.gold 10,000—and is now at least £.gold 175,000. (See also remarks above.)

In 1949 they celebrated the opening of the Coca Cola factory at Jeddah which, apart from threatening to change the drinking habits of half the country and consuming one tenth of Jeddah's daily water supply, is the first modern industrial plant in Saudi Arabia other than those connected with oil and gold. The newly formed parent Company, the Saudi Industries Corporation, in which the Chase National Bank of New York has a large share, also had the construction of a cement factory at Dammam planned but the Minister of Finance insisted on concession terms which were too extortionate and the project has fallen through.

(3) *Abdul Aziz Kaaki*.—A money changer in Jeddah who also owns a bakery business. Abdul Aziz's pre-war worth was about £.gold 2,000—and now he can boast of something like £.gold 20,000. He also partners his two uncles (see 4 and 5) in another firm of money changers in Jeddah and Mecca, the capital of this being separate from the figure £.gold 20,000—mentioned above.

(4) *Salah Moussa Kaaki* and

(5) *Abdullah Moussa Kaaki*.—These two are brothers, and uncles, it is believed, of (1), (2) and (3) above. Before the war they were the most affluent of the Kaaki family and flourished in Mecca with a capital of something like £.gold 15,000. Their present capital exceeds £.gold 60,000—and from their partnership with Abdul Aziz Kaaki (3) above they have a share of a business which hardly existed before the war but is now worth £.gold 15,000.

40. *Khalid Al Qarqani* (alias *Al Hud*, alias *Abu' Walid*)

A Tripolitan, who is said to have served under the Senusi, fought the Italians and retired into exile in Egypt, where he has a daughter married to *Abdur-Rahman 'Azzam Pasha*, Secretary-General of the Arab League. *Al Qarqani* was brought to Ibn Sa'ud's notice, it is said, by *Sheikh Hafiz Wahba*, and came to the Hejaz in 1930. Was appointed in September 1930 First Assistant to the Viceroy, but apparently soon vacated the post and went into business with the German merchant, afterwards honorary German Consul, *de Haas*. Was re-employed by the Government to accompany the American engineer *Twitchell* on his tours of survey for water and minerals. Was sent with *Hamad Suleyman (q.v.)* to 'Asir in November 1932 to investigate the dispute between the *Idrisi* and *Ibn Sa'ud's* Governor. This mission could not be accomplished by the two delegates, who, in the following year, with *Turki al Madhi*, formed an equally unsuccessful delegation to Sana before the outbreak of the Sa'udi-Yemen war. Was a Sa'udi delegate to the Bahrein Transit Dues and Kuwait Blockade Conferences of 1935. Was also a Sa'udi representative at the negotiations over the Red Sea oil concession with *Petroleum Concessions (Limited)*. Acted as buyer for certain German goods for the Sa'udi Government. In 1938 was found to be on the staff of *Amir Sa'ud*, but later in the year officially appointed to that of *Ibn Sa'ud*. Said to have a large salary. Seems to be a trusted adviser, and said to be honest in negotiation, though not necessarily scrupulous in financial matters. Accompanied *Dr. Mahmud Hammuda* to London and Paris in 1939 in connexion with the proposed amendment of the Sanitary Convention. Visited Germany in 1939 before the outbreak of war on a mission to purchase arms for Sa'udi Arabia. Had an interview with *Hitler*, but was otherwise unsuccessful. Has a slight impediment in his speech. Speaks French, Turkish and Italian. Claims to have travelled a good deal in Europe, including Russia, and is regarded by *Ibn Sa'ud* as an expert on European affairs. An interesting talker

but can be waspish. Said by some people to be anti-British but is probably only rather sourly pro-Arab.

When, in 1945, *Khalid* was given only two years to live, His Majesty's Legation tried unsuccessfully to obtain permission for him to rejoin his family in Egypt, though he was allowed to pay a short visit to Cairo in December of that year. Thereafter he fooled his doctors by returning to excellent health and in 1950 was one of the King's closest advisers at Riyadh and a member of the inner circle of advisers, of whom he has been described as the best by *Hafiz Wahba (q.v.)*, and is certainly one of the most likeable.

41. *Muhammad ibn 'Abdul 'Aziz ibn Madhi*

A Nejd, formerly Governor of *Jizan*. Transferred about 1940 to be Governor of *Al Khobar*, which post he now holds. Speaks nothing but Arabic and that with a strong Nejd accent. Comes much into contact with the Americans of the Arabian American Oil Company at *Dhahran* and was lavish in his hospitality to His Majesty's Minister when he visited *Dhahran* in March 1942. Earned the gratitude of the Royal Air Force for his help when one of their aircraft force-landed on *Tarut Island* in January 1942. A younger brother is Governor of the town of *Al-Qatif*, and another brother, *'Abdul 'Aziz ibn Madhi*, is Governor of *Dhiba*.

42. *Mehdi Bey*

Director-General of Police, with headquarters in Mecca, for several years, but in 1938 was made Director-General of Public Security, though no change in his functions was announced or observed. An Iraqi, who has, however, lived little in Iraq. Said to have been a regimental clerk in the Turkish army, in which a brother of his is still an officer. Was employed also in *King Huseyn's* army. He appears to be arbitrary and ruthless and to wield considerable authority. A man of organising ability, and the Mecca orphanage, which was under his charge, has been declared by a competent Indian witness to have the best-organised concern in Sa'udi Arabia. In 1938, when he had extended the system of regular police to *Hasa*, he was given by *Ibn Sa'ud* the title of *el Muslih* (The Reformer). Went on leave in autumn 1945 and has not yet returned. Is now (1948) living quietly in Switzerland on his pension.

43. *Muhammad at-Tawil*

A native of Jeddah of Egyptian origin. Got a small post in the customs in Turkish times and rose to be Director of Customs in Jeddah under *King Huseyn*. Played a leading part in the movement of the Hejazi notables to compel *Huseyn's* abdication and the accession of *King 'Ali* in October 1924. Remained in theory Director of Customs only, but wielded great influence under 'Ali, and was described as being "practically dictator" in November 1925, after his triumph in a dispute with *Ahmed Saqqaf*, the Prime Minister, who decided to leave. Promised at that time to devote to the cause of the Hejaz every penny of "certain economies" which he had effected while Director of Customs. Left the Hejaz on the fall of Jeddah, but returned in 1927 or early in 1928 and started a motor transport business. Was said in 1928 to have been president of the *Hizb-al-Ahrar al Hijazi*, but made his peace with *Ibn Sa'ud* after an absence at *Riyadh*, which was described in February 1928 as a deportation. Was slow to receive official employment, and was perhaps considered unsuitable for such employment in the Hejaz, but was in September 1930 placed at the head of a commission to study and reorganise the financial and economic situation in *Hasa*. Remained for some time in this employment, despite rumours of assassination or flight. Appeared to have tightened up regulations

and trodden on *Qusaibi* corns in the process, but not to have made the *Hasa* Customs as paying as he hoped. A capable and well-reputed man, liked by the authorities at Bahrein, but he fell foul of the Arabian American Oil Company to such an extent that *Sayyid Hashim* was sent to look after their business with the Government in 1935. *At-Tawil* was recalled in 1936 and replaced by two separate officials in his posts as Director of Finance and Director of Customs. In 1938 appointed (against his will) manager of the *Nejd Motor Transport Company*. Since 1943 appears to have lived in retirement on his estate in *Hasa*. The company is now defunct.

44. *Mustafa Badruddin*

Formerly Director of Customs in Jeddah. A North African or of North African origin. Born probably about 1892. Was given a small post in the Jeddah custom-house some years ago, and later became Director of Customs at *Yanbu'*. Transferred to Jeddah in the same capacity in 1930. A man of little ability, obstructive and not very honest. Certainly conceals very well any affection he may have for the British. Is reputed to be well in with gangs of dhow-men smuggling goods across the Red Sea. Arrested in May 1944 when a large consignment of gold was caught being smuggled out of Jeddah to Egypt. Released shortly after. Finally dismissed in December 1945. Now resident in *Medina*.

45. *Ibrahim an-Neshmi*

Formerly *Amir of Jauf*. Said to be a Nejd; to have been originally a maker of native foot-gear; to have been in *Medina* while the *Hashimites* still held it; and to have escaped to the Sa'udi side, where his knowledge of the situation in *Medina* was so useful that he was given a command. He appears to have been employed at *Tebuk* and perhaps at *Yanbu'* in the ensuing years. He became notorious in February 1930 for a large-scale raid into *Transjordan* similar to that of *'Abdul 'Aziz ibn Musaid (q.v.)* about the same time. He was apparently at the time already Governor of *Jauf*, a post from which the King dismissed him about the end of the year, not, it was explained, because the man was bad, but because the King desired to eliminate causes of quarrel with His Majesty's Government. Reappeared subsequently as Governor of *Al-'Ula*, but was transferred to an unspecified post in or about June 1933. Later one of the more important subordinate commanders in the Western Army on the Sa'udi-Yemen border. Governor of *Turaba* in 1934 until September 1935, when he was appointed Governor of *Najran*.

46. *Qattan Family*

(1) *Yusuf ibn Salim Qattan*, said to have been originally a servant in a coffee-shop in Mecca and afterwards of the original *Qattan* family whose name he took. Became a guide for Javanese pilgrims. Rose to be president of the Mecca municipality under the Turks, but was still so uneducated that he was said to be unable to tell "the letter *Alif* from a telegraph pole." Became Minister of Public Works under *King Huseyn*. Was said in 1930 to be full of schemes connected with the pilgrimage and the advancement of his son No. (2) below. Has also come to notice as one of the agents concerned with the properties of the *Sherifian* family.

(2) *'Abbas Qattan*, an ambitious man, born about 1901, who was himself president of the municipality in Mecca in 1930 and occupied that post until November 1945. Also formerly director-general of *Waqfs*.

47. *Qusaibi Family*

An important merchant family in the Persian Gulf. The legation is indebted to the political agent in

Bahrein for an account of them, of which a summary appears in the *Personalities Report* for 1946.

The *Qusaibis* formerly had great influence owing to their position as agents of *Ibn Sa'ud* in Bahrein and buyers of his requirements for *Nejd*, as well as to their wealth and their hold on many to whom they had lent money. Their most distinguished debtor was the King himself, who owed them in 1930 something like £80,000, and who, although about half of this had been paid off by June 1931, still owed them the balance. *Abdurrahman* was given in the latter year a roving commission to try and raise the wind for the Sa'udi Government in Europe, but failed completely. The relations of the *Qusaibis* with the King no longer seem to be as close as formerly. They resented the reforms introduced by *Muhammad at-Tawil (q.v.)*. They were driven by bad business to press the King for money. He has of late employed other persons to buy for him, but he is not known to have deprived the *Qusaibis* of their general agency for him at Bahrein. The *Amir Sa'ud* frequently employed the *Qusaibis* to buy goods for him in *Bombay*, but was said in April 1942 to have become dissatisfied with them and to be employing other agents.

Abdurrahman is now (1949-50) acting in Bahrein as unofficial Saudi trade and general agent and, shortly after a visit to *Riyadh* in late 1950 was, to the general surprise, given the title of Minister of the Interior; the appointment apparently carries no portfolio.

48. *Rashid Family*

Former rulers of *Hail*. Little is known of the remnants of this family once so powerful and later so fallen, even before its final collapse, that it was "accounted infamous, even in such a land of violence as Arabia, for its record of domestic murders." It deserves attention, however, because of the possibility of its reappearance on the scene, e.g., if the *Shammari* tribes from which it sprang should go against *Ibn Sa'ud*. It is understood that, after the fall of *Hail*, the King pursued a policy of absorption, not of annihilation, and that many persons belonging to the *Beni Rashid*, or connected with them, passed into his entourage. Two lads who are being brought up with his younger children and are included in the list of his sons are said to be the children of a *Rashid* lady, whom *Ibn Sa'ud* married after their birth. Their names are—

(1) *Sultan* and

(2) *Mish'al*—

the latter of which corresponds with that of an infant child of the last ruling *ibn Rashid*, as given in the 1917 volume of *Personalities in Arabia*. Two other persons have come to notice, who are said to be related to the *Beni Rashid*, viz.:—

(3) *Mansur ibn 'Asaf*, who is said to have been taken into *Ibn Sa'ud's* service and to have served for a term as Governor of *Tebuk*; and his brother—

(4) *Nasir ibn 'Asaf*, who also served *Ibn Sa'ud*, but was reported to have deserted into *Transjordan* in 1931.

As the information about this family is so meagre, it is worth noting that the following members of it accompanied *Ibn Sa'ud* from *Riyadh* to *Jeddah* in March 1934:—

(5) *Muhammad ibn Talal* (a daughter of his was married to *Ibn Sa'ud* in 1938).

(6) *Mash'al ibn Mas'ud ibn 'Abdul 'Aziz*.

(7) *Rashid al Muheysin al Jabr*.

(8) *Sultan ibn Talal al Jabr*.

(9) *Fahad ibn Hamud al Jabr*.

Of these (6) and (8) may be identical with (1) and (2) given above. The *Umm al Qura* early in 1935 gave a list of the *Beni Rashid* who came to the Hejaz with *Ibn Sa'ud* in March of that year. This list

gave all the names, except (6), unless the name Mash'al al Sa'ūd in the 1935 list corresponded with the same person. Two other names appear in the 1935 list.

(10) 'Abdullah al Mit'ib, who died in 1947.

(11) 'Ubaid al 'Abdullah.

At least one Ibn Rashid accompanied the King's son, the Amir Faysal, to the Yemen front in April, 1934.

The younger princes are greatly in evidence in Ibn Sa'ūd's entourage, being treated generally very much like his own younger sons.

The only member of the family outside Sa'ūdi Arabia, and therefore of some importance, is (12) Muhammad ibn 'Abdul Muhsin ar Rashid, born about 1910. Lives at the Court of the King of Iraq (according to a 1935 report), out of whose privy purse he is said to receive a pension of about £20 a month. Twice stated to have set out, with the cognisance of the late King 'Ali, to raise the Shammar, cross the frontier and take Hail, but returned on each occasion with standards still unfurled, having judged the moment not propitious. Still keeps in touch with the Shammar and maintains bedouin mode of life. Described as ordinarily a rather dull, brooding young man, and perhaps not very resourceful, but, presented with a good enough opportunity, he would quickly be off across the desert to recapture his ancestral home.

Two members of the family, Saud and Abdul Aziz, who had been living in Riyādh, "escaped" by car in October 1947 and subsequently turned up in Iraq. This event seems to have considerably upset the King, who fears that they are hatching some plot with the Regent of Iraq.

Their activities since their escape have given some foundation to the King's fears; various public statements hostile to the Saudi dynasty have been attributed to them and they were received with honour and somewhat provocative ostentation by King Abdullah in Amman and Palestine in 1950. A member of the Embassy who spent most of a day with Mahommed bin Talal (5) and Sultan bin Talal (8) in 1950 came however to the conclusion that if they were typical of their kinsmen neither Ibn Saud nor his family had anything to fear.

49. Rifāda Family

Chiefs of the Billi tribe, with an urban establishment at Wejh. The most notable recent member of the family, Suleymān Afnān, played a not inconsiderable rôle during the first great war, but was killed in a raid in 1916 and left two sons, Ibrahim and Ahmed. His brother Salim, who had died earlier, left a son, Hamid. The cousins in this generation were at enmity. Hamid made a bid for the Sheikship on his uncle's death. He was one of several Hejazi Sheikhs who approached the Residency in Cairo in 1924, complaining both of King Huseyn's tyranny and his inability to protect them against the Wahhābis. He came into greater prominence in 1928, when, having returned from Transjordan and taken to brigandage, he attempted a *coup* at Wejh, hoping to dislodge his cousin Ibrahim, who was Governor there and head of the tribe. After a further period of exile he came into still greater prominence in 1932 by invading the Hejaz at the head of a rebel band. He and two, it was said, of his sons were killed, but there may be survivors of this branch. At the outset of the revolt Ibrahim visited the King at the head of a loyal delegation. He is still head of the Billi tribe in the Hejaz. The family have attaches with a section of the Billi established in Egypt.

50. Rushdi Malhas

Was editor of the *Umm al Qura*, the more important of the two weekly newspapers published

at Mecca and the unofficial organ of the Sa'ūdi Government. A Palestinian from Nablus. In 1937 or before was appointed Assistant Director of the Political Section of the Royal Diwan. The following year had a violent quarrel with his chief, Yusuf Yasin, but retained his position and eventually succeeded him as Director of the Political Section of the Royal Diwan. In appearance a down-trodden little man, but away from his chief he is affable and talkative. Well read in Arabic literature and history. Speaks good Turkish and some French. Promoted to rank of Minister Plenipotentiary at end of 1950.

51. Sâlih ibn Abu Bakr Shâta

Born probably not later than 1890. Comes of a learned family in Mecca, where he was born. Much employed on Committee for Waqfs, grain distribution, &c., under the Hashimite régime. Fled to Jeddah after the Sa'ūdi capture of Taif. Was one of the Hejazi notables who compelled the abdication of King Huseyn in October 1924 and rallied in due course to Ibn Sa'ūd. Became one of two assistants to the Amir Faysal in his capacity as Viceroy. Spoken of in 1930 as a possible Minister of Education in a Cabinet then rumoured to be in contemplation, but, if the rumour was true, the project was not pursued. When the Cabinet was eventually organised on its present lines early in 1932 and the Amir Faysal was given the Ministry of the Interior, as well as others, Sâlih Shâta was made his chief assistant in that Ministry. In 1936 was a member of the Legislative Assembly. Related to No. 65. From 1943 "Second Deputy President" of the dormant "Hejaz Legislative Assembly."

52. Sidayri Family

Take their name from the district of Sidayr in Nejd. Are closely related to the Al-Saud. The King's mother and two of his wives are Sidayris. They are important as being a large family of unquestionably "King's Men." They are, with few exceptions, Counts of the Marches from the Yemen up to Iraq, where they meet the bin Jiluwis (*q.v.*) who perform the same function on a more feudal basis on the north-east and Persian Gulf frontiers. They are the one large group of Provincial Governors who are appointed neither on a tribal nor a feudal basis. The following twelve members of the family are worthy of particular notice:—

(1) *Turki b. Ahmed as Sidayri*.—Born about 1892. Head of the family. Amir of Abha from which he governs the whole of the Asir. A pleasant intelligent man; short and thick-set and beginning to run to fat. Fond of his comforts and not a strict Wahhābi. The radio in his Majlis often plays music and the latest song-hits from Cairo.

(2) *Fahd b. Turki*.—Son of (1). A cripple. Deputises for his father in his absence.

(3) *Abd ul-Aziz b. Ahmed as-Sidayri*.—Governor of Jauf with his headquarters at Qariyat al-Milh. He is important because of the proximity of his Amirate to Transjordan, and his frequent contacts with the authorities of that country.

(4) *Mohammed b. Ahmed as-Sidayri*.—Brother to (3). Formerly Amir of Sakaka. Appointed Amir of Jizan at the end of 1943. He applied for a transfer in June 1948 and his brother, Masa'ad (5), arrived from Sakaka to replace him. However, at the special request of the Imam Ahmed of the Yemen, he has been retained in his position because of his exceptional knowledge of frontier tribal disputes. Effeminate in appearance. Appointed early 1950 "Protector of the Tapline."

(5) *Masa'ad b. Ahmed as-Sidayri*.—Replaced (4) as Amir of Sakaka in December 1943.

(6) *Khalid b. Ahmed as-Sidayri*.—Formerly Amir of Jizan till replaced by (4). Now Amir of

Tebuk and paramount Amir of the northern frontier posts. He is believed to be a capable general and is popular.

Is still (1950) Amir of Tebuk and paramount Amir of the Northern Frontier Posts. Reported to be pleasant socially and to give the appearance of being progressive and decisive.

(7) *Abdur-Rahman as-Sidayri*.—Born about 1910. Formerly Amir of Dhofar. Appointed Qaimaqam of Jeddah in April 1945. A handsome cruel-looking man. Not particularly bright and wisely relies on Ali Taha (*q.v.*) for advice in his post. Fond of motoring and hunting.

(8) *Abdullah b. Saud as-Sidayri*.—Amir of Tebuk from 1931 to 1936. Deputy Governor of Medina since 1936 while the Amirs Khalid and Mohammed nominally held the post.

(9) *Ahmed as-Sidayri*.—Born about 1920. Amir of al-'Ula. Five feet six inches in height. Round face with a small beard and a toothbrush moustache. Appears cross-eyed, but this may be because of a diseased right eye. Tends to be objectionable and off-hand in conversation. Has no small talk. Not popular in his Amirate.

(10) *Mohammed as-Sidayri*.—Born about 1924. Brother to (9). Amir of Mahad Dahab. A weak young man who takes full advantage of his position to conduct petty persecutions of the British and American employees of the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate whose gold mine is in his Amirate.

(11) *Ahmed b. Turki as-Sidayri*.—Born about 1900. Amir of Qunfidah till the middle of June 1948. Has not yet (1948) been appointed to a new post. A thoroughly disagreeable and miserly old man; about 5' 8"; poorly dressed and uneducated. Reputed for his meanness and dishonesty. On his departure, it was stated that no pay had been given to Government officials in the Qunfidah Amirate for three years. He is not a true Sidayri, and the blue-bloods of the family do not recognise him as such.

(12) *Imsa'd b. Ahmed as-Sidayri*.—Brother to (5). Will probably replace (11) at Qunfidah.

53. Sha'ibi Family

Important in Mecca as the Keepership of the Key of the Ka'aba is hereditary in the family. The prerogative is very lucrative because all persons entering the Ka'aba are supposed to make a present to the Keeper according to their means. The family are admittedly descendants of the Quraysh tribe, but not of the Prophet. It is claimed that the pedigree is continuous from pre-Islamic times and that the right to keep the key also dates from that early period. According to one story, there was a blot on the escutcheon in the 19th century, when the male descent failed and the succession passed through a lady of the family who married a slave. The late Keeper's physical appearance suggested that this might be true, but there is no proof of it. Another branch of the family, claiming similar descent, formerly lived in Tunis, but now resides in Mecca. The present Keeper of the Key is—

(1) *Muhammad ash-Sha'ibi*, an elderly man, probably the nephew of the late Keeper, who died in January 1934 and whom this relative was appointed to succeed.

(2) *Abdullah ash-Sha'ibi*, next in succession as Keeper of Key. Is member of the Legislative Assembly and has held numerous other important posts of an honorary nature. Highly respected.

54. Sherifian Family

Also called Hashimites by virtue of descent from the great-grandfather of the Prophet, but this name seems to be more particularly affected by the family of King Huseyn. There have been in the past and are in the present numerous families claiming this descent through one or other of the sons of 'Ali, the

fourth Caliph and son-in-law of the Prophet. There are in Arabia itself many individuals bearing the title of Sherif, which is held to imply descent from Hasan, the elder son of 'Ali, and the whole clan is known collectively as Ashraf. The strains most conspicuous in the Hejaz trace this descent through an intermediate common ancestor Hasan ibn Abū Numey, who was Grand Sherif of Mecca in the latter part of the 16th century. Three groups of his descendants are accounted specially important, viz.:—

The Dhawi Zeyd,
The Abadila, a particular branch of whom are
the Dhawi 'Aun, and
The Dhawi Barakat.

All Grand Sherifs of Mecca in the 17th century were drawn from the rival Dhawi Zeyd and Dhawi 'Aun. The last Grand Sherif belonging to the former was 'Abdul-Mutallib, who held the post three times at long intervals. The majority belonged to the Dhawi 'Aun, of whom came the late King Huseyn and his sons.

Although the most important members of the Sherifian family now live outside Sa'ūdi Arabia, their connexion with the Hejaz is so close as to justify this general notice. The following list, very incomplete, shows those who are worthy of notice:—

(A) Dhawi Zeyd.

(1) *Sharaf Ridha*, usually called Sherif Sharaf *tout court*.—Appointed Acting Minister of Finance under Ibn Sa'ūd in January 1926. Resides in Mecca and is now a member of the Legislative Council. In 1936 appointed to be a member of the King's suite. Appears to spend all his time at Mecca and Taif. A courteous, dignified man, rather silent and with something of a brooding air.

(B) Dhawi 'Aun.

(2) *'Abdullah ibn Huseyn*.—King of Transjordan.
(3) *Zeyd ibn Huseyn*.—Had a Turkish mother, a granddaughter of the well-known Grand Vizier Reshid Pasha, and has property interests quite distinct from those of his brothers. Born in Constantinople in 1900—formerly Iraqi Minister at Ankara. Appointed Iraqi Minister at Berlin in September 1935. Now (1948) Iraqi Ambassador to London.

All these have issue. So had King Huseyn's brother Nāsir, now deceased, who left six sons and four daughters.

(4) *'Abdul Hamid Al'Aun*.—Understood to be a grandson of Ali bin Abdullah, formerly Grand Sherif of Mecca until his dismissal by the Turks in 1907. Chiefly noteworthy as being the principal figure in the Sherifian plot against Ibn Sa'ūd in 1940. Arrested and sentenced to death, he was pardoned (Amir 'Abdullah of Transjordan interceded for him). After a period of detention at Riyādh he was allowed to leave the country with the two younger brothers and some other relatives who were also implicated. Now believed to be in Egypt.

(C) Dhawi Barakat.

(5) *Sharaf ibn 'Abdul-Muhsin*.—Seems to have served King Huseyn in Egypt, but entered the service of Ibn Sa'ūd and became Amir-al-Arbān, or Director of Tribes. Appointed President of the Inspectorate of Government Departments in 1930. His present official status is not known, as the inspectorate is understood to have been abolished.

(D) Apparently of the Abadila stocks though not of the Dhawi 'Aun.

(6) *Sharaf ibn Rājih*.—Said to have also been Governor of Taif at one time. Now resides at Bagdad. Identified both in Jerusalem and Bagdad

as being the Sherif Sharaf mentioned by Tâhir ad-Dabbâgh in February 1932, in a letter which fell into the hands of the Sa'ûdi Government, as a man who might be enlisted in the conspiracy against Ibn Sa'ûd.

(E) *Even less easy to place, but perhaps of the Abadila.*

(7) *Ali ibn Ahmad ibn Mansûr.*—A younger member of a family, two of whom were prominent in King Huseyn's time and had great influence in the Harb tribe. This 'Ali has only come to notice as having been one of the persons arrested at Mecca and deported to Riyâdh at the time of the Ibn Rifâda affair in 1932.

(8) *Ali ibn Huseyn al Harithi.*—One of the Sherifs of Muda'iq, near Taif. Took part in the Arab revolt and is remembered as one of the conquerors of Damascus. Described by Colonel Lawrence as having been at that time an attractive young man, physically splendid and full of courage, resource and energy. Seems to have resettled in the Hejaz, as he was arrested at Mecca and deported to Riyâdh at the time of the Ibn Rifâda affair in 1932.

(9) *Muhammad Mohanna.*—One of the Jeddâ family, one member of which was chief of the Controlling Department in 1917, and was then described as a "bottle-nosed bandit," while his brother, still alive, was said to have acquired wealth by smuggling and general robbery. This Muhammad is only interesting because he was arrested at Jeddâ and sent to Riyâdh at the time of the Ibn Rifâda affair.

55. Suwayt Family

Leaders in the Dhâfir tribe. Two members of it figured in reports from Kuwait about 1936:—

(1) *Ja'dân*, a disgruntled man, hovering between allegiance to Iraq or to Ibn Sa'ûd and too proud to come to terms with either; and

(2) *'Ajemi*, recognised as chief of the tribe by Ibn Sa'ûd.

56. Abu Tuqayqa Family

Formerly chiefs of the Tihâma, mainly Hejazi, section of the Huweytât tribe, with an urban connexion at Dhâba. Rafi'a, their common ancestor, was chief of the tribe prior to his death in about 1870. One of his many grandsons, Ahmed ibn Muhammad ibn Rafi'a, was chief in 1917. He came to notice in 1924 as one of several Hejazi sheykhs who approached the Residency in Cairo with a complaint of King Huseyn's tyranny and his inability to protect them against the Wahhâbis. He appears to have been Governor of Dhâba in 1927, but in that year the family were apparently in serious trouble with the Government, as it is said that Ahmed and four others were "killed by Ibn Sa'ûd," and others fled to Egypt. Numerous members of the family were concerned in the rebel invasion of the Hejaz by Ibn Rifâda in 1932. Seven of them lost their lives in that adventure and five more were reported by the Sa'ûdi commander to have been slain after Ibn Rifâda's defeat. Among the survivors was, however—

(1) *Muhammad ibn [?] Abdurrahim ibn Alwân ibn Rafi'a*, who was regarded as co-leader with Ibn Rifâda. He escaped, and after many vicissitudes left 'Aqaba for Egypt early in October 1932. May be the person against whom an exclusion order was made in Egypt rather later, but whose name is given as Muhammad bin Ahmed.

Another probable survivor is—

(2) *Mahmûd ibn Ahmed ibn Rafi'a*, who ratted on Ibn Rifâda early in the rebellion and tried to make his peace with Ibn Sa'ûd.

Although the above summary cannot be verified at all points, it is inserted in view of the obvious tenacity of the family hatred of Ibn Sa'ûd, and the survival of (1), who seems to have been an active leader and may crop up again.

57. Turki ibn Madhi

Born about 1913. Was in 1932 Inspector-General of 'Asir and was associated with Fahad ibn Zu'ayr in efforts to make Ibn Sa'ûd realise the gravity of the situation preceding the open revolt of the Idrisi at the end of October. Identical with the person mis-named at the time 'Abdullah ibn Turki ibn Mahdi, who, with Abdul-Wahhâb Abu Malha and two chiefs of Asiri tribes, was sent on a mission to the Imâm Yahya in June 1927. Took part in further negotiations with the Imâm early in 1928. Would therefore appear to be one of Ibn Sa'ûd's experts in 'Asir and Yemen affairs. Accompanied Khalid al Qarqani and Hamad Suleyman on their fruitless mission to San'a in 1933, before the outbreak of the Sa'ûdi Yemen war. Visited the Yemen again in May 1943, and in the autumn of 1944 as Ibn Sa'ûd's special envoy to the Imâm. The real purpose of his visit was to report on conditions in the Yemen. He described the people as groaning under the yoke of the Imâm and anxious to transfer their allegiance to Ibn Sa'ûd. Now (1948) Emir of Najran; of medium height and slender build, with pleasant features. Extremely popular in his Emirate. Is a capable and intelligent man, and reputed to be one of the best Emirs in the country.

58. Yahya an Nasri

Formerly principal quarantine doctor at Jeddâ. A Syrian, like most doctors now employed by the Sa'ûdi Government. Born probably about 1897. Studied in Constantinople and Beirut. Previously quarantine doctor at Yanbu'. Pleasant and well regarded by the legation. Speaks Turkish and French. Was Sa'ûdi delegate to the meeting of the International Health Office, Paris, in October 1934. Appointed early in 1943 to be Director-General of Public Health in succession to Mahmûd Hamdi Hamûda. (See 1937 report.) Reported to have suffered a mental collapse and to have left for treatment in January 1945. Relieved of his post in May 1946. Is now (1948) resident in Egypt and represents Saudi Arabi at international medical and health conferences.

59. Yusuf Yasin, Shaikh

Probably born about 1898. A Syrian from Latakia, said by his enemies to be of Yezidi origin. Was at school in Jerusalem in 1917. Joined King Faisal at 'Aqaba and went with him to Damascus. Left on the approach of the French and joined King Huseyn in Mecca. Attached by him to the Amir 'Abdullah at 'Amman, with whom he remained six months. Formed so low an opinion of the 'Amir that, according to his own account, he broke with Huseyn in consequence. Joined Ibn Sa'ûd in due course. Came to Mecca in 1924-25 and started the *Umm-al-Qura* newspaper. Figured as a Nejdî delegate at the Moslem Congress of June 1926. Remained editor of the *Umm-al-Qura* for some years, but was also official Director of Publicity. Took part in negotiations with Sir G. Clayton in 1925, 1927 and 1928. Acted as Minister for Foreign Affairs in absence of Dr. 'Abdullah Damlûji in 1926 and 1927. Reported in 1928 to have worked to undermine influence both of Damlûji, who resigned that year, and of Hafiz Wahba (q.v.). Employed in various negotiations and again acted at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, for Fuad Hamza early in 1931, and for the 'Amir Faysal and Fuad as well in 1932. Was intermittently in charge of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, during the

absences of Fuad Hamza, in 1934, 1935 and 1936. Went to Bagdad at the end of 1935 to negotiate the Sa'ûdi-Iraq Treaty of Brotherhood and Alliance. Is naturally obstinate and hair-splitting in discussion, but can on occasion be amiable and even conciliatory. Takes his cue, in fact, from the King himself, to whom he appears to be genuinely devoted, and who probably trusts him as much as any of his near advisers, except 'Abdullah Suleymân. Is probably a more convinced Wahhâbi than most of the King's alien entourage and is also a strong Arab nationalist, with fewer ulterior motives than Fuad Hamza, having a simpler character and less European knowledge. Has the eyes of a fanatic, but has acquired the figure of a *bon vivant*. Works very hard but delights in creating difficulties and seeks to earn his master's praise for solving problems of his own manufacture. He feels sufficiently sure of his usefulness to the King and the real power of his position to allow himself to be the butt of the King and of those who aim their wit the same way as the King, and often deliberately plays the clown when he judges the King to be in the mood. His gluttony and monogamy are standing palace jokes. He is very jealous of 'Abdullah al Suleymân. As the principal channel of communication between the King and the legation he has in practice exercised the functions of Foreign Minister, the Amir Faysal being little more than a figure-head. He was the negotiator for Sa'ûdi Arabia of the Sa'ûdi-Koweit Agreements which he signed at Jeddâ on 20th April, 1942. He still exercises control over the *Umm-ul-Qura* and drafts official communiqués for publication in it. He has much increased the stock of English which he acquired during a short stay in Surbiton when he accompanied the Amir Sa'ûd to England for the coronation of King George VI. Speaks Arabic with perhaps greater rapidity than any other man in Arabia and retains something of his native North Lebanon accent. Went on a visit to Lataqia, where he and his two brothers own farm property, in May 1943. A rapprochement took place between him and Najib Sâlhâ (No. 69) in 1943 and he bitterly opposed the latter's dismissal in April 1944, remaining in close touch with him after his departure to Egypt. During the discussions between His Majesty's Minister and Ibn Sa'ûd early in 1944 on the reorganisation of Sa'ûdi finances and economy was mostly obstructive and supported 'Abdullah Suleiman in opposing any proposals for reform.

Was the Sa'ûdi delegate at the Preparatory Committee Meeting of the Arab Conference at Alexandria in October 1944, and signed the covenant of the Arab League on behalf of Sa'ûdi Arabia in March 1945. Accompanied Ibn Sa'ûd on his visit to Egypt for the meetings with President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill in February 1945. Was the Sa'ûdi delegate at the special meeting of the Arab League assembly in June to discuss the Syrian crisis.

He has been Saudi delegate at all meetings of the Arab League Council, and this has kept him for long periods away from Jeddâ. Unfortunately, he leaves no one responsible or intelligent in charge during his absence. His feud with the Minister of Finance grew in bitterness during 1945-46, and, as a sop for one uncomfortable scene between the two of them, Ibn Sa'ûd appointed him to the rank of Minister of State.

Shaikh Yusuf, when accompanying the King on his state visit to Egypt, pocketed considerable sums intended for the remuneration of Egyptian journalists. He also asked King Farouq's Chief Aide-de-camp to find him a little estate in Egypt costing from £E.40,000 to £E.50,000. Like most of those around the King, he is busily making hay while the sun shines. His wife, who lives in a Cairo suburb, is said to be dissolute and a drunkard.

The increasingly protracted absences from Saudi Arabia of Fuad Bey Hamza leave him the effective

Foreign Minister within the limited scope the King allows his more trusted servants; both his self-confidence and reasonableness have grown accordingly. The measure of his present worth compared with that of Khair uddin az Zureikly and Taher Ridhwan (q.v.) is the despair with which foreign diplomatic missions receive word of this or that forthcoming absence on his part. He has however spent the whole of the second half of 1950 at Riyadh except during his attendance in Cairo at an Arab League meeting.

His children are all at English schools in Egypt and he intends to send his eldest son to a British university in due course. His English is now good enough for the conduct of routine business without an interpreter.

60. Muhammad Surûr as-Sabbân

Administrator of the Finance Department. Son of a slave of the Sabbân family (mother stated to have been Abyssinian), and became the moving spirit in their hide and skin business, which was at one time important, but became latterly bankrupt. Was a clerk in the municipality under King Huseyn, and is said to have tried to assassinate Ibn Sa'ûd when he conquered the Hejaz in 1925, and to have been subsequently incarcerated at Riyâdh. Returned to the Hejaz about 1929 and was taken up by the Minister of Finance, whose powerful influence got him appointed to his present post. Became second only to him in the Ministry of Finance in practical importance, and during the latter's absence at Hudeyda in May 1934 was in effective control of it. Manager of the Arabian Export Company, a corporation formed to promote the export trade of the country. Continues to have great influence and to be much concerned in commercial enterprises. Reported in 1936 to have a great following in official circles. Pleasant, generous and most capable. Has a younger brother, 'Abdullah, who is not, however, of any importance. By 1939 Muhammad Surûr had lost all influence, and was kept strictly to the limits of his post as head of the Accounts Branch of the Ministry of Finance. Since the dismissal of Najib Sâlhâ (q.v.) has rapidly regained his influence. Early in 1945 was reported to have quarrelled with Shaikh 'Abdullah Suleymân owing to the appointment over him of an Inspector in the Ministry of Finance. Left for Egypt in a huff in June. He returned in the autumn of 1945, apparently reconciled. As head of the newly-created Department of Pilgrimage Affairs, he has produced a more reasonable tariff than usual and has shown himself most forthcoming and helpful.

Is the owner of *Bilad as-Saudiya*, one of the only three newspapers in the country. He is well regarded for his polished Arabic style. Is reported to be connected with the illegal "Hejaz Constitutional Party."

Largely through overwork and sickness at a time when declining Saudi Arabian revenue from oil and many new commitments required more than ever a firm hand upon the financial administration of the country he found the burden of his post too much for him at the end of 1949. The Government's extreme financial difficulties drove Abdulla Suleiman to call once more for Najib Salha (from Cairo) and Mohammed Suroor left for Cairo for reasons of health. He returned in August however, at a time when Najib Salha's unpopularity threatened to become serious and, still as Financial Adviser (and therefore senior to Najib Salha) assumed the task of running the Pilgrimage and Agriculture Departments of the Ministry of Finance. He is still said to be a sick man, but is expected to take over Najib Salha's job as well as his own, should the latter once again leave the country.

61. Asaf ibn Huseyn

Born about 1892. Appointed Governor of Najrân and the "territories of Yam" in 1934, after the conclusion of the Treaty of Taif with the Yemen. Later transferred to Ras, of which he had previously been Emir. Speaks Turkish and was educated at Istanbul. He is a native of Ras and as there are two families there of Ibn Hussein, he has gone back one generation and calls himself Ibn Mansour. Is a short stocky man beginning to run to fat. Always appears well-dressed and with mascara round his eyes.

He was originally an officer in the Sherifal army at the time of the Arab revolt and was taught demolition work by Captain Garland, one of Lawrence's assistants.

A social climber. He has daughters married to the Emirs Feisal, Mohammed and Abdullah ibn Feisal. At present (1948) he is in Riyâdh trying to obtain from the King the post of brigadier in the Saudi-Arabian army.

His eldest son, Hussein, is at the same time in Mecca, having been released from prison at Buraida where he served a sentence for being the instigator of the theft of tyres from the Locust Mission camp at Ras.

62. Ibrahim Shura

Egyptian. Born about 1897. Came to the Hejaz in about 1928 as a teacher. Appointed head of the Education Department at Mecca in 1930. Friendly with Sheykh Hafiz Wahba. Amiable but unimpressive. Has a smattering of English. In 1936 appointed head of the Sa'ûdi Pilgrimage Propaganda Bureau at Mecca.

Appointed Director of the Saudi Arabian Broadcasting Station in early 1950, but lasted only a few months before his replacement by Seyid Muhammed Shata (No. 65). In this position he was clearly a mere tool of the Minister of Finance and Najib Salha, who had, with his appointment, secured the control of the Broadcasting Station from the Amir Faisal's men (mainly Egyptian). As Director he showed little understanding of broadcasting and spent most of his time at the studio enjoying his own broadcasts and being told what to do by his Egyptian henchmen. He showed great pleasure but complete indecisiveness when visited by the Director of the Arabic Service of the British Broadcasting Corporation, in early 1950.

He is believed now to have returned to the Saudi Arabian Education Department.

63. Khairuddin Zuraikli

Syrian journalist. Born about 1880. Editor of *Al Qibla*, Mecca newspaper, official organ of King Huseyn for some years. Later was Hashimite propagandist in Egypt. Go-between between King Ali and Ibn Sa'ûd. Later joined the latter. Adviser to the Sa'ûdi Agency in Cairo in 1935. A crony of Shaikh Yusuf Yasin and Najib Sâlbâ. Attended the Preparatory Committee Meeting of the Arab Conference in Alexandria in October 1944 with Yusuf Yasin and also the discussions which led up to the signing of the Covenant of the Arab League in March 1945. Sent for to Jeddah June 1946 and on several subsequent occasions to act for Shaikh Yusuf Yasin during the latter's absence on Arab League business.

Though Shaikh Khairuddin is probably unscrupulous and something of an intriguer, he has maintained good relations with His Majesty's Embassy and has generally been friendly and helpful, when he has considered it to be within his power to be so. He is not anxious to assume responsibility in any form—but he is not unique in that.

In 1947 accompanied the Amir Nawwaf (*q.v.*) on a trip through the United States. He now seems to have become permanent representative of the

Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Jeddah during Yusuf Yassin's prolonged absences abroad or at Riyâdh. Speaks a little French.

Has spent most of 1950 in Cairo, leaving Taher Ridhwan (*q.v.*) even less effectively in charge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jeddah.

64. Muhammad Sâdiq ibn 'Abdullah

Born in Hejaz about 1888. In 1920 was principal of the Military School at Mecca. Was commandant of the Jeddah garrison during last days of King Ali. Left for Egypt in 1927.

An associate of Tâhir ad-Dabbâgh in anti-Sa'ûdi activities abroad. At instance of Sa'ûdi authorities was required to leave India in 1933. Subsequently travelled in Iraq, Transjordan and Palestine. Returned with Tâhir to Sa'ûdi Arabia under the amnesty of 1935 and in 1936 was made successively Assistant Director of Auqâf and Director of the Census. Reported to be a man of integrity. Present whereabouts and activities unknown. (1950.)

65. Seyid Muhammad Shata

Younger brother of Sâlih ibn Abu Bakr Shata (No. 49). Born about 1908. Holder of an Egyptian degree in religious law. Inspector in the Ministry of Education. In 1935 member of an unofficial delegation for the collection of Waqf moneys in various Islamic countries and India, which did not, however, leave this country. In 1936 appointed Inspector of Sharia' Courts.

Subsequently served in the Department of Education until his appointment, at the instigation of the Amir Faisal, as Director of the Saudi Arabian Broadcasting Station in the Spring of 1950 (in place of Ibrahim Shura (No. 62)).

66. Muhsin at Tayyeb

Moroccan by origin. Born about 1887. Held police appointments under the Hashimite régime. Under Ibn Sa'ûd he was similarly employed. Promoted at the beginning of 1936 from a post in the Sa'ûdi police to be secretary and A.D.C. to the Deputy Minister for Defence. Attached as liaison officer to the British R.A.C. training unit which arrived in Taif in May 1944 to instruct the Sa'ûdi army in the handling of armoured cars presented to the Sa'ûdi Arabian Government by His Majesty's Government.

In 1947 described as an army inspector. He sits in the War Ministry at Taif and acts as a staff officer (Q) for the Minister of Defence. Has a knowledge of French and served in the Turkish army. A suspicious, crafty, clever and unlikeable man who loves intrigue and is generally unpopular. Has some knowledge of military matters but has never seen a military unit since 1918 when he fought in Syria against us. He has made little attempt to hide his dislike of the British military mission. It is believed that he fought in the Balkan War, with King Hussein and, later, joined Ibn Saud when the Hejaz was captured. Was subsequently made Area Commander at Taif with the rank of Colonel. Left Saudi Arabia about April 1949 ostensibly on account of bad eyesight, and is now believed to be living in Egypt in semi-retirement at the expense of the Saudi Arabian Government.

67. Najib Ibrahim Sâlbâ

Of Syrian origin, educated at the American College, Beirut. Born probably about 1902. Came in 1927 to the Hejaz via the Sudan, where employed for a short time by Gellatly, Hankey and Company (Sudan) Limited. After a short but troubled period of service with that firm in Jeddah, he entered the Ministry of Finance. Speaks English

well and has an easy manner. Made himself useful to the Minister of Finance, whose secretary he became. In 1936 placed in charge of a newly-created department of the Ministry of Finance, styled the "Office of Public Works," established to deal with the growing number of foreign concerns holding concessions in Sa'ûdi Arabia. By 1939 he had established himself in the confidence of Abdullah Sulaiman to the detriment of Muhammad Surûr, was employed as purchasing agent for the Government, and was enriching himself almost openly by bribery and commissions. Became indispensable to the Minister of Finance and was specially commissioned by the King to deal with supply matters, but found it difficult to exercise his functions without much interference from Yusuf Yasin. After the outbreak of war he was in constant contact with the legation and showed himself intelligent and apparently frank. He worked very hard and co-operated most helpfully with the legation in the endeavour to organise the provisioning and finances of the country. Was free in his criticism of the ignorance and incompetence of most of the members of the Sa'ûdi Government and made many enemies but was loyally backed by 'Abdullah al Suleymân, and was probably the most efficient of all the King's servants. He was said to have enriched himself but this is scarcely remarkable in a country where emoluments are certain of payment only if the official is in a position to help himself. Although he abstains from tobacco and alcohol he makes no pretence of being a Wahhabi or even a very devout Moslem. Early in 1944 evidence came to light which showed him in his true colours. It was found that he had made use of his position to enrich himself, and one of his associates in crime now estimates his personal fortune at £360,000, in addition to a handsome account in the Guaranty Trust Bank of New York. It transpires that he had deliberately misinformed the legation about the true supply and financial situation of the country in order to ensure the continuance of His Majesty's Government's generous assistance to Sa'ûdi Arabia and thereby to increase his own fortune. When in Cairo early in 1944 he began intriguing with the Americans, whom he had always sought to play off against the British, and warned His Majesty's Minister that the Sa'ûdi Arabian Government would ask for his recall if he were not more complacent over the matter of supplies and finance. Ibn Sa'ûd, who learned of Najib's activities, was furious and dismissed him in April, in spite of strong pressure from Abdullah Suleiman and Shaikh Yusuf Yasin, telling His Majesty's Minister that he had always disliked Najib and had only kept him on because he enjoyed British support. He is at present (July 1944) in Cairo, where he has started a transport company. Ibn Sa'ûd, always generous to those that have served him, is said to be paying him a "retaining fee." His place as Director of the Office of Public Works at Jeddah was taken by Izzed Din Shawa (No. 34). Najib remains in Egypt, where he acts as unofficial agent of the Sa'ûdi Royal Family, and is in close touch with Yusuf Yasin and his associates. He has acquired valuable house property in Cairo, for which he has paid about half a million pounds. He is busy trying to obtain the agencies of American cars and is a partner of Ibrahim Shakir (*q.v.*) in the Sa'ûdi Arab Trading Company formed in January 1945. Continues (June 1946) to reside in Cairo, posing as Saudi purchasing agent. Recalled to Saudi Arabia in December 1949, effectively to replace Muhammed Suroor (No. 60) again, he rapidly became, through his energetic and in many ways fearless efforts to restore some order into the Government's financial administration, the most prominent man in the Hejaz. He has shown the same qualities of shrewdness, hard

work, enlightenment and diplomatic sociability and forthcomingness as he did during the War, but seems, as a very wealthy man himself now, to have transferred his rapacious tendencies to the benefit of the Government. Alongside his efforts to reform the financial administration, in which against the conservatism of the King in particular and the self-interest of most of the men of influence in and out of Government service, he has achieved some piecemeal reform, he has by his own efforts and other favourable factors restored the Saudi Arabian Government's revenue and increased it far beyond any previous level. December 30th, 1950 marked his great moment when the new Aramco concession agreement, for which he was largely responsible, was signed, bringing Aramco into a profit-sharing agreement with the Saudi Arabian Government.

His reforms, and his lack of patience and his understandable failure to follow the local custom of always being available for any member of the community, however unimportant, to see, have brought him considerable unpopularity; and his imminent departure from Saudi Arabia has formed the most persistent rumour of the year (1950). His position remains insecure despite his success with the Aramco agreement and his appointment in August last as a Minister Plenipotentiary (when, with the King's rejection of his budget and currency reform scheme, and the return of Muhammed Suroor, his position seemed most insecure). He is an extremely ambitious man and is clearly thinking of filling the shoes of Abdulla Suleiman (*q.v.*) as Minister of Finance when the latter meets his timely end. But his chances for the time being are fading and he may not stay much longer.

68. Sa'ûd ibn 'Abdullah ibn Jiluwi

Appointed Governor of Hasa upon the death of his father in October 1935. Born about 1900. Made an unfavourable general impression on Sir Andrew Ryan, who was received by the new Amir at Hofuf with a singular lack of ordinary Arab politeness, in December 1935. Described as repulsive in appearance owing to a super-squint. Reported from Bahrein to take an even stronger line with the Bedouin than his father did, and that much of the father's work in the last four years of his life was, in fact, done by the son. Shows nervousness in the presence of foreigners, but this can be overcome. In 1938 it was reported that his powers were being curtailed by the King, and that troops not under his control were to be quartered at Hofuf.

Maintains his "court" on an almost Royal scale and appears now to enjoy Ibn Sa'ûd's confidence. Whether he would remain loyal to the King in all circumstances is not certain. Visited India and Pakistan for medical reasons in the spring of 1948. Entertained King Abdullah of Transjordan at Dharan in June 1948.

Found by His Majesty's Ambassador, who visited him in March 1950, to be as active as ever: a strange soft-voiced ruthless despot, living in a new Palace full of American gadgets, but as medieval as Cesare Borgia: and showing the faintest modicum of humour beneath his rather black and fearsome appearance.

69. Sa'ûd ibn Hedhlûl

Appointed Governor of Tabûk in 1936 in succession to 'Abdullah as-Sidayri (No. 52 (8)). Reported from Transjordan to have made a popular start, partly by recruiting his bodyguard locally, a departure which created a favourable impression.

Subsequently replaced, as Amir of Tabuk, by Khalid as-Sidayri (No. 52 (6)) and present whereabouts (1950) unknown.

70. Tala'at Wafa

Born about 1900 in the Hejaz. In 1934 member of Sa'udi boundary commission for the Yemen-Sa'udi frontier after the conclusion of the Treaty of Taif. Police official of importance, being Director for the Provinces of Asir and Najran, and O.C. regular forces in Najran and Abha in 1936. Appointed Deputy Director of Public Security in 1943 and Director of Police, Jedda, in 1947. Speaks moderate English and has shown himself friendly to the staff of the embassy.

Retired from the Directorate of Police at Jedda in the Spring of 1950.

71. Ibrahim Tāsān

A Nejdī born and brought up in Asir. Formerly in the Ottoman army. Now Commandant of the Jedda military district. Served in the Arab army of Sharif Hussein and was associated with Colonel Lawrence.

A pleasant personality with a strong sense of loyalty to Abdulla Suleiman (*q.v.*), the Minister of Finance, and the Amir Mansur, the Minister of Defence, to whom he is responsible. This probably accounts for his reputed lack of administrative initiative in dealing with Army matters. Promoted to the rank of full Colonel and given command of the Saudi Arabian contingent in Egypt 1950. Re-appointed as Commander of the Garrison at Jedda on his return from Egypt. He also re-assumed in July 1950 the Directorate of the Jedda Airport shortly after the disappearance to Egypt of the temporary Director Sadaga Tarabzouni; in this appointment he has shown himself much more decisive than when he occupied this post before his departure for Palestine.

72. As'ad al Faqih

A native of 'Aley, in the Lebanon. Counsellor to the Sa'udi Legation in Bagdad in 1938. Afterwards chargé d'affaires and appointed in 1943 to be minister there. Has some knowledge of English, and speaks French well. Member of the Sa'udi delegation to the San Francisco Conference in April 1945. Became first Saudi Minister in Washington, December 1945. Became Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States of America when the post was raised to Ambassadorial level in 1949.

73. Khalil Hajjan

Late Director of Police, Jedda. Formerly in Turkish army. Captured by the British during the Great War, but volunteered to join the Sharifian forces. Joined Ibn Sa'ud after the fall of Jedda in 1925. A heavy drinker. Appointed Director of Police, Medina, in 1947, and still (1950) holds that post.

74. Khuraiji, Shaikh Muhammad al-

Father-in-law to Shaikh Abdullah Sulaiman, to whose influence is attributed the fact that he has become the wealthiest man in Medina.

His two sons Muhammed and Abdul-Aziz, have also become influential men in the Hejaz, as Government agents in Medina and as wealthy merchants and builders.

75. Sa'd ibn Faisal

Governor of Duwadmi, one of the main stations on the Mecca-Riyadh route, since 1938. Born about 1898, the son of a Royal slave. Bears a reputation for strong-arm action with the Bedu.

76. Shaikh al Ardha

Family name of three Syrians, brothers. The elder, Midhat, who is doctor of the Royal ladies,

accompanied the Crown Prince to England for the Silver Jubilee. He came to Riyādh as a penniless refugee and is known to have become rich in a few years, not by doctoring. Stated on very good evidence to have brought with him from Syria as maid to his wife an Armenian girl (entered on his passport as his sister) and to have handed over the unwilling girl to Ibn Sa'ud as a concubine. Accompanied the Amir Mansur on a visit to Egypt in March 1942.

The younger brother, Fakhri, who describes himself as an agricultural expert, was in charge of a small experimental garden at Riyādh in 1939, and was also employed that year as Courier to Paris. Fakhri was appointed first secretary to the Sa'udi Legation in Bagdad in 1942 and transferred in 1943 as first Sa'udi Consul to Basra. Midhat was dismissed by the King in July 1943 but later reinstated at the request of Yusuf Yasin (*q.v.*) and other Syrians in the Sa'udi Government.

His brother Nesh'at achieved particular notoriety at the end of 1950 when his name was quoted in the list of those charged by the Syrian investigators in connexion with the disbursement of Saudi bribes for political purposes in Syria during 1950. The coincidence of the Syrian Premier's goodwill visit to Ibn Saud at Riyadh with the mistaken publication of this list and the charges caused the Syrians to back-pedal on the charges, but the Sheikh al Ardha family must now be under a cloud in Syria, though not, apparently, in Saudi Arabia.

77. Shaikho, Muhammad

A young Syrian formerly in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs. Accompanied the Amir Sa'ud to the United Kingdom in 1935 for the Silver Jubilee. Sent to the Yemen in 1937 to sign various agreements on behalf of the Sa'udi Government. Assisted Yusuf Yasin in negotiating the Sa'udi-Koweit Agreements at Jedda in 1940-42. Appointed private secretary to the Amir Mansur in February 1945.

Appointed Minister Plenipotentiary 1950. Remains as private secretary to the Amir Mansur, as Minister of Defence, and does most of the Amir's work, particularly on the air side, where he was found by the British Civil Air Training Mission to be as friendly and helpful as his position with the Amir Mansur permitted. Has kept himself as far as possible above the maze of intrigues surrounding the Amir Mansur and, with the wealth he admits he has amassed and his own ability, expects to advance independent of Mansur if the latter does not last as Minister of Defence.

78. Yusuf ibn 'Abdullah al Fauzan

Formerly lived in Bombay, where he acted as unofficial agent for Ibn Sa'ud. Appointed consul-general at Jerusalem in February 1941. An intelligent young man with pleasing manners. Speaks English well. Replaced in Jerusalem, 1945. Now (1948) living at Riyādh.

79. Zeinal Ali Ridha Family

(See family tree below.)

A family of Persian origin which came to the Hejaz in the third quarter of the 19th century. Since then the family as a whole, which has a branch in Bombay, has built up one of the largest fortunes in the Hejaz and has come nearer than any other family in Arabia to being one of Merchant Princes in the European and Mediaeval sense. Its individual members have played for half a century a prominent and distinguished part in the municipal and political life of the Hejaz. The following members deserve

individual notice (numbers refer to those on the family tree):—

(1) *Ali Ridha*.—Came to the Hejaz from Persia about the 1860's as an already wealthy man. Founded the business now known as Messrs. Haji Abdullah Ali Ridha. Died before the first world war.

(2) *Zeinal Ali Ridha*.—Son of (1). Continued the business. Died in the early thirties.

(3) *Mohammed Ali*.—Son of (2). An exceptionally wealthy man, known locally as the pearl king. Has done much for education in Jedda and Mecca. Was Qaimaqam of Jedda for a short time before his uncle Abdullah Ali Ridha (11). Now spends the greater part of his time in France and India.


(4) Formerly an Ottoman M.P. Died some years ago.

(5) *Haji Yusuf Ali Ridha*.—Born about 1885. Senior member of the family resident in the Hejaz. Is much respected locally. A distinguished and scholarly man in Arabic and Persian who still affects the style of dress fashionable in King Hussein's time. Suffers from diabetes. Possesses a sparkling humour and has two strange passions in life: bridge and billiards.

(6) *Messud Qassim Zeinal Ali Ridha*.—Son of 4. Resident in Istanbul. Is married to a Swiss cabaret artiste about whom he quarrelled violently with his cousin Mohammed Abdullah (13). Now never visits the Hejaz.

(7) *Ibrahim Yusuf Zeinal Ali Ridha*.—Eldest son of (5). Is the head of the Bombay branch of the family firm. Rarely visits the Hejaz. Was a member of the Indian Trade Delegation which toured the Middle East in the spring of 1947.

(9) *Ahmed Yusuf Zeinal Ali Ridha*.—Second son of (5). Born about 1920. Works in Jedda and represents the Zeinal interest in the firm of Haji Abdullah Ali Ridha. A pleasant and friendly young man who speaks good Persian and English. Is severely disciplined by his father and rather foxy in his conduct

**80. Bashir as-Sa'dāwi**

A Tripolitan, and fought against the Italians. In 1939 used by Ibn Sa'ud as emissary in Syria and was present at all but the most confidential talks between the King and His Majesty's Minister at Riyādh. Holds no definite post but ranks as one of the King's advisers. Talks Turkish in addition to Arabic but no European language. Was not much in evidence during His Majesty's Minister's visit to Riyādh in March 1942, nor during his visits to the King in the spring of 1944. Accompanied Ibn Sa'ud to Egypt in February 1945 for the meetings with President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill. He was sent to Damascus in February 1946, after accompanying Ibn Saud on the state visit to Egypt, to act as His Majesty's spokesman to the Syrian President on

of affairs. Is extremely proud of his collection of fire-arms and is an open admirer of the Germans.

(11) *Haji Abdullah Ali Ridha*.—Died about 1932. Qaimaqam of Jedda under the Turks, the Sherifs and the Saudis. He was the leader of the Jedda Notables who secured the abdication of King Hussein in 1924, in which he was motivated by the latter's unpleasant habit of continually raising unsecured forced loans from wealthy merchants. When the Saudi Administration started the same practice during the world economic crisis of 1931 he retired to Cairo.

(12) *Sheikh Ali Abdullah Ali Ridha*.—Usually known abroad as Sheikh Ali Ali Reza. Eldest son of (11). Born about 1910. Educated at Victoria College and the University of California. Is married to an American wife, whom he keeps in seclusion. While he is not uninterested in the family business he has mainly devoted himself to politics and diplomacy. He holds the rank of a Saudi-Arabian Minister Plenipotentiary and usually accompanies His Royal Highness the Emir Feisal to New York and London. He is definitely sharp, rather pompous and without a sense of humour. Still plays a good game of cricket which he enjoys.

(13) *Mohammed Abdullah Ali Ridha*.—Full brother to (12). Born about 1913. Is the effective head of the family firm but is reported to have political ambitions. Large, intelligent and friendly and speaks, as do all the younger member of the family, good English. When not in the presence of his uncle (5) smokes a filthy briar pipe almost continuously occasionally changing to large cigars.

(15) *Haji Hussein Ali Ridha*.—Founded a separate provision business which is still known by his name. Dead.

(16) *Ali Hussein Ali Ridha*.—Son of (15) and head of the firm which, though respectably constituted by Jedda standards, is not on any thing like the same scale as Messrs. Haji Abdullah Ali Ridha. He is married to a daughter of Haji Abdullah and has one son, Hussein.

various issues. He was one of the advisers accompanying the Amir Saud to Inshass, May 1946. He especially cultivates the Amir Saud, and seeks to instruct and develop him. His presence in Tripoli seemed useful to the Civil Affairs authorities in Cairo in the summer of 1946, and his application to visit his home was welcomed by them and approved by Ibn Sa'ud. He now spends much time in Egypt. He is a member of the "National Front for Libyan Independence."

Is understood to have struck up a personal friendship with Rashid Ali at the time of the latter's revolt in Iraq, and to have become a close personal friend of Rashid Ali's in Riyādh. Has now however returned to his native land where, during 1950, he has played a prominent part in securing Libyan independence.

81. Násir ibn 'Abdullah ibn 'Aqil

Formerly director of Finance at Jeddah. A cousin of Ibrahim al Suleyman ibn 'Aqil. Believed to have been born in Yenbo. Regarded by the Minister of Finance as a troublesome and talkative man. Now (1950) living in retirement in Medina.

82. Suleyman Nanaih

Director of Coastguards. A Nejdí, like nearly all the rest of the service. Friendly and helpful. Dismissed in May 1944 for incompetence in dealing with the smuggling of gold from the Hejaz, but was reinstated shortly after.

83. 'Abdul 'Aziz ibn Fawzân

Manager of the Royal garage at Riyâdh. A Koweiti by origin who claims, although it is not known on what grounds, to be a British subject. Said to have served with the British Red Cross in Iraq during the war of 1914-18. A fat, sly, talkative man. He likes strong drink and has an inexhaustible fund of humorous reminiscences and anecdotes. During the Yemen war he was in charge, under the Amir Sa'ûd, of the Sa'ûdi army's mechanised transport. Although not likely to become a figure of political importance he is worth mentioning as being on intimate terms with the King and his advisers and as having proved from time to time that he has a pretty accurate knowledge of what goes on in the King's councils. He is much in contact with the Amir Mansûr who frequents the garage. Appointed Deputy Minister of Defence in December 1944 but resigned in January 1945, owing, according to him, to the intrigues of Shaikh Yusuf Yasin. Seems to be genuine in his dislike of the latter as of the rest of the Syrian gang whose influence in the government of the country he constantly deplures. Headed a Purchasing Mission to Cairo, to acquire Disposals Board materials, May 1946.

Appointed Minister Plenipotentiary in 1950 and spends most of his time between Riyadh and Cairo where he acts as Ibn Saud's personal agent.

84. Sharif Mohsin, Qaid

Born about 1897. Trained in the Military College at Bagdad and rose to the rank of captain in the Iraqi army. An exceptionally keen and comparatively efficient officer with considerable personality and intelligence. Has plenty of initiative and ideas but holds the Minister of Defence in such awe that he will not give a decision on even unimportant routine matters before consulting him. He is a hard worker and is anxious to learn. Is at present studying English with the British Military Mission and attends the minor tactics courses and exercises as a student. After a considerable period during which he avoided the British Military Mission entirely he is now co-operating to the best of his ability. An insignificant-looking man who is generally as quiet as a mouse, but who can for brief periods show considerable spirit.

Believed to be generally respected by the Sa'ûdi army and to have the confidence of the Minister of Defence. Latterly, however (1948), he has been jockeyed out of his position, largely, it is believed, as a consequence of the Amir Mansûr's suspicions of the Ashrâf.

Relegated in January 1949 from his position as Chief of Staff to become Head of the Officer's Cadet school with the rank of Colonel.

85. Yahya at-Tarablosi

Effectively Chief of Staff with the rank of Colonel. Born about 1890 in Tripoli from whence he came to Saudi Arabia as a child. Black-skinned and possibly of Berber origin. Possesses no social graces,

smokes heavily and drinks, but possesses the confidence of the Amir Mansour, and has ousted the nominal Chief of Staff, Said al Kurdi (No. 16) and Sharif Mohsin, Qaid (No. 84).

86. Taher Ridhwan

Official in charge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Jeddah, in the absence of Khairuddin as Zuraikli (No. 63) and Yusuf Yasin (No. 59). Syrian origin and believed to be a brother-in-law of Yusuf Yasin's. Aged about 40, somewhat repulsive in appearance with a huge head and a badly deformed leg. Unintelligent and obstinate. Promoted to be Minister Plenipotentiary in late 1950.

87. Abdul Aziz ibn Ibrahim al Mu'ammâr

Son of Ibrahim al Mu'ammâr (No. 34), born about 1923. Educated at the American University, Beirut, where his student activities appear later to have given rise to suspicions of communist sympathy. Formerly the King's interpreter, now the Government liaison official with the American Construction Company, the International Bechtel Inc., in Riyadh. Young, intelligent, Westernised in taste and outlook and friendly he is much above the common run and, with his father's name to help him, seems to be one of the coming men of the younger generation in Saudi Arabia.

88. Ahmed Ashmawi

Formerly a clerk, with Najib Salha (*q.v.*) in Messrs. Gellatly Hankey & Co. (S.A.) Ltd., Ashmawi has worked his way up, with the assistance of war-time profits at the expense of the Middle East Supply Centre, to become a Director of Gellatly Hankeys (Saudi Arabia) Ltd., and the Managing Director of a new and flourishing business in Jeddah, the Saudi Arabian Markets Co.

Born in Suakin in the Sudan, he has spent his life since his school-days in Jeddah and visited the outside world, Egypt, for the first time in 1950—from the flesh-pots of which his associates are having difficulty in retrieving him.

His importance lies in his close business and personal association with Najib Salha and the influence he has built up in Jeddah. Considering his background he is surprisingly Westernised and speaks English fluently.

89. Ibrahim Zahran

A Sudanese, black-skinned and a cousin of Ahmed Ashmawi's (No. 88), Ibrahim Zahran is effectively the senior Sudanese in the Hejaz. He was educated to Secondary School standard in the Sudan and was trained as a clerk in the Netherlands Trading Society (Bank) Jeddah. He is an extremely shrewd, experienced and intelligent business man, and runs his own private banking business in Jeddah. He is also in partnership with Ahmed Ashmawi and a man of some influence in Jeddah.

Thoroughly Westernised in outlook he pays frequent visits to the U.K. and Europe.

90. Amin Shakir

Adviser to the Amir Mansur, Minister of Defence. Born of a Hejazi father and Turkish mother about 1914. Joined Saudi Arabian Army and was trained by the Italian Air Mission in Italy to become a qualified pilot. Speaks good English and French and some German.

91. Muwaffaq al-Alousi

An Iraqi personality who has now become one of the King's personal advisers. At end of 1950 reported to be appointed Saudi Minister in Rome.

92. Jamal Hussein

Relative of and formerly an associate of the Mufti, and a Palestinian personality. Visited Saudi Arabia in 1949 and 1950 and was appointed one of the King's counsellors in Riyadh in August 1950.

93. Ahmed Taufiq

An Egyptian lawyer who came to Saudi Arabia in 1948 and made his name as the negotiator, on behalf of the Saudi Arabian Government, of the Pacific Western Oil Company's concession in the Saudi Arabia/Kuwait Neutral Zone. In securing such extremely favourable terms for the Saudi Arabian Government he is understood to have assumed full powers of negotiation on behalf of the Saudi Arabian Government, without authority, and

to have completely bluffed the inexperienced lawyer sent out by the Oil Company. Since then he has achieved the position of Chief Legal Advisor to the Saudi Arabian Government and personal adviser to the Minister of Finance and to have caused endless trouble to Aramco and other foreign firms in Saudi Arabia. In particular he was responsible for the long-drawn out dispute (1949-50) between Messrs. Gellatly Hankey & Co. (S.A.) Ltd., and the Saudi Arabian Government over the Jeddah-Mecca electrification contracts in the course of which His Majesty's Ambassador had to appeal for the intervention of the King. This intervention and Taufiq's general unpopularity in the country (particularly with Najib Salha) appear now to have effected Taufiq's withdrawal to Egypt. Speaks English: a plausible rogue.

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No. 14

SAUDI ARABIA: HEADS OF FOREIGN MISSIONS*Mr. Riches to Mr. Morrison. (Received 11th July)*

(No. 68. Confidential) *Jedda,*
Sir, *27th June, 1951.*

With reference to Jeddah despatch No. 118 of 20th September, 1950, I have the honour to transmit to you the annual report on the Heads of Foreign Missions in Jeddah.

I have, &c.

D. M. H. RICHES.

Enclosure in No. 14

**Report on Heads of Foreign Missions in Jeddah,
1st July, 1951****Afghanistan**

Seyyid Muhammed Sadaq al Mujaddedi. Minister. Presented his credentials on 1st April, 1935. He is also accredited to Egypt where he normally resides. Seyyid Muhammed Sadaq al Mujaddedi is regarded by the Saudis as a fanatical eccentric. He has only been seen here once since 1947, namely, in March 1950, when he accompanied the King of Afghanistan on the latter's visit to Ibn Saud. He has no staff or premises at Jeddah.

Argentina

On the departure of the former minister Dr. Antonio Guffanti in October 1949, the legation was left in the charge of a *Depositaire des Archives* called M. Carlos Alberto Stegmann. The latter has now left Jeddah and it may be assumed that the Argentine mission to Saudi Arabia has ceased to exist, though no formal announcement has been made.

Belgium

(See Netherlands.)

China

The Chinese Government has maintained a building in Jeddah but their consul normally only appears during the pilgrimage season. Dr. Wang, of the Chinese Consulate at Cairo did not visit Jeddah in 1950; as a Nationalist he presumably has no standing in relation to any pilgrims from the Chinese

mainland who may arrive and it is most unlikely that the Saudis would accept a Communist nominee in his place.

Egypt

M. el Hussein el Khatib. Minister.

M. el Khatib was appointed in December 1950, but has not yet appeared at Jeddah. His previous post was Warsaw where he was chargé d'affaires. The latest in an undistinguished line of chargé d'affaires at Jeddah is a 3rd secretary called Abdul Hamid Ragheb.

Ethiopia

M. Taffassa Habt Mikael. Minister.

Presented his credentials on 25th May, 1949. He is also Ethiopian Minister in Cairo and has not reappeared in Jeddah. A Saudi national named Mohammed Gabil was appointed honorary consul late in 1949.

France

M. Georges Gueyraud. Minister.

Presented his credentials on 13th June, 1949. He is also accredited to the Yemen, which he visited for some weeks early in 1950.

The French Legation became noticeably more effective in the 18 months following his arrival and this was accompanied by a modest growth of French commercial influence. For this, however, I fear that M. Gueyraud can claim little credit, the rise in French stock being almost entirely the work of the counsellor, M. Jean Legrain, who left Jeddah in the autumn of 1950.

M. Gueyraud is a disappointment. In professional dealings he has proved to be uncommunicative, unreliable and protocolaire; and he seems to retain some suspicion of the English from the time when he was allegedly *attentiste* during the war. He is also a hypochondriac and his relations with his staff are poor.

Madame Gueyraud is an ambitious and forceful woman both more effective and more popular with the foreign community than her husband.

Indonesia

Dr. Mohammed Rasjidi. Minister.

Presented his credentials on 26th April, 1950. He is also accredited to Egypt and pays only brief visits

to the Hejaz. He seems a quiet and agreeable if somewhat diffident man. In his absence his 2nd secretary, Imron Rosjadi, who is pleasant and apparently competent, acts as chargé d'affaires.

Iraq

Since the departure of As-Sayyid Ismail Hajji Ibrahim al Agha in November 1947, no Iraqi Minister has been appointed to Jedda. The present chargé d'affaires is a diminutive, well-educated and agreeable 2nd secretary called Mohammed Safwat.

Italy

Sgr. Ugo Turcato. Minister.
Presented his credentials on 17th November, 1949. He is also accredited to the Yemen which he visited for a few weeks in 1950. He has had fairly wide diplomatic experience before Jedda and has also served in Nairobi. He and his cheerful wife have proved good colleagues, though his slight knowledge of English and his apparent dislike of the French have handicapped him to some extent at this post.

Jordan

Ali Bey Sayido. Chargé d'Affaires.
Arrived 1950. A learned and agreeable man educated partly in Jerusalem and speaks good English. Though he appears to have little to do here, he seems to have established good personal relations with the Saudis and has proved a good colleague.

Lebanon

Shaikh Sami el Khoury. Minister.
A relative of the Lebanese President, Shaikh Sami presented his letters of credence on 11th March, 1946. He is also Minister to Cairo where he spends most of his time, paying perhaps two visits to Jedda with his wife every year.
The present chargé d'affaires, M. Ghaleb Turc, arrived in Jedda on 28th October, 1950. He is a pleasant, hospitable and well-educated man and an extremely good tennis player and mixes more with the European community than any other Muslim diplomat at Jedda. His relations with the Saudis are good. His wife has gradually come to defy the unwritten law by which Muslim diplomats' wives, however free in their own countries, avoid public and social appearances while in Jedda.

Netherlands

M. Hendick Entrop. Consul.
When the Netherlands Legation gave place to the Indonesian Legation in May 1950, Dutch diplomatic interests were formally left in charge of the Indonesian Minister. At the same time, however, M. Hendick Entrop, director of the Netherlands Trading Society at Jedda, was appointed honorary Netherlands Consul and performs what services are required of him in that capacity.
He is also honorary Belgian Consul.

Persia

Mohammed Saadat. Chargé d'Affaires since September, 1950.

Mohammed Saadat is a portly, stiff and lugubrious man. He speaks French and a certain amount of Arabic but does not appear very much in public. Except at pilgrimage time he has nothing of significance to do.

Spain

Since the suicide of the last chargé d'affaires in January 1951, there has been no Spanish representative resident here. I understand, though I have received no official notification, that the Spanish Ambassador at Cairo, Don Domingo de las Barcenas has also been appointed Spanish Minister to Saudi Arabia.

Syria

Jawad Bey al Murabit. Minister.
Presented his credentials on 22nd February, 1950. He had little or no previous experience of diplomacy, having been in the police before entering his country's foreign service. He speaks French and is said to be a very devout Muslim. He is an agreeable if rarely seen colleague and his relations with the Saudi Arabian Government appear to be good, though he has been unable to persuade them to pay the second instalment of the dollar loan which Saudi Arabia made with a great flourish to Syria in the early part of 1950.

Turkey

M. Cevdet Dulger. Minister.
Presented his credentials on 15th March, 1951. He is aged about 50 and has had considerable experience both in the Middle East and in Europe, having been, among other things, consul-general at both Paris and Brussels, before becoming 2nd assistant secretary-general to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Though I understand that he did not relish his present appointment when it was made, he has proved a most agreeable colleague. He is always cheerful and despite his considerable bulk manages to take part in tennis matches and other pursuits involving physical exertion. He is one of the most co-operative of heads of missions here in anything involving concerted action with his colleagues or with the foreign community in general.

United States

Mr Raymond A. Hare. Ambassador.
Presented his credentials on 24th October, 1950. He is a career diplomat of very wide experience in the Middle East, London and elsewhere and, as deputy director of the Office of Middle Eastern Affairs, his last appointment before Jedda, he spent two years as assistant to Mr. George McGhee, Assistant Secretary of State, most of whose ideas on international affairs, and the Middle East in particular, he appears to share. Unlike his predecessor, he seems to believe in extensive aid with few strings to countries such as Saudi Arabia, and is an enthusiastic believer in the principle of Point Four. A very agreeable and cultured man, he has proved to be an excellent colleague with whom all matters of common interest can be discussed freely without fear of any confidence being violated or misunderstanding arising.

CHAPTER III.—THE YEMEN

EA 1051/65

No. 15

POLICY OF HIS MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT TOWARDS THE YEMEN

Mr. Eden to Mr. Jacomb (San'a)

(No. 4. Secret) Foreign Office,
Sir, 8th December, 1951

On your appointment as His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires *a.i.* in the Yemen, I wish to set out the main objectives of His Majesty's Government's policy towards the Yemen and to give you guidance as to the course you should adopt during the interim period before the appointment of a Minister at San'a.

2. It will be your first duty to establish as close and friendly relations as possible with the Imam and with the members of the Yemeni Government, in order to prepare the way for the appointment of His Majesty's Minister, and to ensure that His Majesty's Government's point of view is represented to the Yemeni Government and their interests defended.

3. You are already familiar with the events which led to a serious deterioration in Anglo-Yemen relations during 1949, to the subsequent invitation by His Majesty's Government to the Yemeni Government to send a Mission to London in 1950 to discuss matters outstanding between the two Governments, and to the conclusion of the *modus vivendi* signed on 20th January, 1951. By this instrument, taken in conjunction with the Anglo-Yemen Treaty of San'a of 1934, His Majesty's Government's relations with the Government of the Yemen are regulated.

4. United Kingdom interests in the Yemen are at present small and seem likely to remain so unless and until oil or other important mineral deposits may be found in that country. Failing such a development, the policy of His Majesty's Government towards the Yemen must be primarily concerned, negatively, with the avoidance of any friction, particularly along the frontier between the Yemen and the Aden Protectorate, which might be liable to induce the Yemeni Government to make trouble for His Majesty's Government either in the United Nations or in the Arab League, and, positively, with the establishment and maintenance of the best possible relations with the Yemeni Government.

5. It seems probable that for some time to come at least most of your efforts will

have to be directed towards the attainment of the former objective. The Yemeni Government's pretensions to sovereignty over large areas of the Aden Protectorate are already known to you. I am advised that these pretensions could well be resisted in international law, and I have consequently no intention of admitting any part of them. It is, however, to be anticipated that the Yemeni Government will from time to time revert to them, and may also encourage or connive at encroachments on Aden Protectorate territory in the frontier areas. It will be your duty, in close co-operation with His Excellency the Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Aden, to make prompt and firm representations to the Yemeni Government when appropriate and, failing satisfaction, to report the matter to me for instructions. Any communications you may have occasion to address to the Governor of Aden on such matters should in general be repeated to me. It is, however, my hope that your personal relations with the Yemeni authorities will enable you to dissipate misunderstandings, especially those based on false information, and thus to contribute to the speedy liquidation of incidents of minor importance.

6. In this connexion, it is necessary here to consider the relevant articles of the Anglo-Yemeni *modus vivendi* of 1951. With the establishment of His Majesty's Legation at San'a and of a Yemeni Minister in London, Article 1 of this instrument has been carried out. His Majesty's Government's policy in regard to the remaining Articles is as set out below.

7. Articles 3 to 7: His Majesty's Government have agreed to the establishment of a frontier commission with the terms of reference defined in Article 3 of the Agreement. Pending further instructions, however, you should not press the Yemeni Government to implement this decision, since it appears that a gradual stabilisation of the position on the frontier is in fact taking place, and the Yemeni Government themselves have so far shown no disposition to see the commission established in the immediate future. There may be considerable advantage in allowing

matters to follow this course, since it is unlikely that the commission will be able to agree on many of the points at issue, and it seems advisable that controversies, which might otherwise die down as a result of the better relations which you will promote, should be unnecessarily revived. Nevertheless, if the Yemeni Government should raise the matter, you should inform them that His Majesty's Government stand ready to implement these Articles if the Yemeni Government so desire, and will be glad to entertain any proposals which may be put forward.

8. Article 6 of the Agreement merits special attention, and it is here necessary to make reference to Article 3 of the Anglo-Yemeni Treaty of 1934, which refers also to the maintenance of the *status quo*. Despite this similarity, a clear distinction must be drawn between Article 3 of the 1934 Treaty and Article 6 of the 1951 Agreement. The former, as is plainly stated in the text, refers only to the maintenance of the *status quo* in regard to the frontier. The Yemeni Government has persistently sought to maintain an interpretation of this Article whereby the maintenance of the *status quo* should apply not only to the frontier line itself but also the entire frontier areas on the Aden side of the boundary. Their attitude has been that while they have been prepared to leave their claims to the Protectorate territory beyond the frontier in abeyance for the time being, those claims nevertheless remain, and therefore the Aden authorities must refrain from taking any action in the frontier areas which might tend to consolidate their position there and prejudice eventual Yemeni claims. His Majesty's Government have always taken the line that such an interpretation is inadmissible from the text of the clause of the Article in question, which must be construed as referring to the frontier line only, and they have consequently refused to entertain any Yemeni complaints about internal measures in the Aden Protectorate which the Yemeni Government have based on their interpretation of this Article.

9. Article 6 of the 1951 Agreement, however, does provide that, pending the conclusion of the work of the frontier commission, both Governments will refrain from taking any action which may alter the *status quo* existing in the disputed areas at the time of the signature of the 1951 Agreement. In His Majesty's Government's view, this provision applies only to places in the immediate vicinity of the frontier, particu-

larly those which were the subject of discussion during the Anglo-Yemeni Conference of 1950. His Majesty's Government and the authorities at Aden have faithfully observed the provisions of this Article and will continue to do so.

10. Article 8: The Yemeni Government, basing themselves on this Article, have made frequent complaints about anti-Yemeni propaganda in a newspaper published at Cardiff and in newspapers at Aden. Until now, His Majesty's Government have been able to offer no satisfaction on this score, since the Article in question provides that such propaganda should be checked within the framework of the existing law of the country concerned. Thus, in view of the tradition of free speech in the United Kingdom and the territories which it administers abroad, and the strict legal protection which it is accorded, it has not been possible or desirable for His Majesty's Government to intervene in the cases raised, particularly since no question of active incitement to sedition was involved. It is probable that you will find the Imam particularly sensitive on this point, and you should answer any representations which may be made to you in the foregoing sense.

11. Article 9: During the Conference of 1950, the Yemeni Delegation showed some anxiety to provide for the conclusion of an extradition agreement covering the Yemeni and the Aden Protectorate. You should know that this subject is one involving delicate legal difficulties for His Majesty's Government, and we are consequently not anxious to revive discussion of it. You should do what you can to discourage the Yemeni Government from pursuing it, should they show a disposition to revert to the matter.

12. I turn now to the positive side of His Majesty's Government's policy. Article 2 of the *modus vivendi* refers to assistance by His Majesty's Government to the Yemeni Government in economic and technical matters. It is not the intention that His Majesty's Government should furnish financial assistance to the Yemeni Government, but that the services of the experts in the British Middle East Office should be offered to investigate questions on which the Yemeni Government think that such assistance would be valuable, and to facilitate the implementation of any recommendations that these experts may make by putting the Yemeni authorities in touch with commercial enterprises in the United Kingdom who might be prepared to carry out the work

involved. An example of the form which assistance to the Yemeni Government under this Article may take was the provision in August of this year of medical supplies to combat an outbreak of plague, as a result of an urgent request by the Yemeni Government. On that occasion, it was possible to make a free gift of those supplies, but the Yemeni authorities should not be encouraged to expect that this will be so in every case. On all such matters you should keep in close touch with the Head of the British Middle East Office.

13. Finally, it should be noted that, owing to the previous inaccessibility of the Yemen, little information exists regarding the internal conditions of this country and it is desirable that this information should be supplemented and built up so far as conditions allow. You should, however, bear in mind that the isolation in which the population has hitherto lived, and the suspicions of foreign influence which are believed to be prevalent, are likely to make it necessary for you to proceed with considerable caution in extending your knowledge of the country by journeys and personal contacts. You should be careful to keep in the closest possible touch with the appropriate Yemen authorities and to do everything in your power to avoid rousing suspicions that any journeys or enquiries which you may think it necessary to undertake have any motives other than the gathering of information. This applies particularly to the areas

adjacent to the frontier with the Aden Protectorate. It seems probable that the provision of technical assistance referred to in the previous paragraph may on occasion provide useful opportunities for such journeys or contacts.

14. To sum up, your objectives during the coming months should be—

- (a) to establish the closest possible contact with the Imam and his Ministers with a view to:
 - (i) resolving causes of friction, particularly in regard to the frontier with the Aden Protectorate; and
 - (ii) preparing the way for an eventual settlement of the frontier question between the two Governments;
- (b) to prepare the way for the establishment of a duly accredited Minister to the Yemen;
- (c) provide openings for technical and economic assistance which will facilitate the enhancement of British influence in the Yemen;
- (d) amass information on internal conditions in the Yemen.

15. Copies of this despatch are being sent to His Excellency the Governor of Aden and the Head of the British Middle East Office.
I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

EA 1051/70

No. 16

CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE AND THE
YEMENI MINISTER

(1) Anglo-Yemeni Relations ; (2) Frontier Problems ; (3) Anglo-Egyptian
Relations

Mr. Eden to Mr. Jacomb (Taiz)

(No. 5. Confidential) Foreign Office,
Sir, 14th December, 1951.

The Yemeni Minister, accompanied by Talaat Bey Ghoussein of the Yemeni Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly, called on me to-day.

2. I told his Excellency that I much regretted that I had not been able to see him during my visits to the United Nations meetings in Paris, but that I was glad to have this opportunity of meeting him in London. I was pleased to hear of the growing friendship between our two

countries and was grateful for the contribution which his Excellency had made to this improvement in our relations. The Minister said that His Majesty the King of the Yemen was personally anxious that our relations should continue to improve, and he had taken the step of establishing diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom towards this end. The present Imam was the first ruler of the Yemen to enter into diplomatic relations with foreign countries, and he had encountered a certain amount of opposition to this measure. I told the Minister that I

was sure that His Majesty's decision was a wise one and that we for our part would do our best to let it be seen that this was so.

3. The Minister said that the Yemeni Government viewed with some concern certain actions recently taken by the Governor of Aden in areas of the Aden Protectorate close to the Yemeni frontier. His Government were anxious that nothing should be done which might disturb the *status quo* in those areas until the Frontier Commission, which had been agreed upon at the Anglo-Yemeni Conference of 1950, began its work. I told his Excellency that we had regarded the exchange of diplomatic representatives as the first step to be taken to give effect to the agreement of January 1951. But now that this had been taken we were ready to discuss arrangements for the beginning of the Frontier Commission's work. I hoped that the commission would

be able to regulate the difficult problem of the frontier and so create a better atmosphere for our relations.

4. His Excellency mentioned our difficulties with Egypt. I told him that I much regretted the recent deterioration in Anglo-Egyptian relations. I was willing to accept the position that the Egyptian Government wished to see a revision of the Treaty of 1936, and, indeed, we had made some very reasonable proposals to them for a revision. It was my aim to persuade them to reopen conversations so that we might discuss the possibility of finding a solution acceptable to both sides.

I am sending copies of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Cairo, the Governor of Aden and the Head of the British Middle East Office.

I am, &c.

ANTHONY EDEN.

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